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Why Paris?1 Why France? I’ve been asked those questions more times I can 
 remember—even before I entered graduate school. I always think my interest in 
France is a boring or ordinary story. I quickly fell in love with the French language 
as a middle school student, even though the language was somewhat difficult to 
master. I continued to study French throughout high school. I became very curi-
ous about visiting France and getting an opportunity to speak French with French 
people living in France. I finally got that chance when I enrolled in a study abroad 
program my junior year in college. And for someone who did not have the oppor-
tunity to travel much growing up, my world opened. Not only did I become fluent 
in French by living with a family in Paris and taking courses at Paris 7 (one of the 
University of Paris campuses in the Latin Quarter) and the Institut Catholique de 
Paris, I felt a new sense of independence.
I quickly realized that I was in France not only as an American citizen but also 
as a black American. I saw this in the way I was treated, the questions people asked 
me. I remember being one of the only African-Americans in my study abroad 
program. I remember struggling to find a salon where I could get my hair relaxed. 
And I thought about the complexity of my experiences—having simultaneously 
the privilege of being American and the complications of being black. The French, 
influenced by various stereotypes and images (both positive and negative) circu-
lating in the media, asked me questions about being American, while shopkeep-
ers followed me around in stores. One day when I was on one of my long walks 
across the city, I came across Tyler Stovall’s Paris Noir: African Americans in the 
City of Light (1996) and began to appreciate how I was part of long line of African-
Americans living in Paris for long periods, such as James Baldwin, Duke Ellington, 
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and Richard Wright, and how being Black in Paris made apparent many of the 
contradictions of the French Republic.
My fascination and interest in Paris, and France more generally, only deepened 
as I started to apply my “sociological imagination” to my experiences and observa-
tions about race, ethnicity, and identity in France. Such observations stayed with 
me long after my study abroad experience, to when I entered graduate school and 
started to consider what other scholars had written related to these topics. I found 
my population to study—children of North African immigrants, or descendants 
of the French colonial empire in the Maghreb, who were born and had known 
only France yet were positioned outside of it. Through my ethnographic research, 
I learned about much more than this population. Among other things, I learned 
fundamentally about how race and ethnicity continue to separate and mark indi-
viduals as different in both the United States and France.
I hope that the following pages do justice to the long history of black scholars 
writing about other communities on the margins.
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1
North African Origins in and of the 
French Republic
The Republic makes no distinction among its children.
—Manuel Valls, former French prime minister1
Look at the Gare du Nord.2 You no longer have the impression of being in 
France, you have the impression of being in Africa. No, really. . . . You arrive 
at Gare du Nord, it’s Africa, it’s no longer France. We don’t have the right to 
say that, but I’ll say it because it’s true.
—Nadine Morano, Les Républicains party politician3
A tall, muscular man with tousled dark brown hair, Abdelkrim met me one after-
noon in March of 2009 at a Starbucks in the quartier (neighborhood) of Montpar-
nasse and told me he identifies with Bruce Lee, the Hong Kong–American martial 
artist and action-film star. “He was too American for the Chinese and too Chinese 
for Americans,” he explained between sips of his espresso.4,5 Despite his successes, 
Bruce Lee was caught between American and Chinese cultures, and never con-
sidered as belonging to either. Abdelkrim completely relates to this dualism; he 
too feels that he is too French for Maghrébins and too maghrébin for the French.6
Abdelkrim similarly told me about reading The Autobiography of Malcolm X 
as a teenager, and how Malcolm’s struggles to be accepted as a black man in white 
America deeply resonate with him. A thirty-two-year-old with dual French and 
Algerian citizenship, Abdelkrim boasts that he was born in the same town in cen-
tral France, Châteauroux, as French actor Gérard Depardieu and is just as French 
as Depardieu is.
The story of Abdelkrim’s parents’ immigration to France from Algeria is distinc-
tive when compared with that of other North African immigrants. Whereas many 
maghrébin immigrants came to France primarily for economic reasons in the 
immediate postcolonial period, Abdelkrim’s parents, who are bilingual in French 
and Arabic, came for political ones. They arrived in the late 1960s from Algiers, 
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the capital city of Algeria, after the nation won its independence from France in 
1962. His father was active in the Front de libération nationale, a socialist political 
party fighting for Algerian independence. After the war, he became disenchanted 
with living in Algeria because of the instability in the country brought about by 
Algeria’s new political system. He eventually married Abdelkrim’s mother and had 
five children, and the entire family then immigrated to France. Abdelkrim’s father 
became a maintenance worker at a habitation à loyer modéré (subsidized housing, 
or HLM) complex, and his mother was a homemaker. They had three additional 
children after immigrating to France—including Abdelkrim, who is the youngest 
of the eight. Abdelkrim grew up in a Muslim household, and though as an adult he 
celebrates Ramadan with his family, he does not otherwise engage in Muslim prac-
tices. He also believes religion should be a private affair, per French  Republican 
ideology.
When Abdelkrim was growing up, his parents actively engaged with his school-
ing and communicated with his teachers, thanks to their fluency in French. Though 
neither attended school past the age of fourteen, they engaged in self-education 
afterward. In their predominately immigrant neighborhood, it was Abdelkrim’s 
parents who helped neighborhood residents who could not read or write with 
their “daily round” (Logan and Molotch 1987), whether it was going to doctor’s 
appointments or having conferences with teachers.
In this context, Abdelkrim does not remember feeling particularly different 
from others because of his maghrébin origins growing up, until he attended a 
middle school outside his neighborhood, where there were fewer nonwhites and 
immigrant-origin individuals. “That is when everything changed,” he recalls, “You 
discovered others and they discovered you. And we didn’t have the same life.” 
Sometimes he became friends with people different from him; oftentimes he did 
not. As Abdelkrim had more and more interactions with people outside his neigh-
borhood, his visibility as a maghrébin-origin individual and how that marked him 
as different became increasingly apparent to him. Growing up as a nonwhite per-
son in France, Abdelkrim has since struggled to come to terms with his identity.
He later attended a university in Tours, a town in central France’s Loire valley, 
to please his mother, who wanted him to become a lawyer. He remembers there 
being only two other ethnic minorities there and feeling he had to stick with them 
to survive. On two separate occasions, he was physically attacked and called ethnic 
slurs by other students. Abdelkrim eventually left law school and has since become 
an accomplished freelance journalist, which he feels is his calling.
Still, despite his successes and his attainment of a middle-class status, he finds 
that many of his fellow citizens do not accept him as French. He usually has an 
acute sense of being French only when he is traveling internationally, as opposed 
to when he is in France. He remembers traveling to London when he was twenty-
four years old and meeting some African Americans. Upon telling them that he 
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was maghrébin and Algerian, they informed him that he was French. “They just 
kept telling me that I am from France, so I am French,” he recalled. It seemed so 
logical to them, yet this logic is not so easily accepted in French society.
This disconnect between where he was born and how he is perceived is the real-
ity for racial and ethnic minorities born in France to immigrant parents.
And that is the subject of this book, Citizen Outsider: Children of North African 
Immigrants in the France. Based on ethnographic research, including interviews, 
in the Paris metropolitan area, I address the following questions: How do eth-
nic minorities in France contend with implicitly race-based definitions of what 
it means to be French? How do upwardly-mobile and middle-class maghrébin-
origin individuals perceive the possibilities for participating fully in the French 
mainstream? Decades after the end of France’s brutal colonial empire in the North 
African countries of Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco, what is the legacy of this 
empire for the immigrant-origin population, born and raised in France to parents 
who emigrated for better opportunities, and what are the everyday sociopoliti-
cal realities it faces? How do individuals who are citizens remain on the margins 
of mainstream society, and what does this reveal about how race and ethnicity, 
including differences based on them, operate in practice?
Despite former Prime Minister Manuel Valls and other French politicians’ 
declarations that there is no differential treatment in France, the experiences of 
Abdelkrim and other children of North African immigrants reveal how this con-
clusion is wrong. Differential treatment and exclusion are based on racial and eth-
nic status; individuals like Abdelkrim are marginalized because they are nonwhite. 
Even if Abdelkrim and others like him feel French, claiming French identity rests 
in the degree to which individuals perceive them as French. They hit a glass ceil-
ing: France’s imagined community (Anderson 1991) does not include them. Much 
research on the second generation in Europe and the United States focuses on the 
degree to which they are assimilated, acculturated, or integrated, particularly in 
terms of specific outcomes, such as educational attainment or labor force partici-
pation (Alba and Foner 2015; Alba and Waters 2011; Crul and Mollenkopf 2012; 
Waters 2000; Waters et al. 2010; Zhou 1997; Zhou and Lee 2007). Yet while all 
these terms may apply to Abdelkrim—for example, in his educational attainment 
and achievement of a middle-class status—he is still alienated from mainstream 
French society because he is nonwhite. As such, a focus on the second generation 
through the lens of assimilation or integration is insufficient.
This book specifically focuses on the middle-class segment of the North 
 African second generation—those individuals who have achieved upward mobil-
ity  vis-à-vis their immigrant parents. This is the first ethnographic account of this 
segment of the second-generation population. It connects to a growing litera-
ture on middle-class subaltern minorities worldwide. Instead of just focusing on 
their outcomes, particularly relating to educational attainment and employment 
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patterns, I focus on their experience as an ethnic minority, including the processes 
embedded within that experience, in a national context that does not recognize 
minorities based on ethnic origin or have a language or framework for making 
sense of them.
In doing so, I lay to rest the notion of a French exceptionalism regarding distinc-
tions based on race and ethnicity. I examine how a population that is legally and 
technically French is not considered culturally French, and is therefore excluded 
from popular imaginations of who a French person is. This reveals how race, eth-
nicity, and culture intersect in determining who is a citizen of the nation-state and 
who can claim a French identity.
The continually reinforced rejection by mainstream society experienced by 
Abdelkrim and others belies previous conclusions about the salience of race and 
ethnicity as markers of difference in France. By traditional measures, many chil-
dren of North African immigrants, or the North African second generation, as 
I also refer to them, are assimilated (Portes and Zhou 1993).7 The individuals 
I discuss in this book were educated at French schools and universities. Their 
native tongue is French. They are French citizens. While their middle-class sta-
tus might suggest a triumph of France’s Republican model, which purports to 
downplay distinctions based on identity among citizens, this population’s con-
tinued experiences of exclusion and discrimination challenge this straightfor-
ward conclusion.
I frame these individuals as “citizen outsiders”—a framework rooted in early 
works by black scholars such as Audre Lorde (2007), W. E. B. DuBois ([1903] 1994) 
and Frantz Fanon (1967) and recently coined by political scientist Cathy Cohen 
(2010)—in that they are simultaneously members of a society yet kept on the 
margins of that society. I further use the framework of “cultural citizenship” as a 
corrective to theories of immigrant incorporation and assimilation, as well as to 
illustrate how difference is implicitly marked among individuals without explicit 
designations by the state. Individuals who are technically citizens are not treated 
as full citizens because of their assigned otherness as racial and ethnic minori-
ties. Members of this French-born population find that they cannot escape this 
assigned otherness. Because of their North African origins, they have been denied 
cultural citizenship, which signifies a claim to societal belonging that is accepted 
by others, enabling children of North African immigrants to traverse the cultural-
symbolic boundaries of French identity and be considered truly French.
These individuals’ marginalization reveals both how race and ethnicity remain 
significant in shaping life circumstances in French society and how citizen-
ship status is not a sufficient boundary defining insiders and outsiders. Rather, 
acceptance as a fellow citizen is inextricably linked to boundaries around French 
identity marked by race and ethnicity. Despite promoting a colorblind ideology, 


















6    Introduction
differentiation between nonwhite individuals and the rest of French society, no 
matter how much the North African second generation seeks to challenge that.
The question of who makes up a nation, the role of race and ethnicity in this 
definition, and what happens to those individuals excluded from that definition, 
is, of course, not limited to France. The experiences of children of North Afri-
can immigrants have implications for other racial and ethnic minority popula-
tions worldwide, including, but not limited to, second-generation immigrants in 
the United States such as West Indians (Waters 2000) and Mexicans (Portes and 
 Rumbaut 2001), middle-class African Americans (Carter 2005; Frazier 1957; Lacy 
2007; Pattillo 2007; Pattillo-McCoy 1999), middle-class Dutch women of Surinam-
ese descent in the Netherlands (Essed 1991), and the Turkish second generation in 
Western Europe (Fleischmann et al. 2011). Ultimately, for populations designated 
as “other” or treated as outsiders, including the North African second generation, 
citizenship, or being a citizen, does not sufficiently allow for traversing boundaries 
of full societal inclusion.
In this chapter, I present a historical background on French Republicanism and 
North African immigration to France that contextualizes the contemporary expe-
riences of the middle-class adult children of North African immigrants whom 
I studied. I then provide an overview of our existing knowledge of the North 
 African second generation. Next, I discuss how, despite the middle-class status of 
this population, its members remain marginalized because they are nonwhite. I 
further discuss France’s “racial project” (per Omi and Winant’s 1994 formulation) 
and how race and ethnicity operate in France, without state-level designations. 
Extending from this, I discuss the framework of cultural citizenship, the denial of 
which is evidence of France’s racial project. I finally discuss the methods of this 
study and provide a brief overview of subsequent chapters.
FROM THE MAGHREB TO FR ANCE
Despite a long history of immigration and colonialism, France rarely acknowl-
edges that history, invoking its Republican ideology to preserve the status quo 
and promote a monolithic version of French identity and history (Barou 2014; 
Noiriel 1996; Thomas 2007). But France has never been the uniform entity that 
the Republican model would suggest (Chabal 2015). For example, about 25 percent 
of the French population has at least one parent or grandparent who immigrated 
to France (from any country) (Barou 2014). More recently, according to the Insti-
tut national de la statistique et des études économiques (National Institute of Sta-
tistics and Economic Studies, or INSEE), which conducts the census, as of 2014, 
immigrants comprise 8.6 percent of the total French population (Brutel 2015). 
Immigration has long been framed as a social problem that threatens French 
national identity (Tetreault 2013).
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Under the Republican model, France emphasizes citizenship as the connecting 
factor among her citizens over any other characteristic and conceives of its identity 
in national and civic, rather than ethnic, terms, an emphasis dating from before 
the French Revolution (Bell 2003). The state interacts with individuals indepen-
dent of any group categorization or special interest group (Amselle 2003; Chap-
man and Frader 2004; Oberti 2007; Tetreault 2013).8 Republicanism in France is 
based on equality before the law, individual emancipation (or a rejection of com-
munautarisme9), jus solis (based on place of birth) and jus sanguinis (based on 
parental origins) citizenship, laïcité, and cultural assimilation (d’Appollonia 2009).
Established by law in 1905, laïcité is the French term for the separation of church 
and state.10 It has often been employed to stress the assimilation of immigrant-
origin individuals (Bowen 2006; Kuru 2008). The French state cannot promote 
any individual religion, and individuals are encouraged to keep their religious 
affiliations to themselves (Bowen 2004b).11 The distinction between the public and 
private spheres is emphasized; any difference should be relegated to the private 
sphere (Escafré-Dublet and Kastoryano 2012; Kastoryano and Escafré-Dublet 
2012). Some scholars have noted the role that religion, particularly Catholicism, 
has played in the development of French Republican society (Gray 2008; Laborde 
2008), despite France’s emphasis on laïcité.12
Being French is supposed to supersede all other identities and identifications, 
including ethnic, racial, religious, linguistic, and regional. The creation of France 
as a nation rested in subsuming such identifications. French philosopher Ernest 
Renan’s lecture at the Sorbonne famously asked the question, “Qu’est-ce qu’une 
nation?” (What is a nation?) ([1887] 1992). He emphasized the solidarity among 
individuals—and the sacrifices citizens make on behalf of that solidarity—over 
language, race, religion, or geography (Cartrite 2009). It is these commonalities 
that are supposed to constitute France as a nation and bring its members together. 
In this “indivisible” Republic, acknowledging differences regarding identity and 
recognizing racial and ethnic diversity threatens the disruption of the Republi-
can model (Cooper 2014; Kastoryano and Escafré-Dublet 2012). Acknowledging 
difference is viewed as propagating difference. In fact, the United States is often 
framed as an example of this danger, in that an identity politics based on multi-
culturalism hinders the fostering of a unified and centralized national community 
(Chabal 2015).
Despite the Republican emphasis on the renunciation of racial and ethnic cat-
egorization, scholars have argued that France has long relied on racial and ethnic 
boundaries in constructing its national identity (Chapman and Frader 2004; Kas-
toryano 2004; Peabody and Stovall 2003; Wieviorka 1992). According to French 
historian Gérard Noiriel (1996), immigration has been an elemental feature of the 
construction of the distinction between “us” and “them” in the creation of the 
French nation.13 The Republican model, in fact, marks difference, even without 
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officially acknowledging it (Chapman and Frader 2004; Fernando 2009; Laborde 
2008; Schneider 2008; Wilder 2007). Moreover, French identity has long been 
implicitly framed as white (Constant 2009; Peabody and Stovall 2003). Ideologies 
of racial inferiority were used to justify France’s imperialism in the Maghreb and 
other regions. To give one example, aristocrat Arthur de Gobineau’s 1884 Essai 
sur l’inégalité des races humaines (Essay on the Inequality of the Human Races) 
asserted the biological and cultural superiority of Europeans over blacks, who 
were described as animal-like subjects and belonging to the lowest racial category 
(Thomas 2007; Winant 2001; Wright 2004).14
France’s colonial empire served to reify the boundary between French and 
“other” and highlighted the contradictions embedded within French Repub-
licanism (Kastoryano and Escafré-Dublet 2012).15 France’s relationship with the 
Maghreb began with the colonization of Algeria in 1830, of Tunisia in 1831, and of 
Morocco in 1912. Tunisia and Morocco were French protectorates, while Algeria 
was considered an overseas territory of France. Tunisia and Morocco remained 
in French control until 1956, and Algeria remained in French control until 1962. 
Colonialism in the Maghreb created a differential status for those of North African 
origin, which has ramifications for descendants of immigrants from those French 
colonies today.16 North Africans were framed as culturally distinct from the French 
colonialists, an attitude that persists in the postcolonial period (Kastoryano and 
Escafré-Dublet 2012).
Though emigration from the Maghreb to France began as early as the early 
1900s, World War I brought immigrants from these French colonies en masse to 
France for work (Barou 2014; Kaya 2009).17 It was expected that these immigrants 
would be temporary residents (Winant 2001). In many cities, including Paris, 
immigrant workers settled in the outlying banlieues (suburbs), owing to the pres-
ence of cheaper housing and factory employment (Esman 2009; Stovall 2003).18 
Often these immigrants “were marginalized and excluded from full participation 
in French society. Economically they frequently performed the dirtiest and most 
menial tasks; legally they were disadvantaged as they were not French citizens and 
therefore did not have the same rights as the French; socially and geographically 
they were confined to areas on the outskirts of major cities” (Silverman 1992, 46). 
Moreover, they were treated worse than immigrants from European countries 
(Barou 2014). The numbers of North African immigrants continued to increase 
after World War II, the end of the Fourth Republic in 1958, and the Algerian War 
of Independence in 1962.19 Within a decade, by the early 1970s, there were more 
than 800,000 immigrants from Algeria alone (Silverstein 2008).
This growth in the number of North African immigrants saw more of them 
living in an HLM (subsidized housing) complex in the banlieues, as opposed to 
the bidonvilles (shantytowns), where they had lived previously (Dikeç 2007; Harg-
reaves 1996; Silverstein 2008; Weir 1993). As more and more middle-class Français 
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de souche (white native French) moved from HLMs to private housing because of 
low-interest loans provided by the French government in the early 1970s, HLMs 
and banlieues became even more associated with North African and sub-Saharan 
African immigrant-origin individuals (Barou 2014; Simon 1998; Tissot 2008).20,21,22 
Owing to an economic recession and declining employment opportunities, the 
French government temporarily suspended immigration of non-European low-
skilled workers in 1974 (Stovall 2003).23 However, this led to migrant workers set-
tling permanently with their families in France, as opposed to returning to their 
countries of origin (Barou 2014; Body-Gendrot 1993; Kaya 2009). According 
to INSEE, more than half of the immigrants who arrived before 1974 came for 
employment; one-third came to join their husbands or family. The North  African 
second generation descended primarily from this population (Silberman et al. 
2007).
Government policies and actions have targeted various aspects of the living 
conditions of immigrant-origin individuals.24 The presidency of Socialist François 
Mitterrand in 1981 saw increased immigration-related legislation (Thomas 2007). 
In 1981 he granted equal rights of association to immigrants (Amara 2006; Body-
Gendrot 1993). As a result, organizations such as SOS Racisme, an antiracist orga-
nization heavily influenced by Republican ideology, and France Plus, an activist 
group, were founded during the 1980s (Begag 1990; Silverman 1992). These and 
similar organizations were also influenced by the 1983 Marche des Beurs (also 
known as the March for Equality and against Racism), by children of North  African 
immigrants from Marseille and Paris (Amara 2006; Begag 1990; Hajjat 2013).
A 1972 law banned collecting statistics related to race and ethnicity, including in 
the census. This law further codified the use of race-neutral policies in France and 
framed racism as an individual act, as seen in, for example, prohibitions against 
hate speech (Bleich 2004).25 Because French government policies stress formal 
race neutrality, they are often perceived as ineffective in addressing discrimination 
in areas such as education, housing, and employment (see Bleich 2001, 2003, 2004; 
Calves 2004; Favell 2001; Hargreaves 2004; Lieberman 2004). Because of Repub-
lican ideology, government policies target particular geographical areas instead 
of identity-based communities, as in the United States, creating, for example, a 
territorial affirmative action instead of an ethnic or race-based affirmative action 
(Dikeç 2007).26
Understanding the presence of Islam in France is crucial for understanding the 
racism and marginalization the North African–origin population faces, even if all 
maghrébin-origin individuals do not automatically identify as Muslim. While I dis-
cuss Muslims throughout this book, I stress the distinction between  Muslims and 
North African–origin individuals here. While many respondents are  Muslims, 
which impacts their everyday lives and experiences of marginalization, the fact that 
they are maghrébin or North African is the basis of their exclusion.
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Because of laws prohibiting categorization based on faith, statistics on  Muslims 
in France are scarce and somewhat inconsistent (Bowen 2004c; Laurence 2001; 
Laurence and Vaisse 2006). Muslims are estimated to be about 6 to 8 percent 
of France’s total population (including immigrants and those born in France) 
(d’Appollonia 2009; Gray 2008; Sebian 2007). France remains the country with 
the largest concentration of Muslims in Europe (Hargreaves et al. 2007; Keaton 
2006), and most Français de confession musulmane (French Muslims) are of 
Algerian and Moroccan origin (Bowen 2004b; Laurence 2001). Much research on 
French Muslims has highlighted their heterogeneity, particularly in terms of iden-
tity and practices (which I discuss further in chapter 3, and has drawn a distinction 
between Muslim culture and Muslim religion or between believing versus practic-
ing Muslims.27
Despite portrayals of French Muslims as adopting an oppositional Muslim iden-
tity and of Islam as fundamentally incompatible with French society (Foner and 
Alba 2008), recent research has challenged the prevailing notion of French Mus-
lims as completely different from other French people (Klausen 2008;  Laurence 
and Vaisse 2006), as well as the notion of Muslim status conflicting with national 
belonging to France (Beaman 2016; Maxwell and Bleich 2014).28 Identifying as 
Muslim does not pose a barrier to identifying as French (Barou 2014;  Beaman 
2016; Nyiri 2007).29 Whether or not they actually practice Islam or identify as prac-
ticing Muslims, North African–origin individuals are often considered or iden-
tified as Muslim by others because Islam is the major religion in their parents’ 
country of origin (Hargreaves et al. 2007). As I discuss further in chapter 3, the 
marginalization that respondents experience as Muslims is emblematic of racial 
and ethnic exclusion, in a context in which Islam is an acceptable way to mark 
difference, and race and ethnicity are not. The use of Muslim as a category for 
maghrébin individuals is a way to subvert discussion of race and ethnicity.
The growing attention paid to immigration in France is not related to num-
bers, as the actual number of immigrants has remained constant since 1930, 
but rather to its changing demographics, as presently more immigrants are 
from former North African colonies than other regions (Gafaïti 2003; Noiriel 
1996; Thomas 2007; Tribalat 2004a).30 Recent immigration-related develop-
ments in France reveal how national identity remains under debate and how 
immigrants and their descendants are continually framed as disruptive to 
this constructed national identity (Silverstein 2008). In 2007 then-president 
Nicolas Sarkozy established the Ministère de l’immigration, de l’intégration, 
de l’identité nationale  et du développement solidaire (Ministry of Immigra-
tion, Integration, National Identity and Codevelopment). The ministry’s stated 
goals included controlling migration flows, favoring integration, and promot-
ing French identity,31 which illustrated how language relating to immigration 
and citizenship were tightened under his presidency (Barou 2014). To some, 
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this ministry suggested that “immigrants don’t suit French national identity. 
[It tells them] Integrate or else” (Green 2007). In November 2009, Sarkozy 
and then-minister of IIADS Eric Besson launched a public debate on French 
national identity, with the stated purpose of “constructing a better shared 
vision of what French national identity is today” and “reaffirming Republican 
values and pride in being French.”32 This debate was criticized as a cover for 
anti-immigrant sentiment toward and ignorance about ethnic and religious 
minorities (Cowell 2009; Erlanger 2009; Erlanger 2010).33 Under controversy, 
IIADS was demolished in 2010 (Kastoryano and Escafré-Dublet 2012).
The complexities of nationality and citizenship status in France are crucial to 
understanding how postcolonial immigrants and their descendants were routinely 
left out of both the social and symbolic boundaries around France as a nation and 
French as an identity (Silverstein 2008).34 The French census classifies its popula-
tions in three categories: French by birth, French by naturalization, and foreign 
(Kastoryano 2004). Citizenship is based on jus solis (place of birth) rather than 
jus sanguinis (parental origins); however, children of foreigners have long been an 
exception to this rule (see Bass 2014 for overview of policies and laws for children 
of foreigners). Part of this is due to the historical distinction between French citi-
zenship and nationality, as nationality does not mean automatic citizenship and all 
the benefits it confers. Brubaker (1992) discusses how France has a civic concep-
tion of nationhood (in contrast to Germany, which has an ethnic conception of 
nationhood and citizenship based on jus sanguinis).
In this book, I discuss how, despite this conception of citizenship, descendants 
of colonialism in the Maghreb are kept from being full members of French society. 
Because Algeria was a French colony, Algerians had French nationality, but they 
were not considered French citizens and did not have all the rights conferred to 
French citizens, such as voting (Noiriel 1996).35 During the period of French colo-
nialism, Maghrébins had a second-class status because of this distinction between 
French nationality and French citizenship. Colonial relations therefore shaped 
French citizenship and belonging (Tetreault 2013).36 This second-class status con-
tinued even after the end of colonialism (Kastoryano and Escafré-Dublet 2012).
The carte d’identité (national identity card) and the code de la nationalité 
 française (French nationality code) have served to exclude immigrants from 
becoming full members of French society (Noiriel 1996). The code de la nation-
alité has increasingly shifted toward a more restrictive definition of citizenship 
amid concerns over increasing immigration from North African and sub-Saharan 
African countries (Feldblum 1999; Silverstein 2008).37 Those born in France to 
maghrébin immigrants acquire “virtual citizenship at birth” (Simon 2012). They 
are considered foreigners at birth and generally become citizens when they are 
eighteen years old, or earlier by request (Bass 2014; Brubaker 1992; Keaton 2006). 
The French model of integration is an assimilationist one (Schnapper et al. 2003; 
12    Introduction
Tribalat 2004a).38 Immigrants and their descendants are supposed to assimilate 
into France—to be and act as French as possible. Yet this is not sufficient for 
descendants of France’s colonial empire to be included in France.
THE NORTH AFRICAN SEC OND GENER ATION
As questions regarding race and ethnic origin are not asked on the French census,39 
there is a paucity of statistics available about children of North African immigrants 
(Laurence and Vaisse 2006; Schnapper et al. 2003; Simon 1999;  Tribalat 2004a). A 
few recent large-scale quantitative studies have begun to fill this gap by combin-
ing data on individuals’ country of birth and their parents’ country of birth. The 
1999 Étude de l’histoire familiale (Study of family history, or EHF) determined that 
22 percent of France’s total foreign-origin population has origins in the Maghreb 
and 25.9 percent of second-generation immigrants in France are of maghrébin 
origin (Tribalat 2004a). To be more precise, about 14 percent are of Algerian ori-
gin, 9 percent Moroccan, and 4 percent Tunisian (Borrel and Simon 2005; Tribalat 
2004a).40
Even though this population is statistically invisible, it is socially visible. Despite 
being born and raised in France, the maghrébin second generation is often made 
to feel different by their compatriots. This is evident in the lack of a common lan-
guage or term to describe the North African second generation (Kastoryano 2006; 
Murray 2006). For example, the term étranger (foreigner) is often used to refer to 
the North African second generation (and immigrant-origin populations more 
generally), even though they were born in France (Ribert 2006; Silverman 1992; 
Stolcke 1995; Tin 2008). While I use the terms “second-generation North African 
immigrant,” “second-generation maghrébin immigrant,” “children of maghrébin 
immigrants,” and “the French North African second generation” interchangeably 
throughout this book when referring to this population, there is no commonly 
agreed-upon term (such as an equivalent to African American, for example).41 
They are often distinguished from Français de souche, though they are also native 
French. They are also frequently referred to as Muslims, although this privileges a 
religious identification over other identifications and presumes that every North 
African origin individual claims a Muslim identity in an identical way, or even 
at all (Alba and Silberman 2002). The term beur has also been used, though it is 
historically complicated. Beur, a slang term that is a partial anagram of the word 
arabe, was conceived in the Parisian banlieues by children of North African immi-
grants to challenge the negative connotations associated with being Arab (Begag 
1990). However, the term beur grew to have a negative connotation as well, as it 
became attached to negative representations of the banlieues and their residents 
(Hargreaves 2007).42 Part of the complication regarding their simultaneous vis-
ibility and invisibility rests in the French colonial legacy in which the descendants 
Introduction    13
of maghrébin immigrants were never supposed to be part of France (Sayad 2004; 
Silverstein 2008).
The largest survey of France’s second generation, the 2009 joint Institut national 
d’études démographiques (National Institute of Demographic Studies, or INED) 
and INSEE study, Trajectoires et origines, found that 37 percent of second- generation 
Moroccan and Tunisian immigrants and 39 percent of second- generation Algerian 
immigrants, aged eighteen to fifty, had sometimes or often experienced unequal 
treatment or discrimination in the five years prior to the study. In addition, there 
exists a strong mismatch between individuals who feel French and those who 
perceive that others see them as French. When asked whether they feel French, 
about 70 percent of second-generation maghrébin immigrants indicated that they 
do, but about 43 percent also feel that their “Frenchness” is denied by others, as 
Frenchness is based on rather on a restricted vision of who “looks French” (Simon 
2012, 13). This finding suggests the racial and ethnic parameters that define who 
is in fact accepted as French. This book is an ethnographic complement to this 
survey data. Moreover, I demonstrate how the source of the dissonance Simon 
(2012) identifies lies in how the North African second generation is denied cultural 
citizenship because of its racial and ethnic origins.
Other surveys have revealed the pervasiveness of discrimination facing the 
maghrébin second generation, which historian Tyler Stovall refers to as “a self-
destructive threat to France’s racial status quo” (2003, 354).43 In 2008 the Centre 
national de la recherche scientifique (National Center for Scientific Research, or 
CNRS) conducted a study of ethnic profiling by the police in Paris and found that 
those who appeared to be of North African origin were at least 7.5 times more 
likely than whites to be stopped (OSI 2009).44
Other research on the North African second generation has focused on disad-
vantage inherited from the first generation, particularly in terms of specific out-
comes, including educational attainment and employment prospects and relative 
disadvantage vis-à-vis whites. For example, many individuals of North African 
origin experience discrimination in employment, especially hiring, which they 
perceive as based on their name, skin color, or residential location—all seen as 
proxies for ethnic origin (Silberman 2011). The North African second generation 
is less likely than whites to have professional types of work and is to more likely 
to have a lower average annual income than whites (Lombardo and Pujol 2011). 
Overall, the quality of life of the North African second generation (as defined by 
poverty rate and unemployment) is worse than the quality of life of whites and 
children of European immigrants (Lombardo and Pujol 2011).45
Using data from the EHF, Meurs et al. (2006) compare the labor force partici-
pation of the first generation with the second generation. Based on measures such 
as access to employment, occupational status, and access to jobs in the civil sec-
tor, they find that although the second-generation experiences less occupational 
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segregation overall than the first, they persist in experiencing high unemploy-
ment rates and low job security relative to whites.46 According to Meurs et al. 
(2005), having a maghrébin background makes someone 2.5 times more likely to 
be unemployed than if someone is white (controlling for educational attainment). 
Similarly, according to a 2011 report by the Haut Conseil à l’intégration (High 
Council for Integration, or HCI),47 second-generation immigrants of non-Euro-
pean origin were twice as likely to be unemployed as other citizens. This dispar-
ity exists even for those individuals who are skilled, qualified, and well educated 
(Barou 2014).
Moreover, even for those children of maghrébin immigrants who are gainfully 
employed, a glass ceiling still exists (Belmessous 2007). They are more likely than 
whites to hold jobs beneath their educational attainment level. The disadvantage 
that second-generation North African immigrants experience vis-à-vis whites 
cannot be explained entirely by differences in levels of educational attainment 
(Lutz et al. 2014; Silberman et al. 2007).48
As of 2003, about 15 percent of second-generation North African immigrant 
men, and about 23 percent of second-generation North African immigrant 
women, held salaried jobs. In this book, I focus on this population, or what 
some have termed the beurgeoisie, a play on the slang term for children of North 
 African immigrants, beur (Hargreaves 1998; Wenden and Leveau 2001). These 
individuals have experienced upward mobility vis-à-vis their immigrant parents 
and have achieved middle-class status in terms of educational and professional 
accomplishments.
MIDDLE-CL ASS,  YET MARGINALIZED
By focusing on the middle-class, I argue that being incorporated into French 
society and being accepted as French by others is not a question of professional 
success, educational attainment, or adhering to Republican ideology. Rather, 
France has a growing group of citizens who, despite doing everything right, can-
not achieve full membership in French society. This demonstrates the limitations 
of citizenship within a democratic context, wherein difference based on ethnic 
status reveals a more dynamic notion of who is included in the Republic and 
who is not. Focusing on the middle-class is both a theoretical and empirical con-
tribution, as previous research has focused more heavily on how working-class 
and impoverished immigrants and their children are marginalized and less on 
how “successful” children of immigrants face similar issues despite their upward 
mobility. Middle-class status does not provide automatic inclusion into main-
stream society.
By mainstream or mainstream society, I am applying Alba and Nee’s (2003, 
12) definition: “interrelated institutional structures and organizations regulated by 
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rules and practices,” as well as “practices that foster assimilation, that is, back-
grounding ethnic origins of ‘included’ ethnic minority” members.49 So in this 
context, mainstream society is hegemonic and refers to what is often outside of 
respondents’ maghrébin cultural world—including what they learn in school, 
what and whom they see represented in the media, and whom they see repre-
sented at various levels of government. More generally, mainstream society may be 
thought of as where the majority population feels at home, or “where its presence 
is taken for granted and seen as unproblematic” (Alba and Foner 2015, 5).
In terms of middle-class status, I focus on respondents’ educational attainment 
and professional employment. Following a Weberian perspective, social scien-
tists have measured a middle-class status based on both objective and subjective 
factors, including income, education level, shared values and goals, and prestige 
(Feagin 1991; Stearns 1979; Urry 1973; Wacquant 1991). Middle-class status is not 
just a socioeconomic location, but also a social status (Weber [1922] 1978). Subjec-
tive factors related to class include the ideas “people have and hold about their own 
social positions, ideas that may not be systematically arrived at or as exclusively 
tied to hard and fast economic charts, ideas that can even give substantial weight 
to noneconomic criteria of social worth” (Jackson 2001, 128–29). The symbolic 
boundaries around middle-class as a category are also important, as the middle-
class is also defined by what it is not (Wacquant 1991).
This echoes research measuring the African American middle-class and minor-
ity middle-class populations more generally (see Marsh et al. 2007). For example, 
Pattillo-McCoy (1999, 13) uses “a combination of socioeconomic factors (mostly 
income, occupation, and education) and normative judgments (ranging from 
where people live, to what churches or clubs they belong to, to whether they plant 
flowers in their gardens” in her exegesis of Chicago’s black middle-class. Further-
more, Landry and Marsh (2011) emphasize a Weberian approach to measuring and 
understanding middle-class populations, which are therefore constituted by indi-
viduals with white-collar employment, a term coined by C. Wright Mills ([1951] 
2002) (see also Feagin 1991).
In my focus on “middle-classness,” I emphasize how respondents perceive 
themselves as middle-class individuals and make meaning in their everyday lives. 
Achieving a middle-class status, in France, the United States, and other societies, 
is a benchmark for having made it. Middle-class status, including being educated 
and holding a professional job, is often framed as an aspiration, a step closer to 
being an ideal citizen.
Middle-class minorities are often positioned as examples of successful assimi-
lation, or full integration within mainstream society. As Landry and Marsh (2011, 
374) point out: “For a minority group, the development of a middle-class marks 
a decisive moment in its development, affords access to improved life chances 
as well as membership in the class that provides the brain trust for industry and 
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government. In addition, a minority middle-class serves the indispensable role of 
leadership in the struggle against discrimination and oppression that is often the 
experience of its members.”
Yet the middle-class of a majority group differs from the middle-class of a 
minority group (Hout 1986), or a “subaltern middle-class,” which Pandey (2009, 
322) defines as “middle-class groups that emerge from, and remain in various ways 
closely tied to, long-stigmatized lower-class and underclass populations.” Race and 
ethnicity remain salient regardless of socioeconomic position. Again, the black 
middle-class is an instructive referent, as its members remain distinct from their 
white middle-class counterparts in the United States. In the Black Bourgeoisie, 
African American sociologist E. Franklin Frazier (1957) highlighted the particular 
cultural and political circumstances of the black middle-class. And we now know 
that the black middle-class is not as stable as other middle-class populations, owing 
to continual systematic racism (S. Collins 1983; Gregg 1998; Pattillo-McCoy 1999). 
Journalist Ellis Cose highlights the “permanent vulnerability of status” (1994, 41), 
as black middle-class professionals find that their middle and upper-middle-class 
statuses do not shield them from race-based marginalization.50
As the black and white middle-classes remain distinct in the United States 
(Marsh et al. 2007), so, too, do the white and the North African–origin middle-
classes in France.51 Middle–class status does not confer the same advantages, both 
real and symbolic, on North African–origin individuals as it does on their white 
middle-class counterparts. The fact that socioeconomic status does not ameliorate 
the distinctions among individuals further reveals how France is permanently hin-
dered by its racism and colonial past.
Their stigmatized ethnic and racial identity, in tandem with a middle-class, or 
economically advantaged, status, means that minority middle-class populations 
experience a particular tension. Their middle-class status and accomplishments 
take them only so far—because they are racial and ethnic minorities. They have 
to strategically navigate this insider-outsider position between stigma and status 
(Clerge 2014), or as Hicham, a twenty-nine-year-old of Moroccan origin who 
lives in the banlieue of Poissy, puts it, between “the two sets of codes—French and 
maghrébin. We understand them both.”
Achieving middle-class status is thus not a panacea for resolving social exclu-
sion. This is true for the North African second generation. Such status does not do 
the same work for these individuals as it does for their white counterparts. They 
realize their middle-class status mostly in relation to their working-class counter-
parts and immigrant parents, yet they feel excluded from the full privileges associ-
ated with a middle-class status. As I later discuss, the maghrébin second genera-
tion draws boundaries that, depending on the context, both distinguish them from 
and include them in the economically disadvantaged segment of the maghrébin 
second generation. Respondents are conscious of how their everyday lives are both 
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similar and markedly different from those of their working-class counterparts 
(this is one example of how respondents make sense of their social locations).
French demographer Patrick Simon (2003) identified three paths for France’s 
second generation: a reproduction of the positions of the first generation; a suc-
cessful upward social mobility through education; or a mobility hindered by dis-
crimination. In this book, I focus on the second category—individuals who have 
achieved upward mobility through education yet simultaneously feel hindered by 
discrimination and exclusion in terms of their actual place in mainstream society. 
This is different from positioning the maghrébin second generation as successfully 
assimilated, as Loïc Wacquant (2007) attests, which I discuss further in chapter 3.
By marginalization, I am referring not just to the denial of access to material 
resources, but also what Cathy Cohen (1999, 38) terms the “stigmatized or illegiti-
mate social identity that such groups have in the larger or dominant society.” Mar-
ginalized groups are distinguished by “the pervasive way in which ideologies or 
myths which explain, justify, and recreate their secondary position become insti-
tutionalized throughout society” (43).52 This stigmatized or illegitimate identity is 
born out of the French colonial context. I posit here that children of North African 
immigrants—even those who are middle-class—are framed as stigmatized or ille-
gitimate with respect to having a rightful place within France, and must develop a 
framing of their marginalization outside of a sanctioned language to discuss racial 
and ethnic difference. Throughout this book, I discuss how the secondary position 
of the maghrébin second generation is reinforced through both individual-level 
interactions and macrolevel structures and practices. Middle-class individuals often 
experience more discrimination or feel more marginalized than their  working-class 
counterparts (Cose 1994; Tomaskovic-Devey et al. 2005). Educated and middle-
class second-generation immigrants are more likely to report higher levels of 
discrimination than immigrants and less educated immigrant-origin individuals 
(Fleischmann et al. 2011). Research has shown that the more highly educated North 
African immigrant-origin individuals are, the more the complaints of discrimina-
tion (Silberman et al. 2007). Marginalization is often exacerbated for middle-class 
individuals because they feel as though they have done everything right.
I frame the North African second generation as “citizen outsiders,” a term that 
Cathy Cohen (2010) uses to characterize the precarious social locations of African 
American youth. Cohen considers the degrees to which African American youth 
feel like full members of the citizenry as a way of understanding how marginalized 
individuals relate to the state and how that complicates the relationship among 
race, citizenship, and belonging. This is reminiscent of Patricia Hill Collins’s (1986) 
notion of the “outsider-within” and Tina Campt’s (2005) notion of the “other-
within,” which conceptualize how individuals may be simultaneously members 
of a society yet kept on its margins (and the simultaneous insider and outsider 
positions they hold). The middle-class North African second generation is both 
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included and excluded from the citizenry—they have made it, so to speak, but 
only to a point, as they are continually reminded of how their citizenship is suspect 
and often questioned by others. This is reminiscent of W. E. B. DuBois’s notion of 
“double consciousness,” referring to how African Americans must negotiate two 
seemingly different and unreconciled identities—American and black, as articu-
lated in his Souls of Black Folk: Essays and Sketches.53 The North African second 
generation must bridge the different cultural worlds of France and the Maghreb. 
They have what DuBois has termed a “second-sight,” a way of looking at oneself 
through the eyes of others.
The concept of a minority group based on identity is antithetical to the ide-
als of French universalism and Republicanism, which recognize individuals and 
not groups. There is no framework for acknowledging racial and ethnic minority 
groups and incorporating them within France’s national community. Citizen Out-
sider grapples with this paradox—that France does not acknowledge racial and 
ethnic minorities yet marks those individuals as different. If these middle-class 
individuals feel excluded from mainstream society, their socioeconomic status is 
not the explanatory variable. Their racial and ethnic origin is.
FR ANCE’S  R ACIAL PROJECT:  
THE C ONTINUING SIGNIFICANCE OF R ACE AND ETHNICIT Y
Asserting the significance of race and ethnicity is provocative in France, as under 
Republicanism, being French is supposed to trump all markers of difference. 
Despite the promotion of a colorblind ideology and an official masking of possible 
and real ethnic differences, the state has a narrow definition what of it means to be 
French, a definition with particular racial and ethnic underpinnings. Specifically, 
white supremacy structures the definition of who is French. To the extent to which 
race is mentioned, it is not as a social construction, but rather a physical definition 
of human groups, so acknowledging race propagates racism and furthering divi-
sions among humans (Keaton 2010).
Race and ethnicity are salient in marking boundaries of inclusion and exclu-
sion in France’s “racial project.” In this racial project, “racial categories are created, 
inhabited, transformed, and destroyed” (Omi and Winant 1994, 55). A racial proj-
ect signifies differences among individuals and creates a “racial common-sense” 
(55), or a way of understanding populations seen as “other,” which is continually 
made and remade (Silverstein 2008). This racial common sense is created in a 
seemingly colorblind society. The North African second generation is racialized as 
“other” (Kastoryano and Escafré-Dublet 2012; Winant 2001), and it is this process 
that prevents them from being fully included in France’s “imagined community” 
(Anderson 1991). Racialization is revealed through citizenship laws, mechanisms 
of state control, external ascription, criminalization, spatial segregation, popular 
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and political discourse, and daily interactions (Weiner 2012). The French context 
reveals how these processes of racialization can occur in a supposedly antiracial or 
colorblind society and without legally substantiated boundaries around racial and 
ethnic categories. This contrasts with the United States, where race and ethnicity, 
as measured in the census, have had specific, though evolving, definitions as cat-
egories dependent on the larger societal contexts (for example, the “one-drop rule” 
as a determination of black identity). French Republicanism merely obfuscates 
differences; it does not minimize or eliminate them.54
Even though race as a term exists in the French language, the National Assem-
bly suppressed its use in legislation in 2013 (Beydoun 2013). It is this context that 
makes race in France both necessary and difficult to discuss. Specifically, race “sig-
nifies and symbolizes social conflicts and interests by referring to different types 
of human bodies” (Omi and Winant 1994, 55), which “form a distinctive stigmata 
of inferiority” (Keaton 2010, 106). It is a way of making meaning out of differences 
that are historically and socially informed. I center France’s colonial history and 
postcolonial legacy in understanding the experiences of nonwhite individuals. As 
I demonstrate, North African–origin individuals are read as nonwhite through a 
variety of markers. “Skin color, hair, features, language varieties, and by extension 
family name, religion, in short, people’s ways of being and knowing—have long-
standing social meanings in France, underpinned and enlivened by ideologies and 
policies acting on them” (Keaton 2009, 108).55 Constructing Frenchness as white, 
and French identity as a white one, is part of this racial project, which dates from 
the construction of the nation itself. French culture is portrayed as an unchanging, 
homogenous entity.
To clarify, I am not using ethnic origin or group in opposition to race, as I do 
not want to suggest that ethnic origin is not racialized in France.56 I use ethnic 
origin in the Weberian sense as the subjective belief in a group’s common descent, 
cultural, and historical experiences (Weber [1922] 2013).57 North African–origin 
individuals are constructed as a separate ethnic group (as having ethnic origins 
in the Maghreb) and racialized as nonwhite. These processes are coconstitutive of 
each other.
As such, this book is in conversation with research on racial and ethnic identi-
ties, including how immigrant-origin individuals negotiate their identities in light 
of existing racial and ethnic hierarchies, and how individuals are shaped by their 
experiences of racial and ethnic marginalization in how they see themselves (see 
K. Hall 2004; Sharma 2010; Warikoo 2004; Waters 1999).58 They respond to both 
the ethnic identities of their immigrant parents from their home country and the 
nation-based identities in their current environment (Chong 1998; Cornell and 
Hartmann 2007; Eid 2008).59 Identity based on ethnic origin relies on an inter-
play between external and internal self-identification, subject to various structural 
constraints.60
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Throughout this book, I demonstrate how race and ethnicity remain salient not 
only at an individual level but also as a macrolevel project structuring boundaries 
of inclusion and exclusion around full citizenship. Race and ethnicity are inextri-
cable with nationhood and nationalism, as the construction of race and ethnicity 
occurs simultaneously with the construction of the nation (Brubaker 2009). As 
the experiences of my respondents reveal, belonging in France is circumscribed by 
race and ethnicity, and being included or accepted depends upon racial and ethnic 
status. In France, one’s racial and ethnic status, or being nonwhite, is a barrier to 
full cultural citizenship, a framework upon which I later elaborate.
Beyond denying race as a term, common discourses about race and ethnicity in 
France say that race does not exist; that race is less significant in France than in the 
United States; and that France is a colorblind society (Ndiaye 2008). Understand-
ing France’s racial project requires understanding the salience of race and ethnicity 
in Europe more broadly. Race structures the nation-state yet is framed as existing 
everywhere but in Europe (Goldberg 2006). Racism is discussed solely in relation 
to the Far Right, not as a boundary against “those historically categorized as non-
European, as being not-white” (347).61 Within France, in place of a discourse on 
race and ethnicity, scholars have traditionally focused on class and socioeconomic 
status as the explanatory variable for social marginalization in French society 
(Amiraux and Simon 2006; Ndiaye 2008). This scholarly focus does not acknowl-
edge France’s history of slavery or colonial legacy, nor the structural nature of 
racial and ethnic relations, and rejects race and ethnicity as analytical categories in 
social scientific inquiry.
A few scholars have argued for increased attention to race and ethnicity in 
France, and how they shape daily experiences and life outcomes. In La condition 
noire: Essai sur une minorité française (The black condition: Essay on a French 
minority) (2008), French historian Pap Ndiaye excavates France’s black popula-
tion and demonstrates its paradoxical status as simultaneously visible and invis-
ible as a minority. This visibility of a minority depends upon “the presence of 
phenotypical characteristics that racially or ethnically characterize those persons 
concerned  .  .  . that is, people whose supposed ethnoracial membership can be 
deduced from their appearance” (Ndiaye 2008, 57–58). The black condition in 
France is one of a transnational blackness, or a product of social relations that 
characterizes the shared experience of being black (or at least regarded as black by 
others). In chapter 5, I discuss how this extends to maghrébin-origin individuals in 
France, who often assert identities situated and informed by blackness as it relates 
to black populations worldwide. Moreover, France’s blindness to race is coupled 
with race-based assumptions that lead to a consciousness of race, and therefore 
antiblack racism, which masks itself in different institutions (Keaton 2010).
However, Michèle Lamont (2002), in The Dignity of Working Men: Morality and 
the Boundaries of Race, Class, and Immigration, argues that France’s Republican 
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and colorblind ideology enables not an antiblack racism but a cultural racism—
one that distinguishes between individuals seen as native French and immigrant-
origin individuals who are not. This cultural racism is a remnant of France’s colo-
nial history and is often directed toward immigrants from North and sub-Saharan 
Africa. Therefore, when individuals draw symbolic boundaries that exclude those 
of immigrant origin, they can claim to do so based on cultural differences, rather 
than on racial or ethnic ones.
Yet the focus on cultural racism in France misses how “culture” is code for race 
and ethnicity, historically and in the present. French culture and identity are implic-
itly and explicitly framed as white (Constant 2009). Culture is therefore a social 
and symbolic boundary (Lamont and Molnar 2002).62 A focus on cultural distinc-
tion ignores the structural dynamics at play in the marginalization of maghrébin 
immigrants and subsequent generations. In addition, this focus ignores how even 
maghrébin-origin individuals—such as my respondents—who do not necessarily 
see themselves as different from their white counterparts are still treated as different.
Racial and ethnic minorities can feel as French as anyone else but still not 
be treated as such or accepted as French by others. Therefore, their difference is 
one that is assigned, and one from which they cannot escape. Focusing on cul-
ture instead of race also sustains the denial of race and ethnicity and furthers the 
myth of colorblindness in France (Keaton 2009; Ndiaye 2008). This resembles how 
ideologies of colorblindness in the United States not only perpetuate racism but 
also minimize its importance (Bonilla-Silva 2013). Minimizing race, and therefore 
racism, perpetuates the idea that race and ethnicity as statuses do not affect life 
chances or outcomes. This allows France to continue to ignore the consequences 
not only of its colonial past but the racial and ethnic dimensions of its national 
identity. Because of the emphasis on colorblindness in Republican ideology, mar-
ginalization based on race and ethnicity is harder to combat.
As I discuss in chapter 4, the social location of North African–origin individu-
als relies on the distinction between the legal and cultural dimensions of French 
identity—that is, between being a French citizen and being accepted as French by 
others. Individuals like Abdelkrim can assert that they are as French as any other 
French person, yet because of the boundaries around this identity, they find that 
this claim to French identity is not easily accepted or legitimated by others. The 
boundaries around the identity of native French render maghrébin-origin indi-
viduals “unassimilable” and marginalized regardless of their socioeconomic sta-
tus. I argue that the boundaries structuring who is accepted as French continually 
exclude North African–origin individuals and remind them that they are not. As 
social and cultural barriers, these boundaries are racial and ethnic demarcations 
of belonging within France.
As culture is a euphemism for race, so too is religion—in this case, Islam. While 
previous research has argued that religion is the basis for the construction of 
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symbolic boundaries between “us” and “them” (Zolberg and Woon 1999), I argue 
that religion is also code for racial and ethnic boundaries (Barth 1969). Therefore, 
race is not a mask for something else; rather, religion, culture, and other factors are 
masks for race. When maghrébin-origin individuals are deemed too culturally dif-
ferent from other French individuals, it is not because of their affiliation with Islam 
(which is nonetheless heterogeneous and contextual); it is because of their status 
as “ex-colonial citizens of color,” to borrow Hall 2004’s terminology for second-
generation Sikhs in London. Abdelkrim and others are marginalized not because of 
their religious identity or practices but because of their maghrébin origins ( Beaman 
2016). I discuss respondents’ marginalization as Muslims in chapter 3.
The maghrébin second generation can assert a French identity, yet because of 
the ethnicized and racialized nature of French identity, these North African–ori-
gin individuals are assigned another racial or ethnic identity: nonwhite. Even if 
France does not explicitly recognize distinct racial and ethnic categories, I argue 
that it recognizes French as a specific identity category that is not accessible to 
minorities of color. While race and ethnicity do not exist as something to be mea-
sured or quantified in French society, they operate in everyday life, as the eth-
noracially marked experiences of my respondents reveal. As such, a consciousness 
of racial and ethnic differences exists simultaneously with a denial of race and 
ethnicity. Throughout this book, I discuss how individuals interpret and respond 
to these boundaries that exclude them. Furthermore, these respondents inhabit a 
tenuous social location, in that they fit within the confines of the social boundary 
of citizenship, but not within the symbolic boundaries around French identity. 
They are citizens but are not made to feel like citizens. They are not treated like 
citizens. Because of the symbolic boundaries around national identity, in this case, 
Frenchness, boundaries based on racial and ethnic origin serve to marginalize 
immigrant-origin individuals.
CULTUR AL CITIZENSHIP AND R ACIAL FORMATION
That immigrant-origin individuals are continuously marginalized—which is 
linked to ethnic-minority status—challenges what would be expected in French 
Republican society. The French Republican model rejects any implication of a dis-
tinction between culture and citizenship, meaning that to be a French citizen is to 
be French, or to be French is to be a French citizen. Comparing national boundary 
patterns of the United States and France, Lamont argues that citizenship serves 
as a salient boundary between in-groups and out-groups, or “us versus them” 
in France (Lamont 1995; see also Brubaker 1992 and Lamont 2000). However, I 
demonstrate how simply having French citizenship is not a sufficient marker of 
who is regarded as French and who is not, as individuals who are citizens remain 
excluded from mainstream society.63
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I show that citizenship does not confer the same benefits on other popula-
tions as it does on whites, as children of immigrants, who are racial and ethnic 
minorities, are marginalized to degrees similar to their immigrant parents. They 
are denied cultural citizenship because of their North African origins and because 
they are not white. This denial of cultural citizenship challenges a French excep-
tionalism regarding marking difference among citizens. What exists in France is 
citizenship without societal inclusion, an “ambiguous citizenship” (Cain 2010).
My framework of cultural citizenship emphasizes how citizenship operates 
for marginalized populations, who despite being formal legal citizens are none-
theless not fully included in the citizenry. Cultural citizenship focuses on what 
would allow an individual to traverse the cultural-symbolic boundaries defining 
a particular national community and identity and be accepted as a full member 
(Beaman 2016b). Insofar as cultural citizenship is a claim, it is a claim to full 
societal belonging by fellow members of one’s community rather than a claim to a 
specific set of rights. Being denied cultural citizenship denotes an impaired civic 
status (Meer 2010). Furthermore, cultural citizenship means being fully included 
in society, despite one’s difference from others. When children of North African 
immigrants indicate that their fellow citizens do not consider them as French as 
they are, they are expressing how their fellow citizens are denying them cultural 
citizenship. These are individuals born in France who insist upon their French-
ness and are still denied it. When respondents seek to be viewed as French by 
others, they are ultimately making a claim for cultural citizenship—a claim to be 
regarded as a legitimate member of the French mainstream or a part of French 
culture.
I build upon cultural anthropologist Renato Rosaldo’s formulation, based on 
Latinos in the United States and used to resist dominant racialized power struc-
tures. He speaks of “the right to be different (in terms of race, ethnicity, or native 
language) with respect to the norms of the dominant national community, with-
out compromising one’s right to belong. . . . [This] includes and goes beyond the 
dichotomous categories of legal documents, which one either has or does not, to 
encompass a range of gradations in the qualities of citizenship (Rosaldo 1994, 57). 
He argues that cultural citizenship presumes a universal citizenship based on white 
men, where those who are different are excluded. Latino identity has been shaped 
by experiences of discrimination and efforts toward full inclusion in American 
society. The denial of cultural citizenship to Latinos in the United States, as well 
as to the North African second generation in France, reveals how race and ethnic 
origin keep certain populations on the margins of mainstream society. Cultural 
citizenship challenges the stigmatization and marginalization of different popula-
tions that are supposedly antithetical to the laws of the nation-state.64
Traditional conceptions of citizenship have a culturally normative dimension 
that makes some legal citizens more or less accepted than others.65 However, it 
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is this nonlegal dimension that often goes unacknowledged. Cultural citizenship 
acknowledges the relationship between culture and citizenship and considers 
citizenship beyond its legislative status (Bloemraad 2015; Delanty 2002; García- 
Sánchez 2013; Vega and van Hensbroek 2010), including how it creates both full 
and second-class citizens. It also allows us to unpack how citizenship is socially 
and culturally constructed and how race, class, and immigrant status are barriers 
to full societal acceptance (Ong 1996). Specifically, “citizenship is both a cultural 
and anti-cultural institution.  .  .  . Citizenship positions itself as oppositional to 
specific cultures, even as it is constituted by quite specific cultural values” (Volpp 
2007, 574). The cultural attachments associated with being of North African origin 
are positioned as oppositional to being French (Lamont 2002). There is only one 
way to be French (Volpp 2007).
Difference is seen in relation to a normative center, in which all other cultures 
are on the periphery. As legal scholar Leti Volpp (2000) argues, what is viewed 
as cultural or culturally different is often what is associated with people of color 
and other minorities. In this way, culture is closely linked to race and ethnicity. 
Once we recognize this connection, we can fully consider how culture is code for 
race and ethnicity, particularly in contexts where explicit discussion of race and 
ethnicity is not permissible. It is therefore radical to think of cultural citizenship 
in the French context, as it implies that citizenship status is not the only marker of 
difference. For marginalized groups, citizenship is more precarious (Glenn 2011). 
Racial and ethnic minorities are often denied cultural citizenship or full belonging 
in society (Bonilla-Silva and Mayorga 2011; Cohen 2010).66
This denial of cultural citizenship is evidence of France’s racial project. By 
focusing on cultural citizenship as an explanatory framework for marginalization, 
I specify how citizenship operates as a marker of difference, through its relation-
ship to race and ethnicity (Beaman 2015a). We cannot understand citizenship 
in France without acknowledging its racial divides (Silverstein 2008). Nonwhite 
citizens are denied cultural citizenship. Citizenship as a racialized status is frag-
mented, in that people who are formal citizens are informally excluded from full 
societal inclusion. Citizenship therefore exists as a “surveilled performance of 
national belonging” (25), in which whites reinforce boundaries of who really gets 
to belong.67 Citizenship in this way is better understood as local, everyday prac-
tices (Brettell and Reed-Danahay 2012; Silverstein 2008).
This resembles how second- and subsequent-generation Asian and Latino 
immigrants in the United States are considered “perpetual foreigners” (Wu 2001), 
often questioned about where they are from and having to prove their “Ameri-
canness” (Zhou and Lee 2007). They are still pressured to identify based on their 
ethnic origins, even as they assert that they are American (Zhou and Lee 2007). 
Though they were born and grew up in the United States, only a partial assim-
ilation is possible. They are often asked, “Where are you really from?” thereby 
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drawing boundaries determining who an American is and reinforcing that they 
are not truly American (Wu 2001).
THE RESEARCH
This book is based on longitudinal ethnographic research I conducted primarily 
during the 2008 to 2009 academic year, including semistructured interviews in 
French with 45 adult children of maghrébin immigrants living in the Parisian met-
ropolitan region beginning in fall 2008 (I discuss further details of this methodol-
ogy in the methodological appendix). I was initially interested in exploring what 
it means to be a minority, and how minorities understand their social locations in 
French society. I moved to Paris in fall of 2008 for this purpose.
Recruiting interview respondents proved more difficult than I anticipated, 
because of my outsider status, and I used snowball sampling after contacting 
various organizations and associations for potential respondents. My respon-
dent sample includes twenty-four men and twenty-one women.68 Respondents 
range in age from twenty-four to forty-nine years old (the average age is thirty 
years old). Twenty-five of them (about 55 percent) are of Algerian origin; twelve 
(about 26 percent) Moroccan; and eight (17 percent) Tunisian. Three respondents 
are products of mixed-race relationships, meaning one parent is white and the 
other is maghrébin. All respondents live in the Paris metropolitan region, or Ile-
de-France. Thirty-five percent of respondents live in Paris, and 65 percent live 
in the banlieues, mostly in the inner-ring départements (in France a department 
is a major administrative subdivision or branch of government) of Seine-Saint-
Denis, Val-de-Marne, and Hauts-de-Seine. All respondents have French citizen-
ship, and about a third of them have dual citizenship (the other being in their 
respective maghrébin countries of origin).69 Most respondents’ parents emigrated 
from the Maghreb between 1950 and 1970, primarily for economic reasons. Many 
of these parents have low levels of educational attainment, often not past middle 
school, speak little French, and communicate mostly in Arabic or Berber (Kabyle). 
Usually, the fathers worked in low-skilled jobs, such as construction and factory 
employment, while mothers were homemakers or did domestic labor.
In marking respondents’ middle-class statuses, I focus on respondents’ edu-
cational attainment levels and professional statuses. With regard to educational 
attainment, I focus on those who passed the baccalauréat (bac) exam and attended 
college (whether or not they actually graduated). In terms of employment, I focus 
on those who have professional types of employment—including the French 
socioprofessional categories of cadre (salaried or executive-level employment) and 
professions intermédiaires.70 Some of these jobs include technical director, journal-
ist, doctoral student, lawyer, banker, human resources associate, hospital director, 
high school teacher, insurance agent, governmental administrator, information 
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technology consultant, public relations consultant, and television reporter. I there-
fore use a combination of occupation and educational attainment as indicators 
of the socioeconomic locations of my respondents (Weber [1922] 2013; see also 
Landry and Marsh 2011).
In addition to these interviews with forty-five middle-class maghrébin-origin 
individuals, I conducted nine months of participant observation with some 
respondents. I went to networking events, both professional and social, with my 
some of my respondents. For example, I went to a book-signing event with one of 
my respondents at a literary festival for maghrébin-origin authors. I also attended 
various débats (panel discussions) and lectures on relevant topics.71 I spent time 
with my respondents’ families and visited their workplaces. In the process of con-
tacting various organizations and associations for respondents, I connected with 
the Nanterre Association, a community organization in the western banlieue of 
Nanterre (about ninety minutes from Paris by commuter train), and was able to 
supplement my interviews with participant observation there. The organization, 
located in an impoverished community in Nanterre, serves the local neighbor-
hood by offering educational, cultural, and social activities, including field trips to 
Paris monuments, panel discussions, and after-school tutoring.
My position as an outsider, not only as a researcher but also as a native-born 
American and a black woman, undoubtedly shaped how my respondents per-
ceived me. I discuss the role of my identity further in the methodological appen-
dix. While I was an outsider in some ways, many respondents also perceived me 
as an insider—as we both shared the status of racial and ethnic minority (see also 
Khanna 2011). These perceptions of my personal biography, particularly my racial 
and ethnic identity, were often invoked in interactions with respondents, most 
often to draw symbolic boundaries with or against their own identity. As I discuss 
in chapter 5, these boundaries had implications for studying race and ethnicity 
from a different national context.
OVERVIEW OF CHAPTERS
In the next chapter, “Growing up French? Education, Upward Mobility, and Con-
nections across Generations,” I focus on my respondents’ childhood experiences 
growing up in France with immigrant parents and how they learn to navigate the 
different cultural worlds of home and school. I situate growing up French as a 
question because respondents relate how their place within France was first ques-
tioned at an early age. This is reminiscent of the experiences of second-generation 
immigrants in other societies (Alba and Waters 2011; Essed 1991; Kasinitz et al. 
2004; Portes et al. 2011; Waters 2000) but also complicated in the French context 
because racial and ethnic categories are not acknowledged as meaningful bases 
for identity. There are no identity “options” (Waters 2000). I also discuss how 
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respondents navigate these different cultural worlds throughout their education 
and how they contributed to their upward mobility in adulthood.
In chapter 3, “Marginalization and Middle-Class Blues: Race, Islam, the Work-
place, and the Public Sphere,” I examine experiences and perceptions of discrimi-
nation and marginalization across different domains. I discuss how respondents 
frame and make sense of these experiences, and how their middle-class status 
shapes these meaning-making processes. Chapters 2 and 3 establish how this seg-
ment of the maghrébin second generation is marginalized because of its North 
African origins. Chapters 4 and 5 address the impact of this on their consciousness 
and identity as minorities.
In chapter 4, “French Is, French Ain’t: Boundaries of French Maghrébin Iden-
tities,” I unpack how individuals identify and how being French and having 
North African origins are implicated in their self-identities. I build upon previ-
ous examinations of ethnic identity for immigrant-origin individuals and show 
how respondents negotiate their identities vis-à-vis their maghrébin ethnic ori-
gin. I focus on a continuum ranging from a hyphenated and combined identity, 
seeing oneself as neither French nor maghrébin, to a singular identity as only 
maghrébin. Republicanism constrains the identity options available to this popu-
lation and creates the tension between assigned versus asserted identities. I also 
interrogate how children of North African immigrants interpret French Repub-
licanism as an ideology, as well as the boundaries determining what it means to 
be French. I revisit the concept of cultural citizenship to consider how Repub-
licanism as ideology and in practice creates boundaries defining French as an 
identity that forces these individuals to occupy a liminal position in relation to 
mainstream society.
In chapter 5, “Boundaries of Difference: Cultural Citizenship and Transnational 
Blackness,” I consider how this minority population invokes blackness, based on 
the experiences of black populations elsewhere, in making sense of their social 
locations. Considering how the maghrébin second generation relates to other 
black populations, such as African Americans, allows us to consider how notions 
of diaspora and transnational blackness apply not only to blacks in France but to 
North African–origin minorities in France as well.
Finally, in the conclusion, “Sacrificed Children of the Republic?” I review 
how the racial and ethnic underpinnings of French Republicanism disallow even 
“successful” children of immigrants to ever truly be viewed as French by others. 
I also discuss how cultural citizenship increasingly becomes a relevant question 
in multicultural and plural societies. I consider the important lessons provided 
by the French example in drawing conclusions about the role of difference, race, 
and ethnicity in the twenty-first century. I further consider the implications of this 
study for the future of France, particularly in light of the massacre at the offices of 
Charlie Hebdo and the November 2015 terrorist attacks.
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I first moved to Paris to conduct this research amid the campaign and first 
presidential election of Barack Obama in fall 2008. As the debate of whether the 
United States had entered a postracial era raged on, across the Atlantic Ocean 
in France was an example of a society struggling with how colorblind ideolo-
gies operate in practice. The fever of Obama’s presidential campaign and election 
spread to France (Benia 2009; Erlanger 2008), where it raised the question as to 
whether France could produce its own Obama. I discussed this question one after-
noon with Sabri, a thirty-year-old of Tunisian origin:
It will be hard, but we have to find our own French Barack Obama. There might be 
more than one. . . . But first we must help those who are still stuck in the past. Colo-
nialism is still in the spirits of some people. Meaning when I tell you that people treat 
us like children, for me that’s because of colonialism. Today people think children of 
immigrants in France are still strangers. That we are not really French. So we have to 
show them that they are not superior, that it’s a question of equality. Once they see 
us as equal to them, once we have that relationship, then things will change, but now, 
today, that’s how it is.
As I finished this book, Donald Trump was elected president of the United 
States and Far Right politicians have increased in popularity throughout Europe, 
including in France, where Marine Le Pen of the Front National (National Front) 
launched a presidential campaign on the claim that France is losing its identity 
and will soon be unrecognizable (though she made it past the first round of the 
election, she lost the second round, nevertheless winning 34.5 percent of the vote). 
If France is to move in another direction and produce a president who is an ethnic 
minority like Obama, if it is to fully incorporate individuals who are legacies of 
its colonial empire, it will have to grant all its members, including the forty-five I 
discuss in this book, cultural citizenship.
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Growing Up French?  
Education, Upward Mobility, and 
Connections across Generations
Many people of color living in this country can likely relate to the onset of 
outsized ambition at too young an age, an ambition fueled by the sense, often 
confirmed by ignorance, of being a second-class citizen and needing to claw 
your way toward equal consideration and some semblance of respect. Many 
people of color, like me, remember the moment that first began to shape their 
ambition and what that moment felt like.
—Roxane Gay, “The Price of Black Ambition”
France views and portrays itself as a white country. My whole life, I’ve felt 
erased by the national narrative. People even keep complimenting me on how 
good my French is. It’s deeply embedded in the national consciousness that 
“true” identity is one that has been here forever.
—Rokhaya Diallo, French journalist and writer of Senegalese 
origin
On a February morning sitting in a café near the Palais Garnier at place d’Opéra, 
Safia—a petite and professionally dressed thirty-two-year-old with dual Tunisian 
and French citizenship—described her experiences growing up in France with 
Tunisian immigrant parents. Safia remembered the shame and humiliation her 
parents experienced because of their immigrant status, lack of educational attain-
ment, and illiteracy:
I remember working very hard in school because I really wanted to escape my social 
background. I didn’t want to be as poor as my parents or mistreated. Because when 
you don’t know French perfectly well or have a certain level of education—especially 
when you’re an immigrant—that’s what happens. So I said to myself that when I grow 
up, it’s out of the question to be treated like that. And I also worked hard because I 
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wanted to earn a lot of money, to help my parents, to have my parents be proud of 
me, so it was a bit of a social retaliation there.
Safia grew up in a middle-class neighborhood near the Musée du Louvre with 
her two younger brothers and younger sister, who all still live in the Parisian met-
ropolitan area. Her parents migrated separately to France, where they then met and 
got married.1 Her mother had been widowed in Tunisia and immigrated to France 
to “make a change in her life.” Her father came to France for better employment 
opportunities. Despite speaking little French and communicating mostly in Arabic, 
they were able to make do—get around, read metro signs, and make a life in Paris. 
Her father worked as a cook and her mother worked as a nursery school assistant.
Growing up, Safia always had cousins and other extended relatives living with 
her family, particularly in the initial months after these relatives immigrated to 
France. In retrospect, Safia thinks it was great having these other relatives around 
because it helped her learn about various aspects of maghrébin culture.
Safia remembers learning she was different when she entered high school and 
a classmate told her she had “matte” skin. From that moment on, she understood 
that she would “never be completely considered as a French person.” This only 
intensified as she grew older. As a law student, she remembers classmates calling 
her a dirty Arab and telling her she should return to her country. Safia remembers 
constantly being reminded of how she did not belong, particularly in an environ-
ment of mostly white students and faculty. “I remember crying a lot during that 
time,” she explained.
However, she managed to be successful in her studies, earning both undergradu-
ate and graduate degrees. Safia now works as a journalist and rents an apartment in 
Cergy-Pontoise, a western banlieue, with her two young children and her husband, 
who is a child of Algerian immigrants and works as a banker. There is much that 
makes her proud to be French, such as the values exemplified in the motto of “Lib-
erté, égalité, fraternité.” But she hates that her “Frenchness” is still often questioned 
by others: “Today, when I’m with my children, people still ask me, ‘What are your 
children’s origins?’ or ‘Where do you come from?’ That drives me crazy, because my 
children were born in France to French parents. And me, I was born here, my chil-
dren were born here, and they still ask me that. It is so annoying to have to continu-
ally justify myself based on the color of my skin or the color of my children’s skin.”
Safia feels her place in France is questioned because she of her maghrébin ori-
gin. Reflecting on her status in French society, she feels that she is “French in the 
second degree.” Despite her middle-class status and educational and professional 
accomplishments, she nonetheless feels like she occupies a France that continually 
reminds her of how her visible difference and nonwhite status excludes her from 
being accepted as French by others.
Like Safia, most respondents remember when they first felt different—because 
of their maghrébin origins—from others growing up. Yet intergenerational mobil-
ity is complex for immigrant-origin individuals. Despite her upward mobility 
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vis-à-vis her immigrant parents, she is not treated much different from them on 
an everyday basis. While Safia is very accomplished in realms of education and 
employment, she remains marginalized. Throughout Safia’s childhood, she worked 
hard to counter the stigmatization her parents faced, yet because she could not 
change the thing that really mattered—being nonwhite—she did not dramatically 
change her status in relation to mainstream society. She continues to be denied 
cultural citizenship by her fellow French citizens.
In this chapter, I discuss respondents’ childhood experiences and how these 
experiences shaped both their upward mobility up to and including adulthood 
and sense of social marginalization in wider society. Respondents learn that they 
are not seen as French by others as children. And they are continually reminded of 
this difference as adults. While all my respondents grew up in France, they did not 
grow up feeling French, for they were told at a young age that they were different 
or treated and seen as outsiders. I therefore situate growing up French as a ques-
tion because many respondents remember how their “Frenchness” was questioned 
starting at an early age: Do they really grow up French?
Moreover, children of maghrébin immigrants had to navigate two different 
seemingly incompatible cultural worlds—home versus school, or maghrébin ver-
sus French. I investigate the messages these individuals received from their par-
ents and extended family regarding what it means to be French, as well as how 
these compare and contrast with the messages they received at school, both in 
their primary and university educations. Because of this distinction, children 
of North African immigrants had to become “cultural brokers” (Sharma 2010), 
bridging different cultural worlds. I also trace the influence of these messages on 
their later upward mobility and unpack the cultural repertoires and cultural and 
social capital this generation inherited from their parents. Respondents’ child-
hood experiences set the stage for their later upward mobility and attainment of 
middle-class status. For children of immigrants who are also racial and ethnic 
minorities, the processes of identity formation are especially complicated, as these 
individuals must situate dual cultural worlds within a particular racial and ethnic 
hierarchy (Ali 2008; Waters 1999). Their experiences might be different if they 
were second-generation Italian or English immigrants and did not have to navi-
gate their second-generation status while also being an ethnic minority connected 
to a colonial history. In France immigrant-origin individuals also must navigate 
this in the absence of state-sanctioned identity categories.
LEARNING OF ONE’S  DIFFERENCE: 
HOME VERSUS SCHO OL
As Zara describes the boundaries in her Perpignan community: “There were 
Français du souche and there was everyone else.” Born to an Algerian immi-
grant mother and a Moroccan immigrant father, Zara, a twenty-eight-year-old, 
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remembers learning she was different in her predominately white elementary 
school when her schoolteacher did not understand what the henna on her hands 
meant and made her wash it off her hands. This experience was her first denial of 
cultural citizenship. Growing up in Perpignan, in southern France, she had many 
experiences like this one, which helped her realize she was étranger, or foreign. She 
also remembers getting dirty looks and stares from other students when she did 
not eat pork at the school cafeteria because it was not halal.
It was early childhood moments like these that reinforced dual cultural worlds 
to Zara. Her way of life at home was markedly different from her life at school, 
and this difference was something that not everyone had to consider. In France 
there was and is a stigma attached to North African origins, and children of North 
African immigrants grow up with messages from society at large that they should 
be ashamed of such origins. They became conscious of the distinction between 
the maghrébin and French cultural worlds, and its consequences, through their 
parents’ socialization of them.
Zara’s family, including her two older brothers and one younger brother, was one 
of only five maghrébin-origin families in her neighborhood. Her father worked as 
an electrician and her mother was as a homemaker. Both parents stopped attend-
ing school just before high school. Twenty-eight years old and living in Seine-
Saint-Denis, Zara works as a social worker in the nineteenth arrondissement 
and is actively involved in cultural, social, and political organizations related to 
maghrébin life in France. Her early experiences continue to resonate in her work 
with maghrébin-origin youth.
School is where children of maghrébin immigrants learn both Republican 
principles and what it means to be French, which in turn shapes how they define 
themselves in French society. These factors also shape the boundaries respondents 
draw around French as an identity, and the degree to which they claim such an 
identity as adults. Education is an important means of Republican integration, and 
school is often the first state institution that immigrant-origin individuals con-
front (Fernando 2014; Rojas-García 2013). It is where they are exposed to French 
history and the boundaries of French national identity. As Pierre Bourdieu (1984) 
articulated, the French educational system values the culture of the dominant class 
and enacts a “symbolic violence” against other individuals by delegitimizing their 
values and concealing the power relations inherent in doing so. This symbolic vio-
lence becomes meaningful as symbolic distinctions are translated into real social 
boundaries.
School is also a site where difference is learned and reinforced (Kleinman 2016). 
Through the homogenizing nature of its curriculum, school also reifies a national 
history and national cultural repertoire, one that often excludes the contributions 
of immigrant-origin individuals (Keaton 2006; Lamont 1992).2 This automatically 
marginalizes children of immigrants and contributes to how symbolic boundaries 
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are translated into social boundaries around French identity and citizenship. It 
is, therefore, no accident that controversies over wearing the hijab, or Islamic 
headscarf, are often situated in schools because it is framed as contrary to French 
national identity and French schools are Republican institutions (Fernando 2014; 
Judge 2004; Raveaud 2008).
Because education is relatively centralized in France, schools are crucial sites 
for producing French citizens and instilling Republican principles (Bowen 2008; 
Chabal 2015; Keaton 2006; Maier 2004).3 As their parents were not educated in the 
French Republican system, children of North African immigrants often receive 
the most significant messages about what it means to be French from their school. 
Schools are also sites of otherness for this population, since it is where children 
of North African immigrants first feel inferior to and different from their white 
classmates (Noiriel 1996). Their early educational experiences therefore influence 
how they understand their social location. Martinique-born philsopher and writer 
Frantz Fanon (1967) discuses how in his homeland (an overseas département—a 
major administrative subdivision or branch of government in France) schoolchil-
dren were told to look down on their native creole language in favor of French, 
which helped create a separation between the worlds of home and school. Simi-
larly, in Spain schoolteachers exclude immigrant children from Spanish cultural 
citizenship, which in turn shapes immigrant-origin children’s notions of national 
belonging (García-Sánchez 2013). This is not unlike how the American educa-
tional system reifies a particular American ethos and historical narrative, which 
marginalizes those individuals seen as outside this dominant narrative.
The North African second generation experienced a dual education—one in 
French schools and another at home. School thus serves two identity-related func-
tions for this population—it defines what it means to be French and distances 
them from this definition. Members of this group must then work through how to 
reconcile these two educations, which have different implications for their identi-
ties. School mainstreams individuals by socializing them in the norms and val-
ues of mainstream society (Carter 2005; Maier 2004). Yet there is a limit to the 
degree to which school mainstreams the North African second generation. They 
are socialized in these norms and principles of mainstream society but kept apart 
from it. School helps establish cultural citizenship and then reinforces its denial.
Sabri’s experience is an example of this phenomenon. Growing up with four 
siblings in one of the only immigrant-origin families in Amiens, a town in north-
ern France, he was reminded of his difference at an early age:
I realized when I was around eight or nine or ten years old, that we were different 
from other people; the other children recognized that, meaning that they’d tell us, 
“You’re Arab; go back where you came from; you’re not from here,” and other insults. 
There were not many immigrants, maybe three or four families. .  .  . Everyone else 
was white. We quickly understood the image that they had of us. For that reason, we 
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understood we were different from others. . . . We felt different and not completely 
French, and that remains today.
Sabri would tell his parents about incidents in which he was insulted. However, 
although they were upset, they could not do anything because they experienced 
the same discrimination. These experiences were clearly traumatizing for Sabri. 
Though thirty years old and an eight-year resident of the Parisian metropolitan 
region (he lives in Porte de Saint-Ouen, a banlieue north of Paris) when we met, 
he is still reminded that his maghrébin origin marks him as different—in a society 
that supposedly does not mark racial and ethnic differences.
The experiences of the North African second generation bring to mind Fanon’s 
realization that, as a nonwhite, he was therefore different. In Black Skin, White 
Masks, he recalls how, when in France a white boy identified him as black to his 
mother: “For the first time, I knew who I was. For the first time, I felt as if I had 
been simultaneously exploded in the gaze, in the violent gaze of the other, and at 
the same time recomposed as another.” Like Fanon, who was labeled black, Sabri 
was labeled other, something outside the norm, nonwhite, not French. They are 
“forever foreigners” (Lowe 1996) within France, the country of their birth. Yet 
despite their later successes, particularly compared to their immigrant parents, 
the North African second generation is unable to escape this assigned otherness. 
This is a difference that is imposed on them at a young age, not one they them-
selves choose.
CULTUR AL CAPITAL AND C ONNECTIONS 
ACROSS GENER ATIONS
I will now discuss the influence of their immigrant parents on respondents, 
including the messages they received about being maghrébin and French and 
how this shaped their later experiences, and how they understand those experi-
ences. Although respondents received somewhat differing messages from their 
immigrant parents, they all experienced marginalization by their white counter-
parts. As school provided one message regarding what it means to be French and 
how immigrant-origin individuals are outside this definition, home provided a 
contrary narrative helping to situate them as racial and ethnic minorities within 
France. Often, respondents discussed how their parents (and other relatives) pro-
vided them cultural tools and frameworks to make sense of their social locations. 
Cultural capital, meaning “skills individuals inherit that can be translated into 
different forms of value as people move through different institutions” (Lareau 
2015, 4), is transmitted through one’s family. For children of North African immi-
grants, this cultural knowledge involves navigating being maghrébin in France 
and preparing them for the obstacles they will face, which become particularly 
acute as they move through spaces where there are few other racial and ethnic 
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minorities. Such cultural capital allows them to make sense of their maghrébin 
backgrounds, which are continually and simultaneously marked and denied in 
France—denied in the sense of being viewed as part of French culture and his-
tory and marked in the sense that maghrébin-origin individuals are never seen 
as French.
For example, Safia learned both directly and indirectly from her parents the 
difficulties of being an immigrant in France. This fueled her in part to improve her 
social status, through work and educational attainment. Sabri feels that he learned 
what it means to be a Tunisian from his parents; it’s “what they gave [him].” But 
beyond teaching him about being Tunisian, they related how to be a Tunisian-ori-
gin individual in France and reinforced the connection between his life in France 
and his parents’ and extended family’s lives in Tunisia. He learned how his life in 
France is an extension of his family’s life in Tunisia. “That is where the clash comes 
in, meaning the meeting of the two, how to find an equilibrium between Western 
society and maghrébin culture, how to synthesize it all. Some people can do it, 
some cannot. As for me, I do not say that I’ve figured it out; I am always trying 
to find a compromise, it is a continual negotiation,” he explained. Developing his 
own identity as he has grown up has involved reconciling his Tunisian origins with 
his existence as a French person.
One mechanism for transmitting cultural capital from the first generation to 
the second was trips to the Maghreb, often to visit relatives during the summer. 
For example, Diana, a twenty-four-year-old of Algerian origin, has traveled to 
Algeria at least once a year since she was a child. She often spent the summers with 
her seven older siblings in a small village, which she describes as very traditional, 
where most of her extended family lives.
When I return there, I have the impression of being closer and closer to my origins, 
to the rest of my family. . . . My grandparents are buried there, and I just find that so 
important, to not forget where I came from, where my parents came from, to really 
see their path, to where they are today. They have really lived through some things, 
they were born in these small villages, and they ended up, for my father, destined to 
be farmers taking care of the land, my mother taking care of her children. . . . They 
evolved with the times, transmitting all their culture, all their values, which were 
developed in a context that is totally different, that had nothing to do with France.
When I press Diana on what exactly she feels she learned from her parents, she 
explains:
Well, the language for one—that’s very important in terms of culture. Also, the food. 
I know that sounds silly, but as an adult, I know how to make all the dishes I ate as a 
child, the ones that are really typical from the region where my parents grew up, that 
people of the same origins as me eat. I learned how to make these dishes from my 
parents, and I really liked that. . . . As for the story of what drove us from Algeria, my 
parents have told me about that time. It was difficult for them to talk about at first, 
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because they lived through the Algerian War of Independence, and that was really 
difficult for them. It’s true that they have lots of awful memories, of losing members 
of their families, their parents, et cetera, who were part of the Algerian resistance. . . . 
And it was a really difficult period—they didn’t have easy access to food. Really, their 
story is the story of Algeria. We don’t feel it much anymore. But since I was born—I 
really wasn’t that old—I have understood better the change or the shift, the history 
even. Because it’s true that we read books and learned it a little, but living it through 
people who lived it is important to have a sense of this war, and what stemmed from 
it, so even at a cultural level I find that it’s very important to transmit a culture, the 
culture of your country to your children.
Diana conveys how her existence in France stems from its colonial relationship 
with Algeria. This is a history that is both intertwined with and separate from her 
everyday life in France. Her Algerian origins have direct implications for her social 
status in France, including the otherness assigned to her. Her parents recreated 
their culture within France, namely, through the Arabic language and a particular 
cuisine. But part of their connection to their Algerian culture requires acknowl-
edging that colonial relationship and its psychological and material consequences 
for Algerian immigrants and their descendants. Diana recognizes the intense 
struggle of her parents, even while she faces the difficulties of being a maghrébin-
origin individual in France. As an adult, she can feel connected to Algeria, at least 
in part through her regular travel there, while also recognizing how different her 
life would have been if her parents had not immigrated to France. Because of her 
own experiences growing up as well as her knowledge of her parents’ history, 
Diana dislikes how immigrants and their descendants are referenced in France.4 
She feels that most immigrants are very respectful of French law, and that their 
descendants are just as French as anyone else. They do not have to integrate, since 
the French culture is the one into which they were born and in which they grew 
up. It is their culture, too.
Other respondents also referenced childhood travel to the Maghreb as helping 
situate their lives in France and fulfilling an important cultural function. Hicham, 
a twenty-nine-year-old of Moroccan origin, visited Morocco every summer dur-
ing his childhood with his parents and four younger brothers. Now, as an adult, he 
goes whenever he can. He says, “It allows me to rediscover my origins, language, 
customs, family. It’s just not the same unless you go there.” He anticipates doing 
the same thing for his children. Semi, a thirty-six-year-old of Tunisian origin who 
lives in the twentieth arrondissement, spent much of his childhood, sometimes 
entire years, living in Tunisia. His parents wanted him to have that experience 
so that he “could discover his origins, history,” he explained. “Many second-
generation immigrants in France are not in a good situation; many of them do 
not know where they are from.” Semi thinks it has been easier for him to live in 
France because of his experiences in Tunisia. He has a better sense of his culture 
Growing Up French?    37
and origins than other children of North African immigrants and feels he is more 
grounded then they are.
Similarly, Soria, a thirty-four-year-old of Algerian origin who lives in a condo 
in the fifteenth arrondissement and has worked as a human resources director for 
the past decade, grew to appreciate her Algerian origins because of, in no small 
part, an extended trip she took to Algeria when she was a teenager: “One of the 
best moments of my life, the most life changing, was when I spent four months 
in Algeria. It allowed me to gain what I had been missing, notably in relationship 
to my identity. When I returned, I started speaking Arabic more, because before, 
when I spoke to my parents, I spoke in French, and now ever since then I’ve always 
spoken Arabic with my parents.”
Her travel to Algeria allowed her to capture something previously unavail-
able to her had she never visited. However, her Algerian connection is not with-
out its complications. Soria does not travel there as often now because she is 
not as close to her family there, and also because security concerns make her 
increasingly anxious about possible terrorist attacks in Algeria. Her attachment 
to Algeria has become less about the place and the need to physically be there 
and more about how Algeria represents a connection to her immigrant parents, 
to French colonial history, and to Algerian culture. The Arabic language plays 
a role in strengthening connections across generations in maghrébin-origin 
households. It is not uncommon for children of North African immigrants to 
return to studying (or speaking) Arabic later in their lives, as it remains the 
“highest-status vehicle for religious knowledge,” though the language itself is 
gradually declining in maghrébin-origin Muslim households (Bowen 2004b, 48; 
see also Cesari 2002).
Samir, a twenty-nine-year-old of Algerian origin pursuing a doctorate in 
political science, remembers growing up in Tours and feeling uncomfortable 
owing to his visibility as a member of one of the only Algerian families in his 
town. He felt his teachers did not understand him and thought he was different 
and strange. Samir also vividly remembers tensions with white neighbors. He 
valued his frequent travels to Algeria to see his family and believes they coun-
teracted his experiences growing up in Tours. He explained to me how Algeria is 
the site of his “culture of remembrance,” as opposed to his present culture, which 
is in France.
As these representative examples suggest, the connection between the middle-
class North African second generation and parents of maghrébin origin, devel-
oped through, for example, summer vacations and stories related to them by 
relatives, is a tool that helps them make sense of the marginalization they face 
in France. For many respondents, travel to their parents’ maghrébin country of 
origin further reinforced their difference and illuminated their denial of cultural 
citizenship within France.
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Beyond travel to the Maghreb, children of North African immigrants recalled 
specific messages their parents gave them about growing up in two different cul-
tural worlds. Mohamed, a thirty-year-old of Algerian origin, remembers how his 
parents reinforced that home was France. He grew up in Avignon, near Marseille, 
in the south of France, with his four brothers and two sisters. His father was a fac-
tory worker and his mother a domestic worker. His father had originally come to 
France to work for a few years and then returned to Algeria. However, he found 
he was uncomfortable there. He returned to France in the mid-1960s with his wife 
and had seven children there, Mohamed being the youngest. What he learned 
from his parents was contrary to what he learned at school: he was taught at an 
early age that he was different from whites. Growing up, the mixed messages were 
challenging for Mohamed. As an adult, he sees his French and maghrébin status as 
a richness. He locates himself in the liminal space between what his parents taught 
him about being of maghrébin origin in France and what he learned at school; that 
is, he is simultaneously maghrébin and French.
These connections between the first and second generation are both symbolic 
and real. Cultural capital allows individuals to be able to navigate a diverse number 
of situations. What children of North African immigrants learned, both explicitly 
and implicitly, from their parents reflects the complications inherent in being both 
descendants of immigrants as well as racial and ethnic minorities. Their schooling 
imparted certain messages to these children, and their parents helped them inter-
pret and confront them through their own cultural capital. Despite their education 
in a French Republican school, respondents quickly learned that they were not a 
part of the French Republic. Though they tried, their parents were ill-equipped to 
help them navigate this dual status. As first-generation immigrants, they them-
selves were never assumed to be part of the French mainstream. And yet neither 
are their children.
HIGHER EDUCATION
That children of immigrants felt different from others was also reinforced by their 
university education. All respondents have a university education above the bac-
calaureate level.5 Higher education facilitates their upward mobility into a middle-
class status yet erects barriers to their full societal inclusion.
I noted earlier how Abdelkrim’s sense of having been marked as different was 
heightened when he began his university studies in Tours. “We [he and the other 
students] don’t have the same lives,” he explained. “The more you advance in your 
education, the harder it is to find people like you.” The quest for compatibility is 
not limited to maghrébin-origin individuals in France but also applies to racial 
and ethnic minorities around the world, whether they are African Americans in 
predominately white colleges and universities or immigrant-origin individuals in 
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a predominately white town or neighborhood in some other corner of the globe. 
French higher education does not systematically address its lack of ethnoracial 
diversity.6 This can create added complications for individuals like Abdelkrim, 
who may have had similar and like-minded friends growing up but have diffi-
culty making connections in a university setting. This has implications for the 
development of one’s identity and the perception of one’s status in society at large, 
as research on racial and ethnic diversity in higher education and the workplace 
attests (Feagin 1991; Tatum 1997).
By most accounts, Mourad, a thirty-year-old of Algerian origin, is very success-
ful. He will soon earn his doctorate from the Institut d’études politiques de Paris, 
better known as Sciences Po, and also works as a freelance writer. He lives in an 
apartment in the seventh arrondissement, a neighborhood near the Eiffel Tower, 
which he described to me as “very rich and very white.” Mourad is very close to his 
parents. His father immigrated to France in the 1960s for factory work; his mother 
migrated about ten years later, caring for Mourad and his five brothers and one 
sister. His parents are not educated, which he explains was common in Algeria at 
the time of the Algerian War of Independence. Mourad remembers being marked 
as different at a young age, including being called an Arab as well as ethnic slurs 
by his classmates. Yet he managed to complete his studies in political science and 
sociology and earn a master’s degree studying immigration in the Arab world. He 
is the recipient of a prestigious fellowship funding his doctoral research on the 
French military.
Still, Mourad acknowledges how hard it has been to accomplish all of this and 
cites the various barriers he has faced along the way because he is not white. He 
explains that coming from a modest and maghrébin-origin background, it is not 
easy to succeed:
It’s difficult, difficult, because, for example, to complete your studies you are obliged 
to have a side job.  .  .  . I’m a student at Sciences Po. It’s a prestigious university in 
France. Because my parents cannot afford to give me money, I must have a side job. 
That means that I have less time to complete my studies, so that adds a lot of pres-
sure. . . . It’s difficult to come from a modest background, whether you’re of immi-
grant origin or not, because in France there are a lot of barriers. . . . I think that in 
French society, to climb it, you need to go through the grandes écoles [prestigious, 
university-level colleges that require entrance examinations], and in France these 
schools remain very, very white and bourgeois. Actually, the university is democra-
tized in France; there are many minorities in the regular universities, Paris 8, Paris 
1, and Paris 2.7 But … it’s not because you have a diploma from a university like this 
in France that you are going to experience social mobility, because what’s happened 
is that a lot of people have these kinds of degrees, and so the value of that diploma is 
lowered. That means that if there are five hundred people who have a master’s, there 
are not a lot of jobs that require a master’s, so there are a lot of people who are going 
to be left out. Myself, I know people who have a bachelor’s, who have a master’s, who 
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have jobs that don’t have anything to do with [their degrees or topic of studies], who 
work at McDonald’s, places like that. So there are people from modest backgrounds 
who are at universities, it’s true. However, the grandes écoles, they remain as before. 
With the exception of Sciences Po, which has been making small steps in the past 
four to five years, the other grandes écoles—Polytechnique, Ponts et chaussées, ES-
SEC, HEC—remain [mostly white and bourgeois].8 . . . In France, if you really want 
to move up, to advance socially, it’s necessary to go through the grandes écoles.
Mourad recognizes the education necessary for upward mobility. Approxi-
mately one-fourth of respondents attended or attend these schools.9
When he finishes his doctorate, he hopes to become a university professor, 
though he realizes how many more obstacles exist at that stage. Mourad has con-
fronted the same obstacles throughout his educational trajectory. He frames his 
experiences of higher education in France simultaneously as linked to his ethnic 
origin and working-class background. He is not just working-class and upwardly 
mobile, but also maghrébin. A focus on just socioeconomic status or class would 
omit the salience of race and ethnicity for determining his life path.
Despite his successes, Mourad fully realizes the barriers that all maghrébin-
origin individuals face—regardless of socioeconomic status. He recounted to me 
how he and his other North African–origin friends are regularly stopped by the 
police, who check their identification (the French version of stop and frisk).10 He 
has also been followed in department stores by salespeople and been denied entry 
to nightclubs regardless of how he is dressed.
While higher education is a means to upward social mobility, it is not without 
its complications. Members of the maghrébin second generation are also first-
generation university students. Their higher education again reminds respondents 
of their difference from the mainstream. And it also reveals how the denial of cul-
tural citizenship continues for these individuals well into adulthood.
NAVIGATING T WO WORLDS:  
BET WIXT AND BET WEEN
The 2004 French film Le grand voyage (The Great Journey) by director Ismaël Fer-
roukhi, who was born in Morocco before moving to France as a young child, beau-
tifully illustrates the complicated connections between maghrébin immigrants 
and their children. Réda, the teenage son of Moroccan immigrants, accompanies 
his father on a pilgrimage to Mecca from southern France. His father insists on 
communicating in Arabic, while the son speaks French. Their tense interactions 
across eight different countries reveal how children of maghrébin immigrants live 
in dual worlds—in their parents’ traditional culture and the Westernized French 
culture in which they have grown up.
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In France the denial of cultural citizenship through an assigned otherness 
begins in childhood and is reiterated throughout primary, secondary, and higher 
education. Children of North African immigrants must navigate two cultural 
worlds—French and maghrébin. This reflects the cultural citizenship they have 
been denied, which positions their maghrébin origins as non-French. Those cul-
tural worlds were often in conflict or positioned against each other. This dynamic 
is true for other minority populations in different contexts as well, including 
Latino and African American students in the United States who must straddle 
multiple cultural worlds or invoke multiple cultural repertoires—the dominant 
culture versus the culture of their minority group (Carter 2005). However, the 
maghrébin second generation does this in a context where, ideologically speak-
ing, they should not have to. Per French Republican ideology, they are as cultur-
ally French as any other French person, so long as they adhere to the values of 
the Republic. In this context, navigating two cultural worlds—and never being 
firmly in one or the other—reveals the degree of their marginalization, or distance 
from mainstream society. They move and interact in the dominant cultural world 
but remain outside of it. In this context, the North African second generation is 
never allowed to see itself as whole or integrated; rather, French culture and North 
 African culture are placed in opposition to each other.
Moreover, their attachment to dual cultural worlds or, as Samir puts it, their 
“belonging to two universes,” is something their white peers do not face. However, 
Mohamed grew to see this as beneficial. “Growing up, I didn’t really understand it,” 
he explained. “But now I see it as more of a positive thing. . . . It has added to the 
richness of my life.” Mohamed’s ability to reframe his narrative has helped him be 
successful as a technical director for his company. Because he is middle-class, he 
can access multiple codes to navigate different kinds of spaces. His and his peers’ 
middle-class status forces them into the role of cultural broker (Warikoo 2011), as 
they must bridge the differences between French and maghrébin cultures, as well 
as the differences between the cultural worlds of the middle-class and the working 
class.
I opened this chapter by situating growing up French as a question, and I 
want to return to it now. As my respondents’ experiences reveal, they grew up 
in France, but they did not necessarily grow up French. That matters, because it 
reveals the limitations of the Republican model for incorporating or including 
nonwhite individuals. It also underlines how France, historically, has not acknowl-
edged race and ethnicity as salient. The North African second generation learned 
about their difference from mainstream society at an early age. Their Frenchness, 
or their place within the Republic, has been questioned by others since they were 
young. The denial of their cultural citizenship involves the continual questioning 
and denial of their belonging in France. And this begins in childhood, when they 
learn of their visibility as racial and ethnic minorities. Most individuals did not 
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grow up believing that they were legitimate members of the Republic. Essentially, 
they were socialized into what they are not—that is, not French. They continue to 
navigate this dual status and opposition between French and maghrébin in other 
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It dawned upon me with a certain suddenness that I was different from the 
others; or like, mayhap, in heart and life and longing, but shut out from their 
world by a vast veil.
—W. E. B. DuBois, The Souls of Black Folk
“Here I am, a black man who has done all the things I was supposed to do,” 
he said, and proceeded to tick off precisely what he done: gone to Harvard, 
labored for years to make his mark in an elite law firm, married a highly mo-
tivated woman who herself had an advanced degree and a lucrative career. 
He and his wife were in the process of raising three exemplary children. He 
had surmounted every hurdle life had thrown in this way. Yet he was far from 
fulfilled. “Blacks who have made it up the ladder have had to put up with a 
lot more crap” than have those who had given up along the way. But these 
successful people, he mused, were the very ones likely to be especially sensitive 
to the “crap” they encountered.
—Ellis Cose, The Rage of a Privileged Class
The middle-class North African second generation are cultural brokers (Warikoo 
2011) in two senses—between white and maghrébin cultural worlds and between the 
cultural worlds of their immigrant parents and other working-class North African–
origin individuals, and the middle-class world they occupy at work and school. They 
are cultural brokers in terms of race and ethnicity and in terms of their socioeco-
nomic status. Their educational and professional successes in adulthood only exac-
erbate their feelings of occupying multiple worlds. Their middle-class status only 
heightens the difficulty and frustration of not being fully accepted as French by oth-
ers. Their upward mobility and middle-class status launches them into a world dif-
ferent than their immigrant parents’, but having arrived there, what happens next?
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In this chapter, I explore how individuals navigate these dualisms by dem-
onstrating how middle-class, North African–origin individuals access different 
codes in different spaces. I also discuss their experiences of being marked as dif-
ferent across the different domains of Islam, the workplace, place of residence, and 
the public sphere. Those are all domains where their denial of cultural citizen-
ship is evident. The North African second generation is marginalized owing to its 
North African names, identification with Islam, and residential locations—all of 
which are proxies for race and ethnic origin (Silberman 2011). I further illustrate 
the pervasiveness of the racism they experience, which has implications for the 
relationship between marginalized individuals or minorities and the state. Despite 
Republican ideology emphasizing how all citizens are the same in their relation to 
the state, middle-class North African–origin individuals are still not treated as full 
and equal citizens.
Second-generation immigrants in other societies occupy a liminal status 
between the country where they were born and raised and their parents’ home 
country—never feeling as if they belong in one or the other, or in both (Eid 2008; 
Imoagene 2012; Kasinitz et al. 2004; PRC 2013; Portes and Rumbaut 2001; Portes 
et al. 2011; and Zhou and Lee 2007). For second-generation immigrants who man-
age to be upwardly mobile, there is another dimension to navigate as cultural 
broker—their dual minority and middle-class status (Warikoo 2011). It exacer-
bates their feeling of being between two worlds, as they are not only between 
French and North African, but also between working-class and middle-class. As 
with middle-class populations more generally (Frazier 1957; Lacy 2007; Pattillo-
McCoy 1999; Vallejo 2012), middle-class children of North African immigrants 
move through different symbolic and real spaces, their interactions not limited 
to other maghrébin- or immigrant-origin individuals. This is a product of their 
upward mobility; their working-class roots did provide them with the same cul-
tural and social capital as their white counterparts. They are second-generation 
immigrants, yet first-generation middle-class individuals. They can study at Sci-
ences Po, for example, but they may not fit in or feel as comfortable as their white 
classmates. They may hold a leadership position at work, but they may not feel 
they are regarded as competent or knowledgeable as their white counterparts 
in comparable positions. This is a problem, not only for France, which espouses 
a particular model of identity politics, but also for all minorities in plural and 
diverse societies.
UPWARD MOBILIT Y,  BEC OMING MIDDLE-CL ASS,  AND 
THE GL ASS CEILING
Consider Farid, a thirty-two-year-old with dual Algerian and French citizenship, 
whom I met at a café near the new Bibliothèque François Mitterrand building. 
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I had connected with him through an immigrant-related organization. He lives 
in the southwestern banlieue of Melun with his wife and two young children 
and works for the Ministère de la ville, de la jeunesse et des sports (Ministry of 
the City, Youth, and Sports, since renamed). At a very young age, his parents 
told him, “You are not French. We live in France, but you are Algerian.” They 
imparted to him their love and appreciation of Algeria, which took priority over 
any attachment to France, and their connection to Algerian culture—which he 
and his wife intend to pass on to his young children. His parents shared with him 
the family history and educated him in Muslim and Algerian cultural traditions, 
including music, common expressions, and speaking Arabic. “I do not feel an 
emptiness in this regard,” Farid explains, “meaning. culturally, I believe that I 
have an Algerian heritage. I am connected to a family. I am connected to a region 
in Algeria.”
This might be interpreted as a failure of children of North African immigrants 
to assimilate into French society and adopt its norms and values, and as a prefer-
ence for retaining an attachment to former French colonies in the Maghreb. How-
ever, Farid’s story is more complex.
Looking back, Farid feels that he adopted an Algerian identity rather than a 
French one because he grew up in Rouen, in the northwestern part of France, 
near Normandy, in a predominately Muslim and maghrébin neighborhood, which 
was labeled a zone d’éducation prioritaire (educational priority zone, or ZEP) by 
the French government. He rarely interacted with whites growing up. Many of 
his neighbors also took Arabic courses on the weekend, and many of his class-
mates and friends fasted during Ramadan. His father was a factory worker and 
his mother, twenty-five years younger than his father, was a housewife. His father 
came to France when he was twenty-three years old to work, and then returned to 
Algeria to meet his wife, who would later join him in France.
Because neither of his parents was educated or literate, they always stressed the 
importance of him doing well in school. Farid credits his parents for his educa-
tional and occupational success; none of his childhood friends managed to gradu-
ate from college and hold a professional job, as he did. He remembers that his 
mother signed him up for a library card when he was young, though she herself 
could not read. Farid later studied at the University of Rouen, where he met his 
wife, a child of Algerian immigrants, and then earned a graduate degree from the 
University of Bordeaux. “It was just something I understood at an early age,” he 
said, when explaining the importance of education. “I just really wanted to make 
my parents proud.” His four older siblings have the same education level. Friends 
from his old neighborhood (also of North African origin) are less educated. Those 
who are consistently employed mostly have menial or working-class jobs, and 
some have had trouble with the law. “I think about that a lot, why I was the only 
one of them to finish high school studies, go to college,” he explained. “I think it’s 
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attributable to the motivation of my parents.” His parents served as role models, 
in that they struggled when they first immigrated to France because they were 
uneducated and did not speak French but “were able to adapt, to move forward,” 
he explained proudly.
The nature of social segregation in French society made it difficult for Farid to 
identify as a French person. The French state, through its policies and practices, 
has created and fostered his isolation and separation from mainstream society, 
a sense shared by other children of maghrébin immigrants. This difference was 
thrust upon him, not one he coveted.
If Farid does not necessarily see himself as part of the French mainstream, he 
nonetheless has moved up the ladder and is successful. He enjoys his job, but it 
presents its challenges, particularly in terms of advancing in the department hier-
archy. But, he says, “it is always important for me to remember that I have it a lot 
better than my parents.” This is an example of the dualism Farid and others experi-
ence. They recognize their continuing difficulties as mediated by their maghrébin 
origins, but they also consider them relative to those experienced by their immi-
grant parents and economically disadvantaged.1
Farid is a minority within a minority group. As such, he experiences ambiva-
lence about his social position. Farid recognizes the advantages of his educational 
accomplishments and professional status, yet he is not far removed from his immi-
grant parents and his childhood friends from his neighborhood.
Middle-class North African–origin individuals are distinct from their white 
counterparts in France, as they do not experience the full advantages of middle-
class status. Like second-generation Mexican Americans and other middle-class 
racial and ethnic minority populations, second-generation maghrébin immi-
grants can achieve upward mobility through education, yet face a “glass-ceiling 
mobility” (Rojas-García 2013) or an insurmountable barrier to being viewed as 
truly French. They are “qualified, yet excluded” (Rojas-García 2013). Though 
educated in the society where they were raised, they are not permitted to truly 
fit in.
I was struck by this when I began conducting fieldwork in Paris. Following the 
2005 uprisings in France’s banlieues,2 many news reports focused on the impov-
erished and unemployed segment of the second-generation population and how 
their lower socioeconomic status had kept them outside the French mainstream.3 
These individuals were seen to have turned their backs on France, rejecting its 
norms and practices. It was they who were the problem, not France. They culti-
vated an oppositional identity and did not see themselves as French. Marginaliza-
tion in France was based on class or socioeconomic status, not race and ethnicity. 
The issue was that this population did not work hard enough to make it in French 
society (Beaman 2015b). For members of the second generation who were edu-
cated and employed, marginalization was not an issue.
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Yet maghrébin-origin individuals themselves know differently. The upwardly 
mobile are not viewed differently than their economically disadvantaged or disen-
franchised counterparts. Individuals like Farid still do not feel as though they fit in 
or are included. Their success is not a panacea for the racism and discrimination 
they face. And their marginalization exists across multiple domains, including the 
workplace, residential location, and religious life.
Ndiaye’s (2008) minority paradox, the theory of the simultaneous visibility and 
invisibility of France’s black population, also applies in this middle-class minority 
population; their visibility is heightened by their presence in predominately white 
spaces (including elite universities and professional and executive-level offices), 
but they are invisible because their presence is ignored in mainstream society. The 
discrimination and marginalization they experience is more evidence of how race 
and ethnicity are constitutive of French identity.
North African–origin individuals have an ambiguous status vis-à-vis being 
middle-class in part because of their proximity to their working-class counter-
parts–often individuals in their own families or neighborhoods. For example, 
Hamama, a thirty-five-year-old of Algerian origin who works as a hospital direc-
tor and studied at Sciences Po, has been more successful than her three younger 
brothers, who live in Lille in northern France, where she also grew up. One 
brother has been unemployed for about three years and another one works a bus 
driver. Hamama therefore realizes that her own material circumstances could 
have been widely different. “People see me differently once they learn that I am 
educated, that I went to Sciences Po,” she explains. She started an activist orga-
nization denouncing discrimination and working to help banlieue residents and 
maghrébin-origin individuals who are trying to get ahead but lack the opportu-
nities to do so. Individuals who have made it feel they cannot forget those who 
have not.
Many respondents are heavily involved in maghrébin-related professional orga-
nizations, which seek to provide opportunities for their working-class counter-
parts (as well as networking opportunities for fellow professionals). As the  African 
American middle-class maintains connections to other African  Americans to 
maintain their racial and ethnic identity even while seeking full incorporation 
into the American mainstream (Lacy 2004, Pattillo-McCoy 1999), so too do North 
African–origin individuals use professional and social networks to maintain 
and foster ties with other middle-class maghrébin-origin individuals. However, 
maghrébin-origin individuals must make these ties amid institutional contexts 
that do not recognize their ethnic identity as legitimate. There is no legally estab-
lished maghrébin-French or North African–French identity. They are supposed to 
just be or act French, yet they are not treated as such. These networks allow them 
to cope with their position at the bottom of the ethnoracial hierarchy, despite their 
middle-class achievements.
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Part of being middle-class and maghrébin is moving in multiple spaces, inter-
acting with maghrébin individuals and whites. Assimilation is not an appropriate 
framework for understanding the experiences of this population. That they were 
born and have spent their entire lives in France allows them structural assimila-
tion, yet they are not culturally assimilated (Lacy 2007), for they are not regarded 
as part of French culture. This is not a group that desires separation from non–
immigrant origin individuals or whites; rather, its members become adept at 
strategically moving through in two different cultural worlds. Respondents often 
attend schools where other students do not resemble them, or they work in spaces 
where they are one of few immigrant-origin individuals.
My focus on the stigmatization and marginalization on middle-class 
maghrébin-origin individuals because of their race and ethnic origin challenges 
Loïc  Wacquant’s conclusions about the nature of assimilation and ethnic identity 
in France. He argues that this demographic has adopted “the mainstream cultural 
and behavioral patterns of the French” and has failed to form a distinct maghrébin 
community or assert any “ethnic specificity” (Wacquant 2007, 194), and thus has 
successfully assimilated. According to Wacquant, the second-generation immi-
grant population demonstrates how race and ethnic origin are insignificant for 
French daily life and how France is more successful at integrating its immigrants 
and their descendants than is the United States. He says that even if African 
Americans and North African–origin individuals in France have similar lived 
experiences, the explanations for each are markedly different. He favors socio-
economic explanations for marginality in France, versus a race-based explanation 
for marginality in the United States. However, in addition to neglecting an inter-
sectional analysis focusing on race and socioeconomic status, Wacquant neglects 
how, though children of maghrébin immigrants may be socialized or assimilated 
along traditional lines (for example, by education or language), they nonetheless 
feel excluded from full participation in mainstream French society. Their racial 
and ethnic status do not allow them to identify as French, or have that identity 
accepted by others. He places the onus of this nonassimilation and noninclusion 
on the North African second generation rather than on French society at large: 
it is its members who are responsible for claiming their place within it. This dis-
course, of course, holds true for racial and ethnic minorities elsewhere: African 
American and Latinos, for example, are held responsible for discrimination or 
mistreatment they experience.4 By contrast, Wacquant and others believe that if 
maghrébin- origin individuals assert their French identity, they will be accepted 
as such. However, his theory does not acknowledge that even individuals who 
do everything right are still stigmatized and excluded. Socioeconomic factors are 
not the sole explanation for societal exclusion. Race and ethnicity play significant 
roles, regardless of class and socioeconomic status. More attention, therefore, must 
be paid to the everyday manifestations of France’s racial project.
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DIFFERENCE ACROSS D OMAINS:  
O C CUPYING MULTIPLE WORLDS
I. Islam
The continual marginalization of this middle-class population is also due to the 
intersection of race and religion—here, Islam—in French society. Children of 
Muslim immigrants in Europe “grow up in a world in which Islam is a chronic 
object of discussion and debate, a world that is thick with self-conscious and 
explicit discussions about Islam” (Brubaker 2013, 4). The denial of cultural citizen-
ship extends to this religious context. Maghrébin-origin individuals are associated 
with Islam, and they owe their marginalization in part to that.5
Much research on Muslims in France is based on the assumption that their 
religious identity, practices and beliefs are homogenous (Brubaker 2013; Lamont 
2002).6 I am not interested in Islam in terms of its tenets (see Bowen 2009 for more 
on this), but rather in the degree of their religious-based marginalization and their 
individual religiosity, or degree of religious commitment (Voas and Fleischmann 
2012), and how this shapes their status in and marginalization from mainstream 
society.7 This parallels Cadge and Ecklund’s (2007) “lived religion perspective,” 
which examines religion’s importance outside religious organizations, in social 
institutions such as families, workplaces, and schools.
Second-generation Muslim immigrants construct and negotiate a religious 
identity, but they do this in the context of a religion that is stigmatized in soci-
ety at large. Second generation–immigrant religious participation has been found 
to depend more on the salience of religious identity than ethnic national identity 
(Voas and Fleischmann 2012). France complicates this, as religion stands in for 
race and ethnicity as a marker of difference because race and ethnicity are not offi-
cially acknowledged. When North-African origin individuals are considered too 
culturally different from the French mainstream, their Muslim identity is often ref-
erenced because of the nation’s Islamophobia (Bleich 2006, 2009; Voas and Fleis-
chmann 2012). This is even though respondents say their religious participation 
and religiosity do not hinder them from feeling French or asserting a French iden-
tity (Beaman 2016; Maxwell and Bleich 2014). Rather, they frame their religious 
practices in a way that corresponds to the tenets of French Republicanism—they 
frame their religiosity a personal and private matter.8
Islamophobia, then, is not just about Islam; it is also about ethnoracial exclu-
sion. Religion stands in for racial and ethnic difference in a society that refuses 
to grapple head-on with these differences. Islamophobia is a form of racism—it 
sees certain individuals as too culturally different to ever be fully accepted as part 
of the mainstream. The connection between Islamophobia and racial and ethnic 
marginalization was perhaps most recently seen in the wake of the massacre in the 
offices of the satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo, in January 2015 and the resulting 
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international rally cry of “Je suis Charlie.” Samir explained to me in a conversation 
a few months after the attacks:
It was so weird. . . . After the attacks, I got a text message from a friend from high 
school, a white guy, asking me what I thought about the attacks, if I condemned 
them. It doesn’t make any sense. Of course, I condemn the attacks. . . . I mean, it’s 
not as if we ever ask Catholics and Christians to condemn the attacks that other 
Christians commit. . . . This is a republic. I’m part of a republic. I’m an individual in 
relation to the republic. When I pay my rent each month, I’m just paying for myself, 
not for anyone else or any group.
The experience of Samir, who migrated to France from Algeria when he was two 
years old, reflects the collective punishment (Hajjat 2015; Hajjat and Mohammed 
2013) that many North African–origin individuals experienced in the wake of the 
attacks. Such remarks—to him and to his cohort—serve as a constant reminder to 
children of maghrébin immigrants (and other French Muslims) of their marginal 
status in French society, and reflects that their Muslim identity is secondary to the 
Muslim label constructed for them by others.
About 80 percent of my respondents identify as either practicing or cultural 
Muslims. For many of them, Islam serves as a symbolic marker of maghrébin cul-
ture, just as Christian symbols and rituals are part of African Americans’ cultural 
toolkit, which they invoke in certain contexts to make sense of their marginaliza-
tion (Pattillo-McCoy 1998). Musulmans pratiquants (practicing Muslims) among 
my respondents engage in practices such as salat (ritual prayer); observing Rama-
dan; abstaining from alcohol and cigarettes; following halal food regulations; 
attending mosque; observing Muslim holidays; and wearing the hijab. About 68 
percent of respondents self-identified this way. Zara, a twenty-eight-year-old of 
Moroccan origin who works as a social worker, is a devout Muslim who consid-
ers being maghrébin and French as constitutive elements of her identity. For her, 
being a Muslim means “respecting Islamic principles, the five pillars—faith, fast-
ing, praying, making donations, and making the pilgrimage. I do all these, except 
the pilgrimage, which I haven’t done yet. Insha’Allah [God willing], I will have an 
opportunity to make it.” Although her parents raised her as Muslim, Zara did not 
really take the religion that seriously until she was about fifteen years old. It was 
not until she was twenty years old that she started to say the daily prayers.
Some of my respondents say they are Musulmans croyants—believers who do 
not practice the religion but who nonetheless profess cultural ties to it. They par-
ticipate in only a few rituals, such as observing Eid al-Fitr, the holiday that cel-
ebrates the end of the fasting period and of Ramadan. About 13 percent of respon-
dents self-identified this way. For those individuals, their Muslim status is more 
of a cultural claim than a religious one (also see Bowen 2004a; Venel 2004). They 
essentially see themselves as less Muslim than other French Muslims. Nadia, a 
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twenty-four-year-old of Algerian origin and graduate student studying human 
resources and communications, explains this distinction: “I tend to say I am a 
cultural Muslim, which means that in terms of culture I am Muslim, because I was 
raised that way, though my father was not. . . . Algerian culture is anchored in the 
Muslim religion, so . . . the education I received had a religious foundation.”
Nadia does not remember being particularly interested in Algerian or 
maghrébin culture until she was a teenager. She increasingly felt a need for an 
attachment to her culture, sought out connections with other maghrébin youth 
online, and began to learn more. She owes her identity as a cultural Muslim in 
part relates to this social network of like-minded Muslim friends. Those Muslim 
friends characterize themselves similarly in terms of their religious identity and 
religiosity. Like most respondents, Diana believes religion should remain a private 
matter, per French Republican ideology.
That respondents’ Muslim identity and practices contributed to their marginal-
ization underscores how religion is another space where this population is marked 
as different. It is important to note how this marginalization is often based on 
others’ perception of their religious identity and practices, not the actual practices 
themselves.
Harmellia, a twenty-one-year-old college student of Moroccan origin, was 
raised in a public-housing complex in Nanterre, a banlieue west of Paris, with 
other maghrébin-origin individuals. Her phenotypical features do not immedi-
ately convey North African origin—she has pale skin and long blonde hair. She 
remembers her early marginalization because she was Muslim: “When I was 
young, I did not eat pork. . . . But when I tried to explain that to my schoolteacher, 
she did not believe me. They forced me to eat it.” Her teacher’s ignorance and ste-
reotypical views of maghrébin-origin individuals’ appearance resulted in a refusal 
to believe her.
Mourad also characterizes himself as a practicing Muslim who observes Rama-
dan but does not eat pork and does not say the ritual prayers. He says, “If a Muslim 
wanted to become French, he had to renounce his religion. He had to say, ‘Voilà, I 
want to be French, so I’m abandoning Islam.’ That’s how it was before. And I think 
in the minds of many French people today, you can still find this mindset, this idea 
that it’s difficult to be French and Muslim at the same time. Either we are French 
and not Muslim, or we are Muslim and therefore cannot be French.”
Mourad positions his religious identity as one barrier that keeps him from 
being fully accepted as French by others. He vividly remembers how his Muslim 
identity was used against him when he tried to rent an apartment. He had called 
a landlord to schedule an appointment to see it. When he arrived, the landlord 
asked him if he was Muslim. Mourad did not completely understand why he asked 
this question and responded that he was, indeed, Muslim. He later felt uncomfort-
able and did not pursue the rental.9 This experience was one of many in which 
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he was treated differently because of his ethnoreligious identity. Of note is how 
Mourad was set apart for merely identifying as Muslim, not for his practices. Here 
we have yet another example of how difficult it is for the middle-class maghrébin 
second generation to escape the difference assigned to it.
Nasar, a thirty-two-year-old Parisian of Algerian origin, often has similar expe-
riences of feeling different based on his religious identity. He feels most challenged 
in this regard at his workplace, an organization related to French soccer:
At my job, there about ten Arabs, five of whom drink alcohol, do not observe Rama-
dan, who love to go out, go to clubs, hang out, smoke . . . and there are five others 
who do not go out. Me, I do not drink, I do not smoke, I do not really go to clubs and 
all that. But it’s to me that they say, “You are extremist,” yet they love the others. . . . 
But with an Arab like me, it’s different. . . . If tomorrow you give in and follow what 
the French do, what they are, that’s great. Then they’ll say, “Nasar is a great guy, he 
drinks, he can drink two barrels of beer.”
Nasar’s coworkers see him as different because he practices the tenets of his 
Muslim faith. Unlike some of his coworkers, he refuses to perform a Muslim iden-
tity that the French more easily accept, one that Nasar considers inauthentic. He is 
unwilling to sacrifice his religious identity.
Hicham, a twenty-nine-year-old of Moroccan origin, feels that although he 
agrees with the Republican tenets of keeping religious practices in the private 
sphere, he is repeatedly reminded of his Muslim status and North African origin:
I know they always mock me in terms of halal, what you can eat. Saturday, I went to a 
conference . . . and there was a buffet with different sliced meats that I could not eat. I 
didn’t say anything. It didn’t bother me at all. I ate salad. And people said to me, “You 
don’t eat the sliced meat?” And I said, “No, it’s not halal’. And one guy said, “But this 
isn’t a Muslim celebration.” I didn’t understand . . . why they would say that to me, 
especially when I never asked them anything. I didn’t say anything, I didn’t ask why 
there weren’t other options. . . . I consider it my choice to eat halal, something others 
should respect. There were people there who were vegetarian, who eat neither meat 
nor fish, but I’m not going to ask them why they don’t. . . . I respect their decision. 
I’m not going to tell them, “Well, this isn’t a vegetarian meal.” It’s things like this that 
we encounter more and more.
Hicham was particularly bothered by others’ reactions to his avoidance of 
nonhalal meat because he feels that he does not force his religious practices on 
anyone else. His Muslim faith represents a racial and ethnic otherness to his col-
leagues that they would not apply to a vegetarian. He is continually reminded how 
he is a practicing Muslim and therefore not considered French. This despite his 
nonmaghrébin-like appearance—he has fairer skin than many of his counterparts, 
which has sometimes protected him from discrimination.
While religion is a site of difference for this population, respondents neverthe-
less claim a French identity by how they frame their religion. By relegating their 
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religious practices to the private sphere, they assert their place in France and con-
sider themselves as French as anyone else.
II. Workplace
The exclusion of Muslim respondents extends into the workplace. For example, 
Farid remarked how, when there are meals or events at his office, it never comes 
to mind to his coworkers that Muslims generally do not eat pork. Though he has 
mentioned to them that he is Muslim, it is rarely taken into account. Though they 
have achieved professional success and have middle-class jobs, respondents feel 
that, compared to their white colleagues, they are regularly treated poorly.
The workplace is yet another context in which the middle-class North  African 
second generation is denied cultural citizenship on the basis of its racial and ethnic 
origin. All my respondents are stably employed in professional or similar types of 
jobs: they are lawyers, journalists, teachers, bankers, social workers, and entrepre-
neurs. But to better understand the social locations and positions of immigrant-
origin individuals, it is crucial to address not only underemployed and unemployed 
individuals, but also those who are stably employed. About 15 percent of second-
generation maghrébin immigrant men and 23 percent of  second-generation 
maghrébin immigrant women hold salaried or professional jobs (Lombardo and 
Pujol 2011). Although this is a minority of the North African second  generation, it 
is not a negligible segment, especially when considering the successes and failures 
of France’s assimilationist framework. Existing theories on assimilation among 
descendants of immigrants (Alba and Nee 2003; Zhou 1997), which emphasize 
upward mobility across generations as a key barometer of societal inclusion, are 
not applicable to middle-class children of maghrébin immigrants. While eco-
nomic disadvantage plagues most of the North African second generation—and 
the North African–origin population more generally—even individuals who do 
not face such difficulties are reminded that their maghrébin origins are an inex-
tricable barrier to full societal inclusion. Again, this is reminiscent of the margin-
alization black middle-class professionals face in the United States (Cose 1994). 
As long as the framework for understanding integration into mainstream society 
relies upon upward occupational mobility across generations, it is incomplete. The 
upward mobility of the North African second generation occurs in tandem with 
subtle and not so subtle mistreatment and discrimination when they enter pre-
dominately white institutions.
Being othered in the sphere of employment manifests in two ways—when seek-
ing employment and, if hired, subsequent treatment in the workplace. The road to 
the current professional and employment status of the North African second gen-
eration was a long one. This corresponds with existing research, which shows how 
proxies for race and ethnicity, including name, skin color, or residential location, 
led to discrimination in hiring practices (Silberman 2011). For example, Hicham, 
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who lives with his family in the western banlieue of Poissy, feels that his Tunisian 
origin has directly shaped his experiences on the job market: “As soon as we make 
an effort, we find a wall in front of us. . . . As for me, I had a lot of trouble finding 
my first job after I finished school. It took one and a half years to find my first job, 
but my classmates who were named François, Édouard, Frédéric. It took them 
six months or four months to find a job, but for me it took one and a half years.” 
Hicham’s name thus betrays his maghrébin origins.
Lila, a twenty-five-year-old high school teacher in the banlieue of Drancy, 
remembers having trouble finding a job as well: “I remember realizing when I was 
very young and looking for a job for the summer . . . that all my friends with blond 
hair and blue eyes named Émile were able to find jobs and I was not. . . . It’s more 
the leverage we don’t have, the power we don’t have, or sometimes last names or 
appearances that don’t please employers.”
The markers of differences, including physical appearance and names, serve 
as proxies for being nonwhite and an ethnic minority to employers. Because the 
hiring process for teachers is different than for other occupations (requiring a cer-
tification exam, for example), Lila’s job search was less colored by discrimination. 
Yet she says, “I have felt obligated . . . to show that I was more capable than others.” 
Other respondents say they felt they had to work twice as hard to prove them-
selves as worthy as their coworkers, which mirrors their experiences as university 
students. This dynamic is echoed by racial and ethnic minorities in predominately 
white workplaces in the United States (Cose 1994; Deitch et al. 2003; Feagin 1991; 
Harvey Wingfield 2011, 2013; Neckerman et al. 1999; Skrenty 2014; Van Laer and 
Janssens 2011).
Though Hicham eventually obtained a professional-level job at a bank, the pro-
cess was more challenging and complicated for him because of his ethnic origins. 
He was laid off during the economic crisis. Since he did not actually like his job, 
he saw the layoff as an opportunity to do something that would really fulfill him. 
He has since started an organization assisting the physically disabled (such as his 
younger brother) and began perfecting his English-language skills. Yet Hicham is 
quick to note that only maghrébin workers were laid off with him; white cowork-
ers who began work after him were not. Hicham saw that he was more disposable 
in the eyes of his company than his white colleagues. He remembers a colleague 
suggesting he change his name to one more traditionally French, like Pierre or 
Jacques, to fit in.
Ahmed, a twenty-nine-year-old practicing Muslim who has dual citizenship, 
has also faced difficulties at his work as a technical director for his company 
owing to his Algerian origins. He feels somewhat protected from more overt 
discrimination because of his educational background (he has a bac plus 5, or 
the equivalent of undergraduate and advanced degrees). Ahmed feels that the 
“two different educations” (the maghrébin one at home and the French one 
at school) of his youth provided a rich experience, though he did not always 
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see it this way. However, as a maghrébin-origin employee, he feels he must 
work harder than his white colleagues and “cannot make any mistakes.” Other 
maghrébin employees at his company feel the same way and say they are treated 
differently than their white coworkers. “A Maghrébin making a presentation 
will have no credibility if he makes a mistake,” Ahmed says. He adds that he is 
made to feel different in more subtle ways at work. For example, he says, “In 
my conversations with coworkers, sometimes people say ‘you people,’ and it’s 
like, who is ‘you’?” The language of his colleagues thus “others” different peo-
ple or groups. Sitting in a café outside his office, he described the glass ceiling 
maghrébin-origin employees confront, which impedes upward occupational 
mobility. Though Ahmed has substantial responsibilities as part of his job, 
including managing other employees, he believes that, however hard he works, 
he cannot advance significantly in his company’s hierarchy. “No one wants to 
see an Arab at the top,” he said. Middle-class status and occupational accom-
plishments are not sufficient barriers to marginalization based on race. Their 
successes do not challenge the existing ethnoracial hierarchy. Though they have 
made it on a socioeconomic level, middle-class children of maghrébin-origin 
immigrants are not accepted by others.
III. Place and Residential Location
Place, or one’s residential and spatial environment, is another domain where we 
can examine the relationship among race and ethnicity, marginalization, and 
Figure 1. Nanterre, a western banlieue of Paris. Photo by author.
56    Marginalization and Middle-Class Blues 
citizenship and explore the denial of cultural citizenship to racial and ethnic 
minorities. Put simply, “place is space filled up by people, practices, objects, and 
representations” (Gieryn 2000, 465). The meanings individuals attach to place are 
implicated in how they see themselves (Cuba and Hummon 1993; Gieryn 2000). 
Place also marks and sustains difference and hierarchy (Gieryn 2000). Regardless of 
whether children of North African immigrants live in banlieues or in Paris proper, 
place is one lens through which we can understand this population’s perceptions 
of and responses to marginalization; it offers a spatial dimension to the denial of 
cultural citizenship. Like the patterns of Muslim religiosity among respondents, 
respondents’ attachments to where they live do not negate their assertion of a 
French identity or feeling French. For many of these respondents, especially those 
who live in banlieues in the Seine-Saint-Denis département, where the proportion 
of immigrant-origin individuals is dramatically higher than in Paris proper, there 
is both a physical and social separation.
We can see how this manifests in France by considering the banlieues and 
the associated stigma of living in them (Balibar 2007; Oberti 2007; Préteceille 
2008; Silverstein 2008; Simon 1998). I specifically situate the banlieue as a site 
of racial and ethnic otherness and marginalization, regardless of these commu-
nities’ heterogeneity and where children of North African immigrants live. In a 
context where race and ethnicity are not acknowledged, place or residential loca-
tion becomes more salient as a marker for one’s racial and ethnic status (Silver-
stein 2008; Tissot 2008). If the assumption is that banlieue residents are of North 
African and sub-Saharan African origin, then by identifying someone as living 
in a banlieue, the implication is that he or she is of North African or sub-Saharan 
African origin.10 So someone’s ethnic origin can be referenced or identified with-
out explicitly doing so, and place euphemistically stands in for race and ethnic 
origin (Calvès 2004).11 Residential location is a proxy for ethnic origin, and this 
creates obstacles to employment for banlieue residents. Audits comparing identi-
cal CVs of individuals living in banlieues with those from other areas confirm this: 
employers preferred workers who do not live in banlieues typically associated with 
racial and ethnic minorities (ENAR 2014). Though France is not characterized by 
the same degree of racial and ethnic residential segregation found in the United 
States (Wacquant 2007), and residential integration within France increases from 
one generation to the next (Shon 2010),12 there remains persistent concentration 
of minorities in banlieue communities (Shon 2010) that results in their stigmatiza-
tion (Dikeç 2007; Silverstein 2008; Tissot 2007).
North African–origin individuals are often associated with the banlieues even 
if they do not live there (Amara 2006; Bouamama 2009; Hargreaves 2007; Silver-
stein 2008; Stovall 2003). This association of people of color with the banlieues is 
further evidence of France’s racial project, though ethnic-related segregation is 
antithetical to Republican ideology: the banlieues are stigmatized and considered 
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undesirable places to live. France’s colorblind ideology veils the marginalization of 
individuals because of their ethnic origin.
Banlieues, regardless of the variation in socioeconomic status and ethnic 
background one finds there, are framed as synonymous with disadvantage and 
“otherness” (Hargreaves 1996); they evoke “the image of housing projects, with 
young people hanging around wearing baseball caps and sweat suits, smoking 
joints, perhaps standing beside a burning car. Banlieues have become the symbol 
of a bleak urban environment, deviant youth, and segregated minorities” (Tis-
sot 2008, 1). The term banlieue has also become a catchall for quartiers sensibles 
(at-risk or vulnerable neighborhoods); quartiers difficiles (problem or under-
privileged neighborhoods); zones d’éducation prioritaire (educational priority 
zones, or ZEPs); zones urbaines sensibles (sensitive urban zones, or ZUSs); zones 
à urbaniser en priorité (priority urban zones, or ZUPs); and quartiers populai-
res (working-class neighborhoods) (Dikeç 2007; Hargreaves 1996; Tissot 2008). 
They are flattened to characterizations of mass unemployment; the predomi-
nance of cités (high-rise public housing complexes) the absence of two-parent 
family structure; a deskilled workforce; a high percentage of residents on pub-
lic assistance; low levels of educational attainment; and physical compactness 
(Avenel 2007; Balibar 2007; Dikeç 2007; Kokoreff 2003; Lapeyronnie 2008; LeP-
outre 1997; Maurin 2004; Rey 1996; Silverstein 2008; Stébé 2007; Tissot 2007; 
 Wacquant 2007).
Within the French academy, scholars tend to emphasize the socioeconomic 
segregation of banlieues (Oberti 2007; Simon 1998; Wacquant 2007) over their 
ethnoracial segregation (Lapeyronnie 2008; Tissot 2008). Furthermore, margin-
alization is considered place-specific, so that banlieue residents are marginalized 
and Parisians are not, further separating them from mainstream society. Wac-
quant (2007) questions the marginalization of the middle-class segment of the 
North African second generation. He argues that banlieue residents can pass in 
larger society if they do not exhibit markers of living in a banlieue (including one’s 
demeanor or speech patterns) (Wacquant 2007). But his argument ignores the 
connotation between the banlieues and racial and ethnic minorities who cannot 
overcome the association and be fully accepted as French.
Immigrants from the Maghreb originally settled in the banlieues of major cit-
ies (Tribalat 2004b). Immigrant-origin individuals who reside in the banlieues 
represent multiple ethnic origins, including Algerian, Tunisian, and Moroccan, 
as well as sub-Saharan African (Shon 2010; Simon 1997). Most of my respondents, 
about 65 percent, live in the banlieues, primarily in the inner-ring départements 
of Seine-Saint-Denis, Val-de-Marne, and Hauts-de-Seine (the rest live in Paris 
proper). Many respondents who are residents of the banlieues nonetheless work, 
attend school, or regularly socialize in Paris and travel back and forth by metro, 
bus, and tram.
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This cross-boundary movement appears to be a privilege of the middle-class 
segment of the North African second generation, for working-class individuals 
I encountered spend more time in their neighborhoods or banlieue communi-
ties and are less likely to spend time in Paris. While doing my fieldwork at the 
Nanterre Association, I realized that though Nanterre is only ninety minutes by 
commuter train or a twenty-minute drive from Paris by car, it is more isolated 
from Paris than that spatial distance suggests. One time, when I was typing on 
my laptop in the main room of the Nanterre Association in between sessions 
teaching English, a maghrébin mother from the neighborhood approached and 
greeted me. We spoke briefly. The wallpaper on my computer screen was a photo 
I had recently taken of the Jardin des Tuileries, near the Musée du Louvre. She 
asked whether the photo was of Chicago (since I lived there before I moved 
to Paris) or somewhere else in the United States. I was struck that she did not 
immediately recognize a popular Parisian landmark next to a world-famous 
museum. On another occasion, several children were taking a field trip to a pho-
tography exhibit at the Galerie nationale du Jeu de Paume, near the Place de la 
Concorde, one Wednesday afternoon in spring 2009. Since school is only a half 
day on Wednesdays, the Nanterre Association often organizes excursions for 
those afternoons. An older Algerian man who lives nearby and does occasional 
janitorial work for the organization explained to me that he was excited about 
going on the field trip because he had not been to Paris in about nine years, 
despite living in Nanterre. Another time, when I went on a field trip to the Arc 
de Triomphe with some of the students, many of them were unfamiliar with it, 
though it is a major Parisian landmark and not far from Nanterre. Experiences 
such as this reinforced the separation of Paris and this banlieue community and 
demonstrated that for its residents, the distance between them is mediated by 
socioeconomic status.
The residential communities, past and present, of my respondents, how they 
came to live there, and how location has determined their place in French society 
warrants examination. For racial and ethnic minorities, interactions with whites 
outside their ethnic enclave are often characterized by heightened discrimination 
and prejudice (Eid 2008). This is true for Abdelkrim. He grew up in a HLM com-
plex in a predominately immigrant neighborhood in central France. It was only 
later, when he attended a school where there were fewer immigrant origin indi-
viduals, outside of his neighborhood, that he felt out of place. In this new envi-
ronment, his difference from others became more tangible to him, causing him 
to reconceptualize his identity. He now lives in the Malakoff banlieue, just south 
of Paris, which he describes as better than most banlieues. He prefers living there 
because the residents seem more authentic than Parisians and he feels more com-
fortable and welcome. As with his childhood HLM complex, Malakoff is a place 
where he does not stand out as much.
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Though he works and spends a lot of time in Paris, Hicham is closely attached 
to the banlieue where he lives. He has spent most of his life living in a cité in Poissy, 
a western banlieue about fifteen miles from the center of Paris. His family settled 
in Poissy because the French car company Peugeot employed his father at a fac-
tory there. He describes his neighborhood as special because it is part of an urban 
renewal program. Hicham fought against the demolition of his public housing 
complex, which he feels was motivated by racist perceptions of immigrant-origin 
residents:
We had a mayor who wanted to destroy the neighborhood, because . . . you have a 
lot of people of foreign, maghrébin, African origin, and he wanted to eradicate the 
population. . . . That’s what he said: “I no longer want any of you in this neighbor-
hood or in this town.” This is a racist person. . . . We had a meeting where he came 
to present plans for renewal, and at the end he said, “If I had known, I would have 
brought a translator with me to explain this to you.” . . . But we understand French 
very well. And then he said, “I’m going to ask you to leave the room because we are 
going to have to ask the cleaning staff to disinfect.” He believes that we are germs. He 
kept saying such violent things.
Author: And what did the residents say?
Hicham: They revolted. We revolted and we formed a collective. That was in 2005. 
We fought against him for four years. . . . The apartments, their exterior, everything 
has deteriorated. Come see. . . . Everything is degraded—the living conditions, there 
are rats. We had everything. . . . We had the odors from the sewer . . . the smell of 
piled-up trash, rising almost to the second floor. . . . Oh, yeah, the trashcans—they 
wouldn’t come to empty them. . . . We had no hot water during winter, no heat.
Author: But isn’t this illegal?
Hicham: Yes, it’s illegal, and we complained  .  .  . but the government was slow 
to do anything.  .  .  . They had posted a sign stating that [the cité] was going to be 
demolished. We hired a lawyer and fought to delay demolition until the mayoral 
election. . . . Now there’s a new mayor. He’s launched a new plan. The residents are 
involved in it. We’re staying in the neighborhood.13
Hicham emphasizes the social cohesion of his neighborhood, despite its prob-
lems. “It’s like a family here. . . . There’s a solidarity. Everyone knows each other. 
Sure, the living conditions are a bit difficult, but now they’re improving. It’s getting 
better.” He sees living in his Poissy cité as part of who he is, and he hopes to be a 
role model for others in his community. He attributes the difficulties he has faced 
in finding a job to being maghrébin. He understands why the frustration of minor-
ity youth, led, for example, to the 2005 uprisings. Contrary to what Wacquant 
(2007) would argue, Hicham could not “pass” in larger French society. His name 
connotes not only that he lives in one of Paris’s beleaguered banlieues, but also 
his maghrébin ethnic origin, considered inferior to white “native French” identity.
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Nadir, a thirty-six-year-old of Algerian origin who works as a journalist for a 
major television news outlet, is similarly passionate about his banlieue and eager 
to refute its negative depictions in the media. Nadir lives in a Seine-Saint-Denis 
cité near the Stade de France soccer facility, one of the sites of the November 
2015 terrorist attacks. Seine-Saint-Denis is directly north of Paris, and generally 
considered one of Paris’s most troubled banlieues (Ichou and Oberti 2014; Kepel 
et al. 2011; Kiwan 2009; Truong 2015). He has lived there his entire life, save for 
eight years when he lived in Australia. Nadir describes this community as a typi-
cal French cité, with lots of immigrant families of modest or poor backgrounds. 
One day, when I was taking the tram with him from a café to his apartment so he 
could give me a copy of his memoir, he pointed out the window at all the nonwhite 
individuals on the street and asked me, rhetorically, how these people could ever 
see themselves as part of France.
Nadir is well aware of the perceptions others have of banlieue residents and feels 
it is important to challenge this stigma and set a good example for others in his 
community. Sitting in his office at the television station, one evening, he explained: 
“I feel more and more the fact that I live in Seine-Saint-Denis, because it is the 
poorest département in France, the département of the excluded, the département 
no one cares about, that we are really just left there.” This, of course, influences how 
he sees himself, not just in France but also in the world:
That’s why I feel solidarity . . . with the blacks who suffer in our country, solidarity 
with those in Gaza. I feel a solidarity with all who suffer . . . because I lived the same 
suffering myself when I was a kid. We didn’t have money to buy things. We were 
constantly stopped by the police for no reason, and because we didn’t have a lot of 
opportunities we had the same [kinds of] jobs. And as you can clearly see, there are 
only whites [in my office]. All the people are white. I am the only one [who’s not]. To 
be honest, it is difficult for me to be proud of my country because today, me, I am do-
ing well, but if there is one person [from the neighborhood] who is doing well, there 
are still forty others who are not.
Nadir’s consciousness as a minority (Meer 2010) is situated both vis-à-vis 
place and race and ethnic origin and connects him to other minority popula-
tions. He distinguishes himself from other residents who have no real attach-
ment to their cité and move away as soon as they can, once they have the finan-
cial resources to do so. “If everyone who succeeded left the neighborhood,” he 
explains, “only those who could not leave would live there, and that is what cre-
ates problems. Then you have a real ghetto.” Nadir and Hicham are individuals 
who, though middle-class, continue to live in banlieue communities to which 
they are attached. This attachment helps them cope with their experiences in 
predominately white spaces.
Within Paris city limits, the link between place and residence and the margin-
alization of respondents is also apparent. Mohamed, a thirty-year-old insurance 
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agent of Algerian origin, moved to Paris in 1998 for work and lives in a quartier 
populaire (working-class neighborhood) in the thirteenth arrondissement, near 
the Porte d’Italie. He explains how his neighborhood is full of people who look 
like him. “There are many blacks and Arabs, and I like that  .  .  . because I feel 
like I’m in a familiar element,” he explains. Mohamed prefers to live among fel-
low minorities, rather than in a more bourgeois or middle-class neighborhood 
with more white residents. As one of the few nonwhites at the insurance office 
where he works, it is a comfort to make his home among people to whom he 
can relate. Mohamed’s residential environment helps counter the marginalization 
experiences at his predominately white workplace. He operates within a French 
code while at work but operates within a maghrébin code at home and in his 
neighborhood.
Reda, a thirty-two-year-old human resources consultant of Algerian origin, has 
lived in both Paris and the banlieues. He grew up in in a quartier populaire in 
Meaux, a banlieue in the Seine-et-Marne département near Disneyland Paris and 
lives in the ninth arrondissement, which he describes as nice and bourgeois. He 
does not recall feeling different in any way growing up, since he was surrounded 
by other racial and ethnic minorities. It was only when he moved to Paris that he 
felt excluded, partly because of his childhood in the banlieues, or ghettos, as he 
refers to them. He sees himself as “socially marked” because of his connection to 
the banlieues. Reda sees himself as occupying two different worlds—French and 
Maghrébin—because of he grew up in a predominately Maghrébin environment 
and currently lives in a predominately white environment.
Nasar has a strong connection to where he lives or has lived. He grew up in 
Marseille, second to Paris in the number of immigrant-origin residents, and con-
nects his early years in a predominately immigrant environment with his under-
standing of being an ethnic minority today. He is quick to identify himself as 
marsellais, someone from Marseille; in fact, his coworkers identify him as such. 
Nasar has fewer issues with his identity than his counterparts, he says, because 
of his early environment. He did not feel like an outsider growing up in Mar-
seille. Only after moving to Paris for work in 1998 did he first feel like one. The 
experience of maghrébin friends who grew up in other cities like Paris, Lille, 
Strasbourg, or in smaller towns did not mirror his own. In Marseille, he says, 
one was more likely to draw attention for being white than as a racial and ethnic 
minority:14
I remember the newspaper Le Monde did a study related to the children of immi-
grants, and when people were asked, “What are you?” 98 percent of them said mar-
seillais. Whether they were children of immigrants or not, they said marseillais. I 
should say that in Marseille there are many emigrants. It is the first French port 
[from the Mediterranean Sea]. It was the point of entry from the colonies. People 
here claim to be marseillais first of all, so it’s for this reason that I see these differences 
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[between Marseilles and other cities]. I don’t care if people see me as French or not. 
As long as I am marseillais, I’m fine.
Nasar’s insistence on the stark differences between his city of birth and the 
rest of France provides a coping method of sorts when he confronts challenges 
as a racial and ethnic minority living in Paris. Should others not recognize him as 
French, he can assert his marseillais identity.
Many respondents have also experienced overt discrimination when searching 
for housing. Mourad, whom I introduced in the previous section, attempted to rent 
an apartment and the landlord asked whether he was Muslim. When asked how long 
his parents had lived in France, Mourad answered thirty years, to which the landlord 
responded, “Only thirty?” Mourad was not shocked by this exchange. Rather, he says, 
this is common among his maghrébin peers: “It’s simple, really. You’re looking for a 
place, you see an ad, you call, and you don’t say you’re of Algerian or maghrébin ori-
gin. They say, ‘Yes, OK, come by and check it out.’ And then the day you come . . . [the 
unit is no longer available]. Or if on the phone you give your name—for example, ‘My 
name is Mohammed’ or something like that—then it’s ‘Oh, I’m sorry, the apartment 
was just rented by someone else.’ It happens all the time.”15
Safia, a thirty-two-year-old journalist with dual Tunisian and French citizen-
ship, relates a similar story:
It took my husband and I six months to find housing, and still it was a friend of a 
friend who rented us his apartment, who was the landlord. But our application file 
was never taken seriously [by other landlords], though my husband works in finance 
and I also work. We make enough money. I remember they were asking for three 
times the rent, and with my salary alone we had enough money. So we had a lot, 
and they didn’t want us. They kept telling us, “We just rented to another couple. It 
happened quickly.” It was always this, or “We changed our mind, we have to do some 
repairs, so we’re not going to rent it.” It was always something. And once, an older 
woman told me very clearly when we checked out an apartment, “Yes, why not?” 
And when we called again to schedule another viewing of the apartment, she said, 
“No, you understand, there was a French couple who came, so we rented it to them. 
It’s just easier.” And me, I vividly remember feeling disgusted, and I said to her, “But 
Madame, we are French also.” But they were white French. . . . And my husband, it 
was at that moment . . . he told me, “You see, we have to leave France. We’ll never be 
recognized as normal people, because we both have jobs, but we could find an apart-
ment only through a friend.”
Married with two young children, Safia and her husband, a banker and of Alge-
rian origin, rent an apartment in Cergy-Pontoise, a western banlieue They want to 
buy a house but are already worried that it will be difficult—and not for financial 
reasons.
The couple demonstrate the paradox of the upward social mobility of children 
of North African immigrants. Despite their educational and professional successes, 
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they cannot live anywhere even if they can afford it, a difficulty that Safia attributes 
to being nonwhite or of maghrébin origin. Her experiences of living in France are 
like those of her immigrant parents, although their material circumstances differ. 
This affects how Safia locates herself in mainstream society. Her experiences of 
exclusion place her on its margins. Individuals like Safia are continually denied 
cultural citizenship across multiple domains, including place and residential loca-
tion, though her educational attainment and occupational status would seemingly 
permit integration into mainstream society.
IV. Public Sphere
In addition to other sites of exclusion, the middle-class segment of the maghrébin 
second generation is denied cultural citizenship in the public sphere. Ahmed 
experiences this denial when walking through Paris or taking public transporta-
tion: “If I’m walking in a bourgeois Parisian neighborhood and an old French lady 
sees me, she’ll cross the street to walk on the other side. . . . I think it’s going to take 
several more generations for people to not see differences like this, for someone to 
see a black person or an Arab walk by on the street and not even notice it.”
This is reminiscent of what Lacy (2007) identifies as “public identities,” refer-
ring to the ways that black middle-class individuals negotiate racial discrimination 
in the marketplace, the workplace, and as they engage in other activities in public. 
The marginalization of racial and ethnic minorities in public space is not unique to 
France, as research on racial and ethnic minorities in the United States has shown 
(Anderson 2015; Jackson 2001). What is different about the French context is that 
racial and ethnic minorities were never segregated from whites by denial of access 
to public accommodations, as were black Americans and other minorities (Feagin 
1991). Still, racial and ethnic minorities in France are devalued and discriminated 
against in public space in both subtle and explicit ways: their association with low-
wage work means they face excessive surveillance when shopping. Race and ethnic 
origin mark Ahmed and others as outsiders in French society.
When Safia is out for a walk with her young children, she says that people often 
ask her, “What are your children’s origins?” or “Where do you come from?” These 
questions imply she and her children are not French and not legitimate members 
of the French Republic. Despite the state’s renunciation of racial and ethnic catego-
ries, she is a “perpetual foreigner” (Wu 2001).
IMPLICATIONS FOR EXPRESSING DIFFERENCE
At the end of one conversation I had with Hicham, he sighed and said:
They don’t want me. They tell me to integrate. Me, I don’t want to integrate. I am 
French. I don’t need to integrate. I was born in France, I respect the laws of the 
 Republic. . . . But they still tell us, “No, you’re not French. You’ll never be French.” 
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They tell us that because our parents have foreign origins, we automatically do 
too.  .  .  . We’re sometimes obligated to hide our differences, as if we’re ashamed of 
them. But I’ve arrived at an age when I tell myself, “It’s my difference. I am not look-
ing to put it out front, but I don’t want people to tell me to hide it.”
That is the dilemma of Hicham and many immigrant-origin individuals and 
racial and ethnic minorities in both France and other plural societies: whatever 
they do, whatever they accomplish, they are not accepted as full citizens. Salim, 
a thirty-five-year-old of Moroccan origin and self-described hip-hop journalist, 
concurs. In his living room in Ivry-sur-Seine, a banlieue south of Paris, he tells me, 
“In France we have to hide our differences.” But how? Salim explains that before 
he even speaks, people often assume he was born outside of France. Salim often 
travels to the United States for his work, and he says he was struck that Americans 
openly wearing hijabs and other religious attire were not, as he saw it, stigmatized 
for it. He is happy to say that he is French, but in France he does not feel it’s true. To 
him, the French Republican model is hypocritical. Salim grew up in Paris, and he 
and his family went to Morocco once a year to visit relatives. But he states clearly 
that “Morocco is not my country.” When in Morocco, he was perceived as a for-
eigner. And in France, he is perceived as a foreigner.
At the end of my interview with Djamila in her office, in the eighth arrondisse-
ment, near the Gare Saint-Lazare, the forty-nine-year-old of Algerian origin 
sighed and said:
I think we see racism more and more these days in France. When I was younger . . . 
it all seemed normal. . . . I didn’t experience it as much as other people. But I do re-
member hearing “Go back to your country.” People thought that. But you know, my 
country, it’s here, so how do you want me to return to [it]? But today [I hear it] even 
more. . . . I had thought that as I grew older, that would change, that it would subside, 
that it would fade. We would no longer mark differences or distinguish between 
people. And I see that we do differentiate. . . . We do it more and more. And I regret 
that, I find it sad.
Author: Differences like what?
Djamila: For example, there’s discrimination. It’s not necessary to pretend oth-
erwise. . . . For someone named Rachid Ben Machin, it is difficult to find an intern-
ship. . . . It’s not only a question of a foreign-sounding name, because there’s also a 
territorial racism. If you live in [the Seine-Saint-Denis département], it’s the same 
thing. . . . You can run into difficulties just because of where you live. We see that ev-
ery day. . . . But I also believe it’s because France has not addressed certain problems 
in its past. It hasn’t always acknowledged its past.
Djamila says, “France belongs to everyone who lives here.” She recognizes, 
however, that this is more theory than practice, as there are barriers to full soci-
etal inclusion for maghrébin-origin individuals, even those who are “successful.” 
Djamila feels French. She affirms it as her identity before acknowledging her 
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Algerian origin. She considers herself as French as any other French person, even 
if she is made to feel separate and apart from the French nation.
Djamila grew up in the twentieth arrondissement and continues to live there 
with her partner. She has worked hard to get to her current executive-level posi-
tion in a membership-based social development association. Yet her success 
has not shielded her from the same prejudices and mistreatment experienced 
by her less economically successful North African–origin counterparts. Djamila 
remains troubled by how immigrant-origin individuals are still considered dif-
ferent, treated as foreigners. The North African second generation grew up in 
a France that communicated to them—and still communicates to them—that 
not only are they different, but that they should be ashamed of their difference. 
They were not and are not considered French, yet many nevertheless assert their 
French identity.
In the several domains discussed above, my respondents, are repeatedly denied 
cultural citizenship. They feel their exclusion acutely. Though citizens on paper, 
they remain outsiders in the society into which they were born. And they acknowl-
edge this status takes a toll over the course of their lives.
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French Is, French Ain’t
Boundaries of French and Maghrébin Identities
I went back to England and I became what I’d been named. I had been hailed 
as an immigrant. I had discovered who I was. I started to tell myself the story 
of my migration. Then Black erupted and people said, ‘Well, you’re from the 
Caribbean, in the midst of this, identifying myself with what’s going on, the 
Black population in England. You’re Black.
—Stuart Hall, “Old and New Identities, Old and New 
Ethnicities”
France is not a race. It is not a religion. It is values!
—Bruno LeMaire, former French minister of food, agriculture, 
and fishing
Mourad, a thirty-year-old of Algerian origin, moved to Paris in the early 2000s 
for his doctoral studies in sociology at Sciences Po. He grew up in Tours, near the 
center of France. He lives alone in the seventh arrondissement, a bourgeois neigh-
borhood not too far from the Eiffel Tower. Neither of his parents went to college, 
so it will be a significant accomplishment for him to get an education at one of the 
world’s best universities.
When I first met with him at the university café in the Saint-Germain-des-Prés 
neighborhood, he described what it means to be French:
There’s the theory and there’s the practice. . . . There was a French philosopher named 
Renan who said that every day you have to want to be French.1 You accept living 
together. It’s a community of the future. . . . For me, being French is a desire, a desire 
to live together despite our origins. That is the theory, but in practice being French 
when you are of immigrant origin . . . of Swiss or Swedish or British origin, there isn’t 
a problem. You’re viewed as French, and no one talks about integration. However, 
if you’re of maghrébin origin, that’s different. There are barriers. And in the eyes of 
others, you see that you are not always considered French.
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Though Mourad acknowledges that he is a French citizen, there is a difference 
between citizenship and the degree to which he personally can identify as French, 
and have that identity accepted by others. All nonwhite immigrant-origin individ-
uals find themselves in the same position; their white counterparts, despite their 
immigrant origins, identify as French citizens and are accepted as such. We spoke 
further about the degree to which Mourad feels he can successfully assert a French 
identity: “Yes, I feel French, I want to be French, but what’s certain is that in the 
eyes of others, we are not always seen as French. That’s the hardest part. . . . If I say 
yes, I am French, I am French. But I cannot get into a nightclub. If I submit my CV 
[to apply for employment], I get no response. I’m discriminated [against in] hous-
ing. [They tell me] I’m not French.”
His otherness is thus assigned. France tells him he is not French and denies him 
cultural citizenship because of his maghrébin origins. He and others like him do 
not feel they fit within the boundaries that define a French person, and they find it 
difficult to negotiate a status that is both maghrébin-origin and French. White citi-
zens clearly have no such difficulty. The invocation of ethnic origin by Mourad and 
other members of the second generation reflects the boundaries they draw around 
French and maghrébin identities, as well as the influence of French Republicanism 
on boundary-making processes.
I discuss below the dual identity of the middle-class North African second gen-
eration, which is at once both French and maghrébin. I examine how its members 
define what it means to be French, and how their perceptions of French identity, 
and the boundaries around it, are shaped by their own experiences of racial and 
ethnic marginalization. I examine their insider-outsider status and the salience 
of their maghrébin origins in their self-identification. Most respondents claim a 
French identity, but they vary in the degree to which they assert their North Afri-
can origins. Identity is relational and therefore influenced by how others regard 
one’s claims to it. The rejection of such claims is tantamount to exclusion from the 
mainstream.
I further unpack the cultural complexity of French identity and its racial 
and ethnic nature. What does it mean to be French? Can one become French? 
How can one signify or perform “Frenchness” to others? Because others ques-
tion whether they belong in France, members of the middle-class North African 
second generation employ various strategies to assert and justify their French 
identity. Individuals will point out that, having been educated in France and hav-
ing spent their entire lives there, they are no different than other citizens. Or 
they will demonstrate their acceptance of French Republican ideology, even if 
Republicanism in practice places them on the margins of French society, what-
ever their accomplishments and despite their middle-class status. For all that, the 
North African second generation sees itself as part of France’s racial and ethnic 
hierarchy.
Figure 2. Covers of two French newsmagazines, L’Express and Le Point, with features about 
what it means to be French, at a Parisian newsstand in 2015. Photo by author.
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French Republicanism determines how individuals are identified—as French 
or foreigner. French citizenship or having been born in France do not ensure one’s 
acceptance as French. Children of Maghrébin immigrants formulate their identity 
in accordance with French Republicanism, yet in their interaction with whites, 
they experience discrimination and marginalization. Their white counterparts 
use race and ethnicity to reassert the symbolic boundaries separating insiders and 
outsiders. American identity is imbued with racial and ethnic meaning, compli-
cating the efforts of racial and ethnic minorities to effectively assert it as their own 
(without adding a prefix, as in “African American”). Yet in France it is no different. 
Ethnic categories are not codified by law, and it remains difficult for racial and 
ethnic minorities to effectively assert a French identity. National ideologies con-
strain identity options. In the United States, the census defines racial and ethnic 
categories, whereas in France, Republican ideology does not allow the census to 
measure race and ethnicity. In a society that does not acknowledge multicultural-
ism, “doing race/ethnicity” is a negotiation of the private rather than the public 
sphere (Khanna 2011).
Though identity politics in France and the United States differ, children of 
immigrants in both countries are pressured to identify according to their eth-
nic origins rather than base identification on nationality. They are still under an 
“immigrant shadow” that frames second and subsequent immigrant generations 
(Zhou and Lee 2007). The title of this chapter is a nod to Marlon Riggs’s1994 docu-
mentary, Black Is . . . Black Ain’t, an examination of the diverse notions of what it 
means to be a black American.2 In referring to this title, I highlight how all individ-
uals operate within boundaries of different identities, whatever the heterogeneity 
within the North African second generation. Demographically speaking, France 
is quite diverse,3 but the definition of who is accepted as French is quite narrow.
DEFINING FRENCH IDENTIT Y AND MARKING  
IT S B OUNDARIES
About 67 percent of respondents reference French Republican values, including 
those exemplified in the French motto Liberté, égalité, fraternité, when they define 
what it means to be French. Many respondents were well versed in the tenets of 
the Republican model and quick to invoke them. Mourad and other middle-class 
children of North African immigrants distinguish between cultural and legal 
dimensions when defining French identity, for they are included in the first and 
excluded in the second. Which is to say that the social locations of many chil-
dren of maghrébin immigrants are tenuous. When individuals invoke the cultural 
dimensions of French identity, they reference values, customs, traditions, and 
practices, as well as the racial and ethnic underpinnings of each of these. Other 
common definitions include speaking French perfectly, sharing a common destiny 
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and history, and having spent most one’s life in France. As Linda, who is of Alge-
rian origin, points out, being French “is not just a plastic card. . . . It’s not just being 
born in France. . . . It’s about values and a spirit, a culture, not just the legal things.” 
“Frenchness” thus is not equated with citizenship but involves “cultural markers 
of birth, ancestry, and accent as well as residence” (McCrone and Bechhofer 2010, 
921). These cultural markers are sustained by race, ethnicity, and religious distinc-
tions. French identity is defined by whiteness and the exclusion of immigrant-
origin individuals tied to its colonial empire.
Nadir, a thirty-six-year-old Algerian-origin journalist who lives in Seine-Saint-
Denis, is one of many respondents who invoke race and ethnicity as marking 
whether someone is French. “Many people think being French, it’s being white, 
eating pork, going to mass every Sunday morning, being Catholic and so on,” he 
explains. “But . . . for me, being French is simply working in this country, paying 
taxes. It’s just living here.” By framing being French in this way—that is, focus-
ing on the legal or technical definition—Nadir actively resists and challenges the 
racialized nature of French identity, where being white means being French.
Zara, though she acknowledges feelings of difference, believes that participa-
tion in everyday life in France qualifies her as French: “Being French is being a 
citizen, meaning behaving in a citizenlike manner  .  .  . and having the power to 
decide what happens, via the vote, for example. Being French is having a voice in 
France, being heard in France, because unfortunately, even with French residence, 
you are not necessarily treated as if you [are].” Although Zara is marginalized as 
a “visible minority” (Ndiaye 2008), she nonetheless sees being French as a core, 
inescapable element of her identity. She does not believe her North African origins 
should disqualify her in this regard. Rather than defining herself in opposition to 
French identity, she embraces it.
One winter evening I met Mohamed, a thirty-year-old insurance agent and 
aspiring journalist of Algerian origin, at the metro stop near the Opéra Bastille. 
We walked to a nearby café, and en route he asked whether I liked living in Paris 
and about my overall perceptions of Paris as an African American. He was really 
fascinated by and curious about my experiences. We sat in the crowded café, sip-
ping glasses of vin chaud (mulled wine), and dressed in a suit, Mohamed, a tall, 
statuesque man with almond eyes and dark brown, slicked-back hair told me: “For 
me, being French means to believe in the ideals of France, meaning loving France 
and all its freedoms, the France of the Enlightenment, the France of equality, the 
France of universal values. She has values that transcend differences . . . that pierce 
through [them]. You can be black or white or gray, but . . . you share those values. 
You can be Muslim, Christian, whatever you want.”
In emphasizing values that supersede individual differences, Mohamed draws 
boundaries around being French that include him, and claims a privilege associ-
ated with being French. He sees it as an advantage to live in a democratic and 
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occidental society. As he said in a later conversation: “[Former French president 
François] Mitterrand once said, ‘We are all from the country of our childhood.’ To 
me, that means I spent my childhood here, I didn’t spend it elsewhere, and there is 
no one who can take that from me.”
As he grew up, Mohamed’s parents continually told him that his home was here 
in France. Because his parents emphasized this, he feels like he has fewer issues 
with his identity as an adult than other children of North African immigrants. 
Mohamed grew up in France, just like any other French person, and therefore 
this is something that is a part of him. Despite the stigma associated with having 
maghrébin origins, he still feels fortunate to be French, and to have been raised in 
France. He sees his dual French and maghrébin status as a richness—both con-
stitute his identity—and believes France’s values are what set it apart from other 
societies.
Aurélien, a thirty-two-year old of Algerian origin who works as a human 
resources consultant, associates being French with Republican principles of the 
1789 Déclaration des droits de l’homme et du citoyen (Declaration of the Rights of 
Man and of the Citizen). “It’s great French men, great authors, Rimbaud, Hugo,” 
says Aurélien, who lives with his wife and baby daughter in Paris. “It is an image 
and a country in which Liberté, égalité, fraternité, would not be vain words.” He 
sees himself as embodying both French and maghrébin cultures, yet coming from 
a quartier populaire in the banlieue of Meaux, he feels marked as different by 
whites.
Yet as Aurélien, Abdelkrim, and others reference principles of French Republi-
canism in how they define French identity, they simultaneously critique how such 
principles are implemented in French society. They do not reject Republicanism 
as an ideology; rather, they feel it does not apply to them. Because they support 
French Republicanism, many respondents are fearful about communautarisme 
(communitarianism) in France, or the idea that different groups would interact 
only with each other and not with people of different identities. Many respon-
dents drew a parallel to American identity politics and multiculturalism. Linda, 
a twenty-one-year-old medical student of Algerian origin, says, “It’s a problem 
for both [whites and nonwhites], people sticking to people like themselves.” She 
was once in a relationship with a white man and believes that they broke up in 
part because of the racist views of her ex-boyfriend’s family. She remembers his 
father’s obsession with Islam and her Algerian origins. Yet this painful experience 
demonstrates, Linda says, that “you cannot live in France without interacting 
with others who are different.”
Similarly, Salim, a thirty-five-year-old of Moroccan origin who lives in 
Ivry-sur-Seine, a banlieue south of Paris, recognizes the good and bad parts of 
French Republicanism. Under the French Republican model, he says, “We are all 
the same,” but he also finds its implementation hypocritical. Respondents thus 
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critique French society—and often, their own circumstances—within the confines 
of French Republicanism, but do not establish or seek an alternative framework.
FEELING FRENCH:  CL AIMING A PL ACE IN FRENCH 
REPUBLICAN SO CIET Y
While racial and ethnic minorities are continually told, both implicitly and 
explicitly, that they are different from or do not share the values of their white 
counterparts, they nonetheless reference these same values when defining what 
it means to be French and see being French as part of their identities. This resem-
bles how marginalized individuals in the United States identify with and relate 
to the mythologies of being American, such as the American dream, despite 
their own experiences of racial and ethnic marginalization (Waters 2000; Young 
2006).
About 18 percent of respondents consider themselves exclusively French. 
They privilege their French over their maghrébin ethnic origins in how they view 
themselves. They acknowledge that they are treated differently from their white 
 counterparts, yet they respond by asserting how they are just as French as any 
other French person. That is, they follow the Republican model by asserting an 
identity based on citizenship. They do not believe that their North African ori-
gins negate their being French, even if others deny their claims to French identity 
because of their racial and ethnic status.
Karim, a thirty-five-year-old of Algerian origin, works in Levallois-Perret, a 
banlieue northwest of Paris, near the seventeenth arrondissement. He was born 
and raised there and clearly distinguishes between the discourse by which French 
identity is defined and the reality of who can legitimately lay claim to it. He strug-
gles to do so, for he has repeatedly been told that he does not meet the definition 
of a French person: “To be French, you must forget yourself a little bit, adopt the 
behaviors that are imposed on us. There is a path to follow to become French . . . 
but as a French person of Algerian origin . . . when I’m in France, I don’t feel French 
French. . . . France has to accept all French people as they are, and not as they wish 
they were.”
Sitting in a café in Levallois-Perret, Karim becomes increasingly animated:
The French really don’t accept us, they tolerate us, that’s all. But I have a million more 
reasons to be here than [then–French president] Nicolas Sarkozy. . . . In the last few 
centuries, there wasn’t a shared history between France and Hungary,4 right? But 
between France and Algeria, I mean, we used to be a French colony. . . . But even if I 
don’t want [to be French] . . . even if I say no, it’s not true [that I’m not French]. It’s a 
part of me. . . . If not, I wouldn’t be here. . . . [I’ve] said I wasn’t French. But I am French, 
whether they want it or not. . . . That means . . . we’re really here. But that’s why I say 
that it would be good if the French [reached out to] us, gave us  opportunities. Why 
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can’t I, Karim, Algerian—I’m educated, I went to a French school, I’m not dumber 
than anyone else—how come, when I apply for a job, they pick a French person and 
not me? The day that changes, we can say France has evolved, but for now, it’s not the 
case, and we are very far away from that.
Despite the colonial relationship between Algeria and France, and though he is 
a result of that relationship, Karim is treated as not French. He regularly confronts 
racism, marginalization, and exclusion. Though the French identity he claims 
inevitably intersects with race and ethnicity, Karim still wants to assert it, even 
when others refute that assertion. Rather than developing an oppositional identity, 
he instead asserts his French status and his place in society, even if he is not always 
proud to identify as French and others do not acknowledge that identification.
Soumeya, a forty-nine-year-old divorcée of Algerian origin who has spent her 
entire life in Paris, is one example:
I never pose that question to myself. People ask me all the time what my origins are. 
So I say I’m Parisian, I’m French. And then they ask me, “But what are your origins?” 
Because you have a name that sounds different, strange. . . . I don’t claim an Algerian 
identity. I’m French. I see myself as French.  .  .  . Some people say, “I’m French of 
maghrébin origin,” but . . . it’s stupid to say you’re French of this or that origin. . . . 
We’re all humans.  .  .  . No one ever asks someone named Sylvie Dupont what her 
origins are, even though she [has] them. . . . When people talk to me about Algeria, I 
always shock them, even my own mother, because I say my country is France. It will 
always be France.
Soumeya believes she is French because she was born and raised in France. This 
is the only relevant criterion. She rejects any relationship to her parents’ country of 
origin, and she does not understand why other descendants of immigrants would 
insist on one. Like Soumeya, many respondents grew up in families that did not 
emphasize their connections to the Maghreb and, as a result, have a weaker rela-
tionship with their parents and with their parents’ country of origin.
Soumeya is unwilling to deny her “Frenchness” and considers herself no less 
French than a white person, even in the face of her differential treatment by oth-
ers as a North African–origin individual. She maintains that those who question 
her French identity or refuse to accept it are in the wrong. She believes in French 
Republican ideology but attributes racism and discrimination to the failure to 
implement it. For all that, Soumeya can imagine a France without racism where 
all citizens are equal.
Other respondents claim French identity in the absence of strong ties to any 
other. Sonia is a single thirty-year-old of Algerian origin, has a doctorate in eco-
nomics, and owns a home in the northern banlieue of Le Bourget. “Being French 
is something so deeply inside of me that I cannot separate it out,” she says. Sonia’s 
privileging of a French identity stems from her life experiences. Though she has 
spent her entire life in the Seine-Saint-Denis département, she does not feel 
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particularly attached to where she lives. Nor is she affiliated with any religion. 
Sonia felt different growing up in Le Bourget—not from whites, but from other 
maghrébin individuals. Her parents were literate and fluent in French, which set 
her family apart from other maghrébin families. As a child, she had more educa-
tional opportunities and always excelled academically, which contributed to her 
sense of difference. Now she has had a successful career working for an association 
that advocates for rural workers. She has not been to Algeria since she was sixteen 
years old. “I know it sounds bad, but I don’t feel any affinity for Algeria,” she says. “I 
have no desire to go back. It doesn’t mean anything to me.” These sentiments may 
be partially explained by her estrangement from both her parents and her four 
older siblings. She has not spoken to them in years.
Nacira, a twenty-five-year-old biology teacher at a high school of Algerian ori-
gin, connects her claim to French identity with her experiences as a student and 
teacher. The older she gets, the more she accepts herself as French: “For me, [being 
French] is really bound to where you did your studies, and I realize that the refer-
ences that I have are references linked to the French Republic. When I think, I 
think in French. When I dream, I dream in French. Even if the French system 
has its faults, it also has its advantages. . . . For me, being French is bound to the 
education you get in this country. . . . When I teach, I teach how a French teacher 
teaches, with the same tools, the same resources, etc.”
Nacira references the ontological nature of French identity, which exists from 
birth and cannot be denied. Her French identity does not, however, preclude a 
critique of how French Republicanism is practiced, particularly of the inequalities 
she sees between schools in bourgeois areas of Paris and those in the Seine-Saint-
Denis département where she teaches.5
Yacine is a thirty-three-year-old of Algerian origin and the divorced father of 
a seven-year-old daughter. An IT freelancer, he lives in the western banlieue of 
Asnières-sur-Seine. He, too, links his French citizenship to his educational experi-
ence. As a child, he attended what he refers to as a “Republican school.” His social-
ization there as a French person ties him to his compatriots: “I had the same schol-
arly training as most French people, so I think we are the same group, in theory. 
Yes, we each have our own paths, but me, I consider myself as French as anyone 
else.” Though Yacine grew up as one of the only maghrébin-origin individuals in 
his community, he never identified as anything else but French. He thus invokes 
his educational trajectory to insert himself within the boundaries of a French 
identity. But he acknowledges an anti-maghrébin racism that is particularly acute 
when it comes to employment opportunities in mid- and upper-level positions, 
and feels he has been treated differently because of his North African origins.
Loubna, a twenty-seven-year-old of Moroccan origin, laid claim to a French 
identity when she realized how much her life in France had shaped her. “If I had 
grown up in Morocco, I would be completely different [as would] my ways of 
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thinking. . . . So, yes, I would say I am French,” to the point that she distances her-
self from her Moroccan counterparts. Diana, a twenty-four-year-old of Algerian 
origin who lives south of Paris with her parents, identifies as French above all 
else, though her values may differ because of her ethnic origin. “I was born here,” 
she says. “I grew up here. I speak French. I have Algerian origins, but I definitely 
feel French before I feel Algerian. When I speak, I’ll speak in French. I can sort of 
speak Arabic, but not well.”
FEELING MAGHRÉBIN:  INVOKING ETHNIC ORIGINS
These citizen outsiders invoke their maghrébin origins as part of their iden-
tity in different ways. The distinction between assigned and asserted identities 
complicates identity-formation processes for the middle-class French second 
generation. The racial and ethnic hierarchy in France means that that nonwhite 
individuals are not considered French. A claim to French identity by children of 
North African immigrants is not accepted. They are denied cultural citizenship 
and their rightful place as French citizens. In short, the North African second 
generation has no ethnic options (Waters 1990); it cannot dictate the salience 
of its ethnic origin to the perception of other citizens. For its members, that 
salience is critical to how they see and understand themselves in French society 
and how their North African origins intersect with their French status in defin-
ing their identity.
Many children of North African immigrants get their first lesson in what it 
means to be French when they begin school in predominately white neighbor-
hoods. They learn at an early age that they are not French, a continually lesson 
reinforced when they reach adulthood. Their differing responses to discrimination 
and marginalization determine how they invoke their ethnic origins, how they 
define their identity, and how they position themselves in French society.
The invocation of ethnic origins by the middle-class maghrébin second gen-
eration is contextual and varies. Neither this generation nor its middle-class 
segment is monolithic. That is, there is a continuum and no prescriptive cat-
egories. Most individuals identify in a way that acknowledges their French and 
maghrébin status, highlighting the space between the categories of French and 
other. This includes adopting a hyphenated and combined identity, viewing one-
self as neither French nor maghrébin, or viewing oneself as only maghrébin.6 
Their relationship to parents and country of origin, as well as to childhood and 
educational and work experiences, influences how respondents invoke their 
North African origins.
Inevitably, these contribute to consciousness of one’s ethnic minority status 
in France, as do interaction with and the mutual influence of ethnic community 
members, culture, and the state.7 This phenomenon is also seen in the emergence 
76    French Is, French Ain’t
of a Muslim consciousness in the United Kingdom, which challenges existing 
notions of assimilation and informs identity-related claims-making among British 
Muslims (Meer 2010), and of DuBois’s ([1903] 1994) notion of a minority double 
consciousness, or the “second-sight” African Americans possess.
HYPHENATED AND C OMBINED IDENTIT Y—FRENCH 
AND MAGHRÉBIN
Many respondents see being French and having North African origins as cocon-
stitutive elements of their identity. Noura, a thirty-seven-year-old single mother 
of Algerian origin who works as a nurse’s assistant, says: “To be French is to have 
French citizenship. I don’t know if I feel completely French. It’s complicated. When 
people ask me what I am, I say I am French of Algerian origin.” Her Algerian ori-
gins play the greater role in her daily experiences. Noura is more comfortable with 
her hyphenated identity in the quartier populaire of the nineteenth arrondissement 
where she lives, than she was when she lived in Deux-Sèvres, a département in 
western France. Noura describes her current neighborhood as having a “Brooklyn 
element” to it because there are so many immigrant-origin residents. She iden-
tifies as French of Algerian origin because she acknowledges that being techni-
cally French—having French citizenship—does not mean others will accept her as 
French. France, through macrolevel structures and microlevel interactions, “oth-
ers” people like her.
When Noura’s young children experience racism or discrimination, she finds 
it difficult to explain to them that others do not regard them as French. She told 
me that her eight-year-old son’s teacher is racist, holding the boy’s darker skin 
color against him. Her seven-year-old daughter is spared such racism because her 
lighter skin allows her to pass as white. To Noura, this is one of many examples 
that demonstrate the salience of race and ethnicity in how individuals are treated 
in France.
Of the individuals in this study, about 44 percent have adopted a hyphenated 
or combined identity like Noura. Respondents identify as French of maghrébin 
origin, French of Tunisian origin, French of Algerian origin, and French of Moroc-
can origin. Those constructions mirror the strategy of Asian Americans and 
African Americans in the United States, whose American identity is contingent 
upon acknowledging their racial or ethnic origins. But it should be noted that 
the French part of the hyphenated identity always precedes the maghrébin ori-
gin, such as Français d’origine marocaine (French person of Moroccan origin) or 
Français d’origine maghrébine (French person of maghrébin origin). That in effect 
foregrounds French identity, obstructing the full fusion of French and maghrébin. 
In a country that does not acknowledge ethnic origins in identity construction, 
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some members of the French North African second generation turns to a hybrid 
identity, or ethnic hybridity (Jiménez 2010), that incorporates both.
When Linda, a twenty-one-year-old medical student who lives with her parents 
in the western banlieue of Rueil-Malmaison, visits her Algerian relatives every few 
years, she is made aware of how French she is. “My life,” she says, “would be com-
pletely different if my name were Fatima.” Linda identifies as French of Algerian 
origin, but her name and features do not immediately convey her North African 
origin. She tells the story of a patient who had to go to another hospital for tests. 
When he returned, he told her that his stay there was unpleasant, as his roommate 
was Algerian. Besides being offended, she found it ironic that her patient did not 
realize that Linda herself was of North African origin.
She grew up in a mainly white neighborhood, and her parents wanted her to 
fit in with the other children. So she celebrated Christmas, though she was and 
remains a practicing Muslim.8 As an adult, Linda is ambivalent about her position. 
She is successful and will soon become a doctor. She plans to move to Paris and 
share an apartment with a friend. But, she says, “I sometimes feel guilty that I have 
made it when so many others like me have not.”
Some respondents say they occupy separate French and maghrébin cultural 
worlds simultaneously. Diana, a twenty-four-year-old graduate student in commu-
nications with dual Algerian and French citizenship, grew up in Orsay, a predomi-
nately white banlieue south of Paris and a more economically advantaged banlieue 
than most.9 She lives there with her parents in an HLM complex supported by the 
factory where her father, now retired, used to work. “I used to feel closer to the 
French mentality than to the maghrébin mentality,” she says. “And I think that’s an 
effect of living in Orsay. . . . There just aren’t many foreigners there. There are many 
French people. It’s a really nice neighborhood with a high standard of living.”
As a child, Diana does not remember being particularly interested in Algerian 
or maghrébin culture. But when she entered her teen years, she set out to learn 
more about it, sought out connections with other maghrébin youth online, and 
developed a deeper attachment to her origins. Diana is now well versed in her 
French and maghrébin identity and appreciates how both elements made her who 
she is: “There are parts of the maghrébin culture that I value, for example, the 
strong family ties and large families.  .  .  . But there are also parts of French and 
Western culture that I value, such as gender parity and feminism.”
She now has as many white friends as maghrébin but acknowledges the dif-
fering perspectives of the two. Diana considers her parents as modern as those of 
her white friends’ parents and more modern than the parents of her maghrébin 
friends. She feels comfortable dating white men and would not hesitate to marry 
one (two of her sisters married whites). However, she knows that some maghrébin 
friends do not understand why she would date someone who is of different origin. 
Though her parents would be happy if she did marry a maghrébin man, they do 
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not insist on it. “They would have stayed in Algeria if [marrying an Algerian man] 
were a requirement,” she says.
Diana affirms the French and maghrébin elements of her identity in a context 
in which North African–origin individuals are defined as nonwhite, and therefore 
not French, and at the bottom of the racial and ethnic hierarchy. Her lighter skin 
and name mask her North African origins, which has allowed her to evade, to a 
degree, the discrimination experienced by her maghrébin-origin friends. One of 
them had considerable difficulty finding a job after finishing engineering school. 
Diana does not anticipate the same fate once she completes her studies: her résumé 
does not betray her origins. Though Diana recognizes the prevalence of racism in 
French society, she has been confronted it less than others like her because she is 
not as visible as an ethnic and racial minority.
A combined French and maghrébin identity may also be viewed as the simul-
taneous possession of two separate cultures. Hicham, a twenty-nine-year-old 
with dual Moroccan and French citizenship who lives in a public housing high-
rise building with his parents and three of his brothers in Poissy, puts it this way: 
“There is a real gap between us, people of immigrant origin, and those who are of 
pure French origin, . . . and we can understand them because we have this double 
culture. At home we were raised in a maghrébin way and at school we are educated 
in the ways of the French Republic.”
As discussed in chapter 3, Hicham and others know how to operate in two 
worlds. This is comparable to the bridging of different cultural worlds by African 
Americans through code-switching and behavior-switching (Jackson 2001; Pat-
tillo-McCoy 1999). Here, respondents access different codes in different spheres 
(home, school, and work) and cultural worlds.
As Hicham grew up, his parents emphasized the importance of the family’s ties 
to maghrébin culture through annual summer trips to Morocco. They also culti-
vated in him a love and appreciation for French laïque (secular) society, underlin-
ing the freedoms it affords, freedoms not available in the Maghreb. Hicham sees 
the value in being fluent in multiple codes but is nonetheless repeatedly reminded 
of his difference from others, such as when he was fired from his bank job and his 
white coworkers were not. Hicham reluctantly accepts the limitations of having to 
navigate two worlds. His lighter complexion makes it sometimes easier for him to 
pass as white in public spaces, but his name gives him away as maghrébin.
Soria, a thirty-four-year-old Muslim of Algerian origin, owns a condo in the 
fifteenth arrondissement and has worked as a human resources director since 
2000. She grew to appreciate how maghrébin and French cultures are equally 
implicated in her sense of self. After an extended trip she took to Algeria at the age 
of sixteen, she began to assert elements of her Algerian culture. As an adult, she 
has been involved in many cultural organizations and activist causes concerning 
maghrébin-origin individuals and immigrants in France. She has organized group 
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travel to the Maghreb for an association and participated in demonstrations in 
solidarity with Palestine. Soria makes it a point to assert the maghrébin and Alge-
rian component of her identity, partly to refute misconceptions associated with 
maghrébin-origin individuals. She rarely introduces herself as French; rather, she 
claims she is an “Arabe de France”:
Soria: When I introduce myself like that, it’s not a rejection [of French culture]. Not 
at all. But it’s obvious I’m French. I grew up here. When people who aren’t French, 
especially Arabs, ask me, I always tell them, “My culture is also French, it’s true. I 
have a double culture, but I express myself in French. Even if I speak Arabic, the 
language I express myself the best in is French.” And if I travel abroad tomorrow, it 
will be the French element . . .
Author: So you feel you’ll be perceived more as a French person than as an 
 Algerian?
Soria: Yes, exactly, even if I feel intensely Algerian as well.
Soria’s attachment to being maghrébin does not negate her attachment to being 
French and living in France.10 For these individuals, the one does not negate the 
other and vice versa.
NEITHER FRENCH NOR MAGHRÉBIN
One winter afternoon, I met Termoul in a café in Les 3 Fontaines, a large shopping 
mall in Cergy-Préfecture. Twenty-eight years old and possessing dual citizenship, 
he lives in in the northwestern banlieue of Pontoise with his wife and two young 
children and works in a bank in Paris. He speaks of alienation. “[Second-generation 
North African immigrants] don’t have an identity,” he told me. “No one thinks we’re 
French in France, and no one thinks we’re Arab in Algeria.” Travel to Algeria influ-
enced his view of himself as neither French nor maghrébin, but rather an occupant 
of some space between the two. He visits his in-laws and extended family there 
annually and wants his children to learn Arabic in their “native environment,” but 
he nonetheless feels like a foreigner there. And also in France.
About 20 percent of respondents see themselves as neither North African nor 
French. While gender is not a significant determining factor in any of the other 
identity configurations, more men than women described themselves in this way. 
Their sense of otherness leaves them between two cultures.
Or, as Ahmed, a twenty-nine-year-old practicing Muslim with dual Algerian 
and French citizenship, puts it, “We are sitting between two chairs.” He adds: “I am 
a manager at my company. I drive an expensive car. I go to a club . . . but cannot 
get in, and then I return to reality. You are never 100 percent either way. Maybe I 
am asking for too much, wanting to be both 100 percent Algerian and 100 percent 
French. But I can’t choose between them. I want to combine the best parts of both 
into something great, but . . . I still feel different.”
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Ahmed cannot reconcile his North African and French components. He has 
attained middle-class status, but despite his success, he feels he does not fit into 
French society. At the same time, he does not necessarily relate to other Algerian-
origin individuals, particularly those who are working-class. Ahmed remains close 
to his parents and six older sisters, and lives in Nanterre so he can be near them. 
He has traveled to Algeria to visit his relatives every year since he was a child. One 
of his sisters has spent most of her life in Algeria with her godparents, and Ahmed 
believes her sense of self is very different as a result. But Ahmed himself feels he is 
labeled as “other” in the two cultural worlds he occupies.
Ahmed poses a contrast to Diana, whom I discussed earlier and who identi-
fies with both French and maghrébin cultures, revealing a heterogeneity in how 
children of immigrants invoke their North African origins. He is well educated, 
successful, and actively involved in maghrébin organizations, and has close famil-
ial relationships and several maghrébin-origin friends and acquaintances. But like 
Hicham and Abdelkrim, Ahmed had two different and opposing educations as a 
child—one at home and one at school. And his adult experience in the workplace 
was one of differential treatment. In contrast to Diana, who claims a combined 
French and maghrébin identity, Ahmed feels he has none.
Like Ahmed, Mona, who is thirty-four years old and also of Algerian origin, 
straddles two different cultural worlds. Dual French and Algerian citizenship (she 
was born in Algeria and immigrated to France when two years old) has made her 
feel neither French nor Algerian. “It’s just a fact,” she says. “You’re not really one 
or the other.” She views the two as in opposition to each other. Mona grew up in a 
middle-class neighborhood in the seventeenth arrondissement of Paris but lives in 
the banlieue of Épinay-sur-Seine, in the Seine-Saint-Denis département, where it 
is less expensive. A business manager who works in Paris, she is involved with the 
same maghrébin networking and business association as Ahmed.
Sofiane, a twenty-six-year-old with dual French and Algerian citizenship, lives 
with his wife in a cité in the impoverished banlieue of La Courneuve. Of his nei-
ther French nor maghrébin status he says:
For me, being French is many things. . . . I’m French. I’m also Algerian because I have 
double nationality. But being French means being included in French society . . . liv-
ing in this society, being responsible, representing your country, doing everything 
you can do so that your country does well. For me, that’s what being French is. . . . 
It’s everyone having the same rights, which is not yet the case here, because when 
you live in Neuilly-sur-Seine [an upper-class banlieue] or in La Courneuve, it’s not 
the same thing. . . . I don’t really have an identity, as I was born to parents who are 
foreigners. When I go to Algeria, they say I’m a foreigner. When I’m in France, they 
say I’m the son of immigrants, which really means I’m neither French nor Algerian. 
I’m between the two.
Here, Sofiane claims French identity by referencing the Republican model, which 
acknowledges his citizenship. But only to a degree, for he does not feel included in 
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French society, and he attributes that to the failure of France to practice Republican 
principles. Sofiane feels he has no identity. He travels to Algeria annually, owns two 
houses there, and enjoys its different way of life. Still, he feels like a foreigner there. 
His treatment in France is comparable. As a resident of a much-maligned cité, he 
feels marginalized. Residents of La Courneuve face exclusion from French society. 
“France is one of the most diverse countries in the world, but it has a big problem 
with racism,” he says. “France has a bad history with immigrants. They are happy to 
use them when they need them but just discard them afterward.”
Ahmed, Mona, and Sofiane are thus constantly reminded of their difference. 
Others do not consider them French, denying their cultural citizenship. And they 
cannot claim an identity based solely on their Maghrebin-origin status. They draw 
strict boundaries around what it means to be French and what it means to be 
Maghrébin, yet they do not fit within them. Unable to define themselves as French 
or maghrébin, without any sense of belonging, they are people without identities.
ONLY MAGHRÉBIN
About 5 percent of respondents identify solely as maghrébin, even if they have 
French citizenship and have spent their entire lives in France. Hamama, a thirty-
five-year-old practicing Muslim of Algerian origin, told me, “Just because I was 
born in France does not make me French. I am not like my parents who immi-
grated here, who chose to come here. I did not choose where I was born, where 
I grew up.” Though she does not reject French society, she has no affinity for it. 
Fortunately for her, that claim to a singular maghrébin identity has not been a 
hindrance. Hamama studies health policy at Sciences Po and works as a hospi-
tal director in the western banlieue of Plaisir. Not identifying as French does not 
inhibit her ability to succeed in French society. Her success is self-evident.
Farid, a thirty-two-year-old with dual Algerian citizenship who lives in the 
southwestern banlieue of Melun with his wife and two young children, also com-
pletely rejects a French identity. When he was very young, Farid’s parents would 
tell him, “You’re not French. We live in France, but you’re Algerian. There’s no 
difference between your family here and your family in Algeria.” Clearly, Farid got 
the message: “It is impossible, impossible for me to say that I’m French.” His par-
ents instilled in him a love and appreciation for Algeria, which takes precedence 
over any attachment to French society.
BEC OMING FRENCH?  
THE C ONTINUING SIGNIFICANCE OF R ACE AND ETHNICIT Y
The example of former French president Nicolas Sarkozy offers a different per-
spective on the intersection of national and ethnic-origin identities. Born in 
France to a Hungarian immigrant father and French mother, Sarkozy’s immigrant 
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origin posed no barrier to his presidential campaign or ascension to the French 
presidency. He had become French and was never considered anything else. Such 
success is almost unimaginable for an individual of Algerian, Moroccan, or Tuni-
sian origin. He or she would not be considered a legitimate member of the French 
Republic.
Farid is a thirty-two-year-old of Algerian origin who lives in the southwestern 
banlieue of Melun with his wife and two young children. He feels that, were Sar-
kozy to acknowledge his immigrant origins, it would benefit all immigrants and 
perhaps widen the definition of French identity. Sabri recalled how Sarkozy once 
likened himself to Obama in an interview, on the grounds that both were second-
generation immigrants, though Sabri noted that “the son of a white immigrant is 
not the son of a black immigrant. It’s not the same thing.”
In this chapter, I have painted the portrait of a group of individuals who for 
the most part see themselves as French but are continually told they are not. I 
have highlighted how the middle-class French North African second genera-
tion learns of and interprets its difference and responds to its marginalization, 
a phenomenon first experienced in childhood. In France, North African–origin 
individuals and other visible minorities are racialized. They occupy the bottom of 
France’s ethnoracial hierarchy. Such is France’s continual racial project, in which 
distinctions among citizens based on visible and socially meaningful differences 
are reinforced.
There exists in France a fear that identity-based groups will desire self- 
segregation and separation from others, yet as I have shown, individuals of 
maghrébin origin, viewed by others as different, still wish to be considered French. 
Their attachment to their maghrébin origins do not negate their attachment to 
French society. The social separation they experience is not one of desire, but of 
circumstance. Many middle-class maghrébin-origin individuals are racialized as 
nonwhite but still see themselves as French. But ethnic origins remain salient, and 
they are denied a French identity.
Contrasting citizenship and nationhood in Germany and France, Brubaker 
(1992) states that France has a territorially inclusive principle, or civic notion of 
citizenship, while Germany’s is based on ethnicity. In theory, French identity is 
accessible to any citizen. But racial and ethnic minorities, particularly those con-
nected to former French colonies, find that identity out of reach. The experience 
of this population proves that the symbolic boundaries around French identity are 
not malleable. Respondents may assert their French identity, and they and they 
may say they are French when questioned about their background, but that is the 
extent of their agency. There is a distinction between the identities they assert and 
the identities they are assigned.
By focusing on second-generation individuals who are racial and ethnic 
minorities, I show that citizenship does not confer the same benefits on other 
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populations as it does on whites. Like their immigrant parents before them, chil-
dren of immigrants experience marginalization. They are denied cultural citizen-
ship and excluded from the imagined community of France, yet members of the 
North African second generation are faithful to the French Republican model and 
do not cultivate an oppositional consciousness or identity. Rather, they seek to 
reconcile how they see themselves and how others see them. Even as they wrestle 
with what being French means and attempt to determine their place as an ethnic 
minority in French society, they still wish to claim French identity and be accepted 
as such by others. In the meantime, they inhabit a marginal social location. The 
distinction between their assigned versus asserted identities allows these individu-




Cultural Citizenship and Transnational Blackness
“Dirty nigger!” Or simply, “Look, a Negro!”
—Frantz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks
One sometimes has the strange impression of upsetting others by being black 
in a country that thinks of itself as white.
—Rama Yade, Noirs de France1
Of Antillean origin, he has lived in Bordeaux for many years, so he’s a Eu-
ropean. But he is black; so he is a Negro. There is a conflict. He does not 
understand his own race, and whites do not understand him.
—Frantz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks
After a long discussion in a Starbucks with Nasar, a thirty-two-year-old of Algerian 
origin who works for the French Soccer Federation, he asked me some of the same 
questions I had posed to him. How do I see my identity? I said I identify as black 
American or African American. “But what does that actually mean to you?” he 
asked. “Why not just say you’re American?” I answered that, for me, being  African 
American implies a link to the African diaspora, especially the forced migration of 
West Africans to the United States for enslavement.
“But what if I put you in the same room with a white American, a white person 
from Tanzania, and a black person from Tanzania,” he challenged. “Who do you 
think you’d have the most in common with?” Before I could respond, he answered 
for me: “You’d have the most in common with the white American, not anyone in 
Tanzania or anywhere else in Africa. That is because you are American.”
As Nasar points out even if I am not always treated as an American or as 
 American as any other American, I would still have the most in common with 
white Americans because we share a national identity. In the same discussion, 
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Nasar acknowledges that he has been treated differently from others because he is 
not white and is a racial and ethnic minority, but it does not make him less French. 
He does not negate being French, even if that identity can be difficult to assert, for 
he is denied cultural citizenship. He is not ashamed of his Algerian origins, and in 
his mind, they do not make him less French than others. Even if French identity 
has racial and ethnic underpinnings, Nasar and his counterparts, though marked 
as different and treated differently because of their race and ethnic origin, still 
identify as French. Nasar sees me in the same light. He knows I am a racial and eth-
nic minority in the United States, but that doesn’t make me any less an American.
While my conversation with Nasar, including his hypothetical scenario, was 
a bit jarring, it was also illustrative of how the middle-class maghrébin second 
generation thinks about the relationship between nation-based identity and racial 
and ethnic identity, and more specifically the relationship between race and the 
nation. For Nasar, his lower rank in a racial and ethnic hierarchy does not negate 
his attachment to his nation-based identity.
In this chapter, I discuss the varied ways respondents marshal blackness, 
including a transnational blackness connecting them to black populations else-
where, and the experiences of racial and ethnic minorities in other societies, to 
understand, and sometimes challenge, the racial and ethnic hierarchy of which 
they are a part. Most of these individuals see their interests and experiences as 
aligned with black populations, even if they do not want a French reclamation of 
an American or other model of identity politics.
Beyond demonstrating how race functions as a basis for the marginalization of 
and denial of cultural citizenship to the North African second generation, I argue 
that the connections made by French racial and ethnic minorities with other racial 
and ethnic minority populations worldwide, including black Americans and Pal-
estinians, are part of France’s racial project. Such ties allow respondents to make 
sense of their social locations. In a society that does not recognize racial and ethnic 
difference, identification with others contributes to the consciousness of their eth-
nic minority status. It is also a “diasporic consciousness” (Smith 2014), in that they 
see themselves as sharing the struggles against racial and ethnic inequalities that 
other populations confront. Such connections are especially valuable to respon-
dents in a nation where there is no accepted and legitimate language for discussing 
race and ethnicity in society, a nation that purports colorblindness yet exhibits 
racial and ethnic consciousness (Keaton 2010). In the absence of such language, 
respondents look to other societies, including the United States, to understand the 
racism and exclusion they face.
Blackness operates as a socially constructed vessel of otherness. Respondents 
develop a consciousness of what it means to be subsumed in this vessel, and use it 
to make sense of their position on the margins of French society. That conscious-
ness connects them to black and other minority populations across the globe. 
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I argue that the conception of blackness they invoke builds upon French histo-
rian Pap Ndiaye’s (2008) notion of “transnational blackness” and Tommie Shelby’s 
(2002) notion of “thin blackness.” For members of the maghrébin second genera-
tion, the diaspora and transnational blackness apply to them as well.
SHARED EXPERIENCES,  SHARED OPPRESSIONS
Abdelkrim, a journalist of Algerian origin, believes his own experience parallels 
that of Malcolm X, whose autobiography he has read (X and Haley 1965). He is 
inspired by accounts of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. and the Black Panthers and 
how they responded to racial oppression. Even as a young student, he wanted to 
be a journalist. He remembers a white teacher who told him as an adolescent that 
he would never be good enough to realize this aspiration. It is one of his earliest 
memories of being treated differently because of his maghrébin origin.
“Maybe it wasn’t false at the time,” Abdelkrim says. “Maybe I didn’t have the 
grades that would have allowed me to follow that path.  .  .  . But it reminds me 
of the day of when Malcolm X said to his teacher that he wanted to be a lawyer 
and his teacher responded that “you are a negro and you will never be anything 
but a carpenter.” Here, Abdelkrim accesses the framework of another marginal-
ized population—African Americans—to make sense of his own experiences and 
position in an ethnoracial hierarchy. It brings to mind another respondent, Nadir, 
who in chapter 3 expresses his solidarity with blacks and Palestinians because of 
his experience in Seine-Saint-Denis and as the only nonwhite person in his office.
But the connections he makes to black Americans are not just historical. “The 
media here always encourages negative portrayals of blacks and Maghrébins,” he 
says. “It’s the same thing the media does to blacks in the United States.” He gestures 
in my direction, assuming I immediately understood the reference. When he and I 
discuss the 2005 banlieue uprisings, he again draws a parallel between maghrébin-
origin individuals and black Americans and other racial and ethnic minorities: 
“The problems of the police in the banlieues are like the problems between the 
police and blacks, African Americans. . . . These uprisings involved all of France, 
because we share a common destiny  .  .  . being a minority, being a child of an 
immigrant . . . [and they are] just like uprisings throughout the world.” Abdelkrim 
and other children of North African immigrants make sense of being a racial and 
ethnic minority in France by viewing their experiences in a broader context.
Respondents closely followed the 2008 presidential campaign in the United 
States and wondered what Barack Obama’s election might mean for them. In 
October 2008, there was a débat (panel discussion) entitled “Barack Obama: Un 
modèle pour les minorités dites visibles en France?” (Barack Obama: A model 
for so-called visible minorities in France?) at the Nanterre Association. Many in 
attendance were of North African and sub-Saharan African origin. Mamadou, a 
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thirty-six-year-old of Algerian origin and association director, was enthusiastic 
about the new president: “We are all really excited about Obama. It’s such a good 
symbol for minorities here, especially because his father is African.” The general 
sentiment of that evening’s débat was that Obama’s election would be a positive 
and encouraging symbol to minorities in France and throughout the world, and 
that it would also serve to change perceptions of African-origin individuals every-
where. Almost every time I visited the Nanterre Association that fall, Mamadou 
or someone else would ask me about Obama. What did I think of him? What did 
I know about him? Was I going to vote for him? Did I think he could win? As an 
African American from Chicago, I was expected to respond positively and say I 
was happy he was running for president and hopeful that he would win. The pros-
pect of the first black president often led to discussions about such a prospect in 
France and what would have to change to make that a reality. If it could happen in 
the United States, could it happen here in France? Many saw the civil rights move-
ment in the United States as leading to Obama’s election and wondered if France 
needed its own civil rights movement to produce its version of Obama.
In January 2009, I watched the president’s inauguration on a television at 
the Nanterre Association. Several of the children could barely focus on their 
 homework—much to Mamadou’s chagrin—because they were so captivated by 
watching him being sworn in, with his wife, Michelle, by his side. At one point, 
Mamadou said, somewhat jokingly, “Obama is more my president than Sarkozy!” 
Clearly, he identified far more with the black American president than with his 
own. Obama’s story resonates not just because of his African-born father, but also 
because of his life story and upward mobility: he grew up with a single mother and 
was elected to the highest post in American government. His extraordinary move 
up the social ladder was really striking to many interlocutors.
At one point, Hafid, another director at the Nanterre Association, who is thirty-
six years old and also of Algerian origin, told me, “While it’d be great to have 
[a black president] in France, it’s much easier . . . in the United States. . . . There 
are more possibilities for blacks there.” Though my respondents share with their 
American counterparts a history of racial oppression and hope to follow their lead 
and overcome it, like them, they are not necessarily sanguine about the prospect 
of a minority president in France.
ARE MAGHRÉBIN-ORIGIN INDIVIDUALS BL ACK? 
DIASPORIC C ONNECTIONS AND TR ANSNATIONAL 
BL ACKNESS
This was a question often posed to me, either literally or rhetorically, when I dis-
cussed my research with others.2 It is useful, therefore, to consider the meaning of 
black and blackness in France and Europe more generally.
88    Boundaries of Difference
In Black Skin, White Masks, Frantz Fanon (1967), the Martinique-born psycho-
analyst who would later support the Algerian Revolution through his involvement 
in the National Liberation Front, writes about French colonialism’s codification 
of different statuses for whites and nonwhites: colonizing whites are superior; 
colonized blacks are inferior. Fanon details how his blackness and skin color are 
more important to others than any other facet of his identity. He is not viewed by 
whites as a doctor but as a black man who is a doctor. His visible otherness always 
comes first. Blackness, he writes, is “overdetermined from without.” And “France 
is a racist country, for the myth of the bad nigger is part of the collective uncon-
sciousness” (92). To be seen as black—as a “Negro”—contrasts with being French, 
or even European. This is an opposition with which the North African second 
generation is all too familiar.
Moreover, blackness functions as a “social uniform,” setting individuals 
racialized as black apart from others or from mainstream society. The assign-
ment of racialized identity experienced by maghrébin-origin individuals in 
France connects them to black populations elsewhere. Historian Tyler Stovall 
(2009) points to the convergence of black lives in the United States and France. 
Fanon himself makes this connection: “In America, Negroes are segregated. In 
South America, Negroes are whipped in the streets, and Negro strikers are cut 
down by machine-guns. In West Africa, the Negro is an animal” (1967, p. 113). 
Blackness is defined as otherness, outside the norm, an identity forced upon or 
assigned to individuals rather than chosen. Even if maghrébin-origin individuals 
do not identify as black, they nonetheless reflect a consciousness situated in and 
informed by blackness. This is a blackness defined as a vessel of otherness or of 
not belonging, or having a rightful place, in mainstream society. Blackness has 
historically been framed as a permanent otherness and inferiority in Western 
society (Wright 2004).
Children of North African immigrants in France are engaged in a transnational 
project allowing them to connect to the past and present realities of black popu-
lations worldwide, including black Americans. This is an important distinction 
between identifying as black and identifying with the black American experience 
or experiences of other black populations. In her ethnography of second-gener-
ation South Asian Americans, Sharma (2010) discusses the diasporic sensibility 
of these “desis,” which reflects a “racialized consciousness that emphasizes com-
monality formed in the negotiation of difference among people of color” (3–4). 
Minority and marginalized populations may thus feel a sustained and genuine 
connection to blackness through, among other commonalities, similar expe-
riences of inequality, without self-identifying as black. In the case of the North 
African second generation, this connection to blackness is an expression of their 
position at the bottom of the ethnoracial hierarchy in French society. “Othered,” 
marginalized, and excluded because of their racial and ethnic status, and without 
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a language or discourse to discuss it, they look elsewhere to make sense of their 
lives: “With their national belonging perpetually in question, blacks in Europe 
often seek out diasporic resources that originate in other parts of the black world” 
(Brown 2009, 13).
Sharma’s (2010) theory of “making race,” and the global race consciousness 
of her respondents, is also instructive here, for it conceptualizes how individ-
uals reject and incorporate the language of other racial and ethnic groups.3 
Children of North African immigrants grow up as racial and ethnic minori-
ties in a society that does not recognize that status. As a result, in effect they 
“make race” through their experiences of racialization. The consciousness thus 
gained allows them to connect to black populations and other racial and ethnic 
minorities.
North African–origin individuals’ self-identification as black is less relevant 
than the assignment of blackness to them as a category, one forcing them to con-
tinually justify themselves as legitimate members of society. Fanon writes of this 
as well: “The European has a fixed concept of the Negro, and there is nothing more 
exasperating than to be asked: ‘How long have you been in France? You speak 
French so well’ ” (1967, 35). Blacks in France are not considered of France. “French” 
identity is positioned as nonracial, but they—and members of the North African 
generation—are considered neither as white nor French. Most respondents under-
stand being a racial and ethnic minority in France through an understanding of, 
or reckoning with, blackness. This connection is particularly valuable in a context 
that does not recognize minorities based on race and ethnicity. Such blackness 
“continues to constitute not just a historical but also a contemporary otherness” 
(Smith 2006, 423).
The question of what blackness means to the maghrébin second generation is 
situated in a larger discourse concerning black France, black Europe, and black 
Paris (Boittin 2012; Boittin and Stovall 2010; Germain 2016; Stovall 1996, 2003, 
2006; Thomas 2007). Such a question has emerged in recent decades in conversa-
tion with existing notions of the African diaspora. As such, black Europe is based 
upon colonialism and postwar migrations, whereas for African Americans, the 
emphasis is on the Middle Passage (Wright 2006).
Yet existing notions of black France or black Europe (Hine et al. 2009) have 
failed to focus on North African–origin individuals, who though they may not 
present phenotypically as black or self-identify as black, nonetheless reference 
blackness in making sense of their social locations.4 In view of the transnational 
connections made by the North African second generation, I argue for using a 
more expansive definition of blackness, one that encompasses individuals racial-
ized as black or other and subject to oppression or marginalization. As Keaton 
(2010) puts it, blacks in France constitute a “community-in-formation,” as black-
ness in France has “transformed common oppression into shared outlook and 
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shared ways of being” (2010, 116). That is, a politics of identity has developed in 
spite of Republican ideology because of the marginalization and racism experi-
enced by blacks in France.
In La condition noire: Essai sur une minorité française, Pap Ndiaye (2008) con-
versely argues that there is no strong black community in France, but that a trans-
national blackness connects sub-Saharan blacks to black populations elsewhere. 
Rather than an essentialist notion of blackness or who is black, this transnational 
blackness is a product of social relations and interactions. Shelby’s (2002) concep-
tion of “thin” versus “thick” blackness is also useful for considering the transna-
tional connections the North African second generation makes with black popula-
tions outside of France. Thin blackness is a “vague and socially imposed category 
of difference based on certain visible, inherited physical characteristics” (2002, 
239), such as having darker skin in the case of the United States. Thick black-
ness has a narrower social meaning and comprises racialist, ethnic, cultural, and 
kinship aspects. Shelby argues for a black solidarity that does not privilege black 
identity, but rather is based upon the shared experience of oppression and the 
commitment to resist it. I argue that Ndiaye’s transnational blackness and Shelby’s 
thin blackness also extend to maghrébin-origin individuals who, in the absence of 
discourse about race and blackness in France, invoke notions of blackness from 
other societies. Blacks in France must continually assert their Frenchness, as it is 
often the first thing that is questioned by others. Maghrébin-origin individuals, of 
course, must do the same.
Though respondents make transnational connections with black Americans 
and other black populations, they still consider themselves French. Abdelkrim’s 
identification with Malcolm X is a case in point. But in a nation that excludes him 
from mainstream society, he nevertheless feels closer to marginalized populations 
around the globe. The same can be said of the enthusiasm generated by Barack 
Obama’s narrative among French racial and ethnic minorities in France. Outsiders 
recognize those who are like them. Children of maghrébin immigrants develop 
a sense of blackness, or a black consciousness, which reaches beyond national 
borders.
Nasar, like Abdelkrim, defines himself as French. He found it difficult to understand 
my identification as an African American, privileging my connection to the African 
diaspora above my ties to nationality. Karim asserted he was more French than for-
mer president Sarkozy, stating that, as a child of Algerian immigrants and a product 
of French colonial history, he has closer ties to France than the  Hungarian-immigrant 
politician. To see himself as anything but French would be absurd.5
Elisa Joy White (2012) describes the African diaspora as the shared experi-
ences of individuals who are racialized as black. Like their black counterparts, 
my respondents have been marginalized, and their nation-state identities are con-
sidered illegitimate. This is not to reify an essentialism regarding black identity. 
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Instead, I position children of maghrébin immigrants as part of a diasporic project 
connecting them to other populations positioned on the margins of society. Black-
ness in this context refers to a vessel of otherness, a container of those not included 
in the definition of French. By connecting to other racialized populations, they 
construct a sense of solidarity and community.
Moreover, even though a French identity is supposedly open to all citizens, the 
experiences of the North African second generation reveal that it is a racialized 
identity unavailable to many. This has implications for considering the relation-
ship among race, ethnicity, and nation for other black diasporic populations. In 
There Ain’t No Black in the Union Jack, Paul Gilroy (1981) argues that “British” 
and “black” have been historically positioned in opposition to each other and 
that “Britishness” itself is defined by race and ethnicity, an argument to which 
the North African second generation can relate. Colonialism in the Maghreb, and 
the silence with which its brutality is met in present-day French society, unites 
children of North African immigrants despite distinctions among the former 
French colonies of Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco and mirrors the centering effect 
of the transatlantic slave trade or the Black Atlantic for black populations in the 
diaspora, as articulated by Gilroy.” The shared connections formed by children 
of maghrébin immigrants are a direct response to their experiences of exclusion 
from mainstream society. Resisting a distinction between black and British opens 
up the category of black or blackness and rejects an essentialist formation. Dia-
sporic connections reveal how individuals imagine race and ethnicity beyond the 
boundaries of their nation-state (Edwards 2003. Diasporic connections are prac-
ticed and repracticed as the middle-class North African second generation uses 
languages and discourses from other contexts to make sense of their own social 
locations. The way in which respondents interacted with me and made assump-
tions about my life in the United States was further exemplification of this.
To answer the question of whether maghrébin-origin individuals are black 
requires broadening the definition of that term to encompass shared experiences 
of otherness and exclusion from the nation-state. Their connection to black popu-
lations is a product of their exclusion from national belonging. As British and black 
are perceived as in opposition to each other, so, too, are French and black. When 
kept out of state projects determining who belongs in the nation, they are forced 
to connect to populations with shared experiences elsewhere (Brown 2009).6 In 
turn, these diasporic and transnational connections help them make sense of their 
present circumstances.
Differential treatment experienced by respondents because of their North 
African origins force them to come to grips with the salience of their racial and 
ethnic status. And they make sense of their marginalization by connecting with 
others who themselves are subject to it, such as Abdelkrim’s identification with 
Bruce Lee or with Malcolm X. Ndiaye’s (2008) theory of transnational blackness 
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in France applies to the North African second generation, which is engaged in a 
transnational project of its own. Both populations share experiences of stigma and 
discrimination.
R ACE MAT TERS,  BL ACKNESS MAT TERS
Children of North African immigrants assert a French identity, but because of the 
ethnicized and racialized nature of French identity, they are viewed only as North 
African or maghrébin. France does not explicitly recognize distinct racial and eth-
nic categories, but French identity is a category inaccessible to minorities of color. 
If, on the face of it, race and ethnicity are not measured or quantified in French 
society, they nevertheless operate in everyday life, as the ethnoracially marked 
experiences of respondents reveal. Consciousness of race exists simultaneously 
with a denial of race and ethnicity. At the bottom of a racial and ethnic hierar-
chy, children of North African immigrants feel a connection to black populations 
worldwide. African American culture and identity resonate with these individu-
als and provide a way to make sense of their own marginalized social locations. 
But whatever their identification with other racial and ethnic minorities, they see 
themselves as French.
Clearly, transnational blackness applies not only to blacks in France but to 
North African–origin minorities there as well. While maghrébin–origin individu-
als are generally excluded from our notions of the African diaspora, they nonethe-
less make diasporic connections. In a context where Republican ideology does 
not acknowledge their own racialization, middle-class North African–origin indi-
viduals invoke the experiences and vocabulary of other racialized minority popu-
lations to identify and frame their own experience. The connections they make 
reveal the portability of blackness.
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Sacrificed Children of the Republic?
Heard about the guy who fell off a skyscraper? On his way down past each 
floor, he kept trying to reassure himself: “So far, so good. . . . So far, so good. . . . 
So far, so good.” How you fall doesn’t matter. It’s how you land.
—From La haine, a film by Mathieu Kassovitz
“Rwanda has nothing to do with race, so I’m told. Discrimination against 
Koreans in Japan has nothing to do with race, so I’m told. The very long 
struggle of the Irish in Great Britain is not about race, so I’m told. Maybe. 
But when is racism ever about race, pure and simple; when is religious per-
secution ever simply about religion; when is patriotism ever about defending 
the nation-state; when is misogyny nothing more than an uncontrollable and 
inexplicable hatred of women; when is tribalism ever merely one tribe fight-
ing another tribe because, well, they’re another tribe? The question, therefore, 
is not whether race matters but how it matters. How does it shape, sustain, 
and define systems of domination? How has it functioned in different times 
and places?”
—Robin Kelley, “Race and Racism: A Symposium”
In 2009, in a radio debate on national identity, Nadine Morano, a Les Républicains 
party politician, said: “We’re not putting young Muslims on trial. I respect their 
situation. What I want for them is to feel French because they are French. I want 
them to love France when they live here, to find work, and to not speak in slang. 
They shouldn’t put their caps on back to front” (Leveque et al. 2009).
Recent events in France show that Muslims, and maghrébin-origin individuals 
more generally, are on trial.
On January 7, 2015, the brothers Saïd and Chérif Kouachi massacred twelve 
people in the eleventh arrondissement offices of the weekly satirical magazine 
Charlie Hebdo. Hundreds of thousands gathered at the Place de la République that 
94    Conclusion
evening for a spontaneous demonstration. President François Hollande declared 
the following day, January 8,1 a national day of mourning. On January 9, Amedy 
Coulibaly took hostages in a Hyper Cacher kosher supermarket near Porte de 
Vincennes and killed four people. The Kouachi brothers, born in Paris to Algerian 
immigrant parents, and Coulibaly, born in the southeastern banlieue of Juvisy-
sur-Orge to Malian immigrants, had ties to Islamic extremism.
In the aftermath of the killings, attention focused on the slain cartoonists and 
the columnists, and the rallying cry “Je suis Charlie” sprang up. A different cry 
soon appeared, in recognition of another victim of the attacks: Ahmed Merabet. 
Merabet, a Muslim police officer of Algerian origin, was killed while trying to 
pursue the Kouachi brothers. But the cry of “Je suis Ahmed” was far less common. 
Instead, French Muslims were subjected to “collective punishment” (Hajjat 2015), 
and many, among them my respondents, were asked to denounce violence they 
had nothing to do with. In the wake of the massacre at Charlie Hebdo headquar-
ters, France witnessed more than 128 anti-Muslim attacks. Several supporters of 
the massacre were arrested as “apologists for terrorism,” including the comedian 
M’Bala M’Bala, known professionally as Dieudonné, who joked on Facebook, “I 
feel like Charlie Coulibaly.”2
Later that year, in November, another series of coordinated terrorist acts, also 
linked to Islam extremism, occurred at several sites in the Parisian metropolitan 
region, including the Stade de France, in Seine-Saint-Denis; the Bataclan theater in 
the eleventh arrondissement; and La Belle Équipe and several restaurants and cafés 
near the Canal Saint-Martin. Among the more than 130 people killed, there were 
several maghrébin-origin individuals. Following the attacks, President Hollande 
proposed stripping dual citizens convicted of terrorism of their French citizenship 
(a proposal withdrawn several months later amid opposition). Hollande declared 
a state of emergency that lasted several months, allowing police to conduct raids 
without warrants, among other measures.3 Heightened Islamophobia ensued.
On July 14, Bastille Day, 2016, Mohamed Lahouaiej Bouhlel, a thirty-one-year-
old born in Tunisia who moved to France in 2005, drove a truck through a crowd 
gathered to watch the fireworks in Nice, in southern France, killing eighty-four 
people and injuring more than three hundred. The Islamic State claimed respon-
sibility for the attack, and the French government declared it a terrorist incident. 
The incident raised additional concern about whether Muslims could be success-
fully incorporated into French society.4
The summer of 2016 also saw the controversial ban on the burkini, the full-body 
swimsuit covering everything except for the face, worn by some Muslim women. 
Several French towns banned it, and photos of Muslim women on beaches who 
were fined and forced to remove their suits flooded the news and social media. 
Then-Prime Minister Manuel Valls referred to the burkini as a form of enslave-
ment. The ban in the French Rivera town of Villeneuve-Loubet was overturned as 
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a violation of civil liberties. Yet opposition to the burkini—on the argument that 
its presence challenges French values—remains.5
These events illustrate the implications of the denial of cultural citizenship to 
racial and ethnic minorities in French society and are only a sampling of many 
similar incidents. They sparked concerns about the presence of Muslims in France 
and their perceived incompatibility with Western society, but the role of race and 
ethnicity as markers of difference was rarely mentioned. Islamophobia is not just 
about Islam; it is also about racism. Even North African–-origin individuals who 
do not identify as practicing Muslims nonetheless feel marginalized because of 
their North African origins, because they are nonwhite. They are treated as though 
they are not French, even if they identify as such. Even though France espouses a 
colorblind Republican ideology, race and ethnicity are very much present in the 
lives of non-white minorities.
I chose the title Citizen Outsider because the middle-class North African second 
generation qualifies as both. Its members are simultaneously part of French soci-
ety and separate from it. They cannot fully belong to it because of their maghrébin 
origins and their connection to France’s colonial history. Contemporary France 
cannot see them as having French origins, only North African ones. If France con-
tinues to ignore the experiences of those on the margins of society, violent inci-
dents like those I describe above will continue to occur. She ignores her minorities 
at her own peril.
I have been fascinated with and curious about the politics of identity, race, and 
ethnicity in France for well over a decade, beginning with my first trip to Paris. I 
originally sought to understand what it is like to be an ethnic minority in France, 
and how it contrasts with the experiences of ethnic minorities in the United States. 
As I planned the dissertation research that later served as the basis for this book, 
many people—both French and American—told me, or perhaps warned me, that 
race and racism were dramatically different in the two countries. In France dif-
ferences between children of maghrébin-origin immigrants and whites are based 
on religion (Islam versus Christianity), socioeconomic status, and culture. As the 
adage goes, “Some people just don’t want to be French.”
I originally thought France would be dramatically different from the United 
States—based in part on the history of black American expatriates there. Yet, as 
I have demonstrated, the experience of minorities in France is not as different as 
one might expect—not only of how immigrants and their descendants fare but 
also in how people of different races and ethnic origins are treated. France, like the 
United States and other pluralistic societies, is a work in progress. As the experi-
ences of these respondents reveal, race and racism are central to their lives. And 
they take precedence over citizenship and socioeconomic status.
In this book, I have shown that ethnic minorities in France, even as citizens, 
remain on the margins of mainstream society, which underlines the salience of 
Figure 3. Place de la République. Photo by author.
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race and ethnicity. The marginalization of children of North African immigrants 
persists despite their trajectories of mobility and attainment of middle-class status. 
They are denied cultural citizenship because they are maghrébin, or nonwhite. The 
implicit and explicit racial and ethnic boundaries that define French identity keep 
the North African second generation from successfully asserting it. Its members 
remain vulnerable in a society that refuses to acknowledge them as French.
WHAT D OES THE NORTH AFRICAN SEC OND 
GENER ATION WANT,  AND WHY D OES IT MAT TER?
I have discussed respondents’ experiences growing up in France with immigrant 
parents, and the dual cultural worlds children of maghrébin immigrants have had 
to navigate between France and the Maghreb. Respondents’ place within French 
society was questioned at an early age, implicitly and explicitly. Explicitly, children 
of North African immigrants were told to “return to their country” or called eth-
nic slurs by neighbors and students. Implicitly, children of maghrébin immigrants 
were socialized through the French educational system and other state institutions 
that they were not a part of the definition of a French person. This is an example 
of how, from a young age, the North African second generation is denied cultural 
citizenship because they are of maghrébin origin. In chapter 3, I discussed how this 
denial of cultural citizenship continues into adulthood for respondents, includ-
ing in the workplace, religion, place and residential environment, and the public 
sphere. Even after this generation attains a middle-class status, they cannot escape 
being treated differently because of their racial and ethnic status. I also discussed 
the implications for how the North African second generation is expected to hide 
its difference, even when it cannot. After discussing how respondents are denied 
cultural citizenship and marginalized because they are non-white, I then discussed 
the impact of this on how the North African second generation self-identifies in 
chapter 4. Most respondents configure their identities in some way that references 
both being French and maghrébin. Yet they are only seen as maghrébin by others 
and not as French. Finally, in chapter 5, I discussed how respondents connect with 
black populations worldwide, including black Americans, and understand black-
ness more generally as they make sense of their social locations and experiences 
of marginalization.
Children of maghrébin immigrants are rejected despite belonging to France. 
They are staunch defenders of the Republican model but feel in their case it is not 
implemented correctly. They want all French citizens to be treated the same. They 
do not assert an oppositional identity or consciousness. They accept, rather than 
reject, France.
Safia, a thirty-two-year-old with dual Tunisian and French citizenship, describes 
this view:
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France confuses assimilation and integration, and that’s a shame. Assimilation in-
volves erasing. I don’t want to erase my origins. I don’t want to forget that my parents 
immigrated here from Tunisia, that I have a Muslim sensibility, that I have family 
that lives in Tunisia. Assimilation, it means that to be French I have to eat pork and 
drink alcohol.  .  .  . But integration is understanding that I’m French regardless of 
those differences. And I would like people to stop asking me about my origins when 
they meet me for the first time. It’s not the only thing that defines me. I’m reduced to 
my social origins, my ethnic origins. And that’s the problem.
The maghrébin second generation wants to be viewed as French as any of their 
compatriots. Its members wish to belong in France and to be accepted as French. 
Its understanding of what it means to be of maghrébin origin and French is shaped 
by whites who deny its members their place in mainstream society. This informs 
the boundaries they draw around both maghrébin and French as identities. They 
wish to be recognized as part of the French Republic (Keaton 2010). The North 
African second generation desires “more integration” and “strongly supports the 
French model while they are perceived as threatening core Republican values” 
(d’Appollonia 2009, 283). They do not voluntarily reject Frenchness; Frenchness 
rejects them. The difference ascribed to immigrant-origin individuals is often 
framed as one of culture, religion, residential location, or citizenship status. But 
these are code words for race and ethnicity, as they know from their everyday 
interactions and interactions with social institutions.
THE C ONTINUING SIGNIFICANCE OF R ACE 
AND ETHNICIT Y
The year 2015 marked the tenth anniversary of the uprisings that spread through 
banlieues throughout France, following the deaths of two ethnic minority youths 
who were fleeing the police that fall.6 One respondent, Mourad, described to me 
the sentiment of many banlieue residents at the time: “You don’t see me as a French 
person. OK, we’re not French, so we’re Muslim, Algerian, Moroccan, Tunisian. I’ll 
wear a jacket with the Algerian flag on the back. . . . That transforms into aggres-
sion. That’s what the riots in November 2005 were all about.”
When I asked other respondents about the uprisings, they said pretty much 
the same thing. The frustrations of this often-ignored segment of the French 
population made the uprisings inevitable. The American media bemoaned the 
failure of France’s Republican model to integrate its immigrants and minorities 
or fully address its colonial legacy. It brought attention to the “other France,” the 
one not typically seen in tourism brochures and films about France accessible to 
 American audiences. Within France, much of the media commentary subsequent 
to the uprisings characterized the individuals involved as unwilling to integrate 
into mainstream society, and rejecting its norms and values. On a French nightly 
Conclusion    99
news program, then–minister of the interior Nicolas Sarkozy insisted that the 
individuals involved in protests must learn to adapt to France. The implication, 
of course, was that they were too different to assimilate into the society in which 
they were born and raised and that change must come from them, not the state 
or French society. Protestors challenged this dominant narrative and began car-
rying signs stating, “Nous sommes tous les racailles” (We’re all scum), reclaiming 
a pejorative term Sarkozy had used against them and demanding that France see 
them as French.
Many respondents said that uprisings of this sort would likely happen again, for 
they felt that little had changed. Ten years after their occurrence, the police offi-
cers involved in the deaths of Zyed Benna and Bouna Traoré were acquitted of all 
charges.7 A Human Rights Watch (2012) report found that the majority of North 
African–origin and sub-Saharan-origin individuals said identity checks by the 
police were a major problem. They are six to eight times more likely than whites to 
undergo “pat-downs” (see also OSI 2009). The framing of immigrant-origin indi-
viduals as rejecting France does not fully explain the occurrence of the uprisings. 
Even when maghrébin-origin individuals do everything right, such as acquiring 
university degrees and working in a professional capacity, they are still excluded 
from mainstream society. If French society rejects racial and ethnic framing as a 
means to understand events like the 2005 banlieue uprisings, ethnic minorities 
know differently.
The experience of Zara, a twenty-eight-year-old of Moroccan origin, again 
demonstrates how the onus of integration falls on racial and ethnic minorities. 
Her Algerian aunt had been in an abusive relationship with a white man. Zara had 
told her repeatedly that he was not good for her, that something was wrong with 
him, and that she should leave him. But her aunt did not listen and Zara eventually 
lost touch with her. One day her aunt called her, crying, and asked Zara to help her 
and come pick her up because she did not feel well. Zara did and her aunt came to 
live with her. Her aunt told her how they had been arguing a lot. One morning, her 
aunt went downstairs to use a telephone booth, and soon afterward Zara heard her 
aunt shouting. Her abusive boyfriend had figured out where Zara lived. Wearing 
a nightgown, Zara ran outside to find the boyfriend shoving her aunt into his car. 
“I tried to stop it, but I didn’t succeed,” she explained. “He drove away with her.”
Zara then went to the local police station to file a report against him. The officer 
said that the police would go to the boyfriend’s house and bring him in. Though 
Zara asked the police to contact her after this took place, she heard nothing from 
them. She returned to the station later that day and learned that her aunt was in 
custody. The police had removed her aunt from the boyfriend’s house and then 
took her with them. Zara started to complain to the officer, but he told her that the 
boyfriend had said it was Zara who was racist toward whites like him. “It’s impor-
tant that you integrate,” the officer told her.
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The roles of Zara and the boyfriend had suddenly reversed. It was she who had 
become the problem; it was the boyfriend who complained. And it was Zara who 
needed to change. She remembers thinking that, had she been white, she would 
have been treated differently and the police officer probably would have taken her 
complaint seriously. In frustration, Zara said there was nothing she could do. A 
colorblind, Republican institution of the state had failed her.
In theory, the Republican model does not recognize race and ethnicity, does 
not want to reify differences that those terms imply.8 What is clear, however, is that 
the model is not working if a segment of France’s population is marked as different 
and treated differently because it is nonwhite.
The French model for identity politics differs from that in the United States 
and many other societies.9 France essentially attempts to erase race and ethnicity 
from social life; by refusing to acknowledge such categories, they are deprived of 
meaning. The colorblind Republican model holds that race, ethnicity, and other 
distinctions related to identity produce identity politics, making race and ethnicity 
salient where they otherwise would not be. But as the experiences of these citizen 
outsiders show, individuals are still racialized even without state-sanctioned iden-
tity categories. The distinction between public and private spheres does not change 
this, for the differences drawn exist in both.
Boundaries around identity in France dictate who does and does not belong 
in French society. The North African second generation, and its middle-class 
segment, is repeatedly told it does not belong. In response to this marginaliza-
tion, the second generation has formed a distinct community, and a distinct 
identity politics related to ethnic origins. Ironically, communautarisme, which is 
feared in France (Chabal 2015), has been recreated by the exclusion of children of 
maghrébin-origin immigrants and their desire to connect with others who share 
similar experiences.
Members of the North African second generation see themselves as racialized 
or ethnicized subjects. Their difference, or otherness, is an ascribed one and not an 
oppositional choice of their own. Race and ethnicity establish and reinforce their 
second-class citizenship and deny them cultural citizenship.
CULTUR AL CITIZENSHIP IN FR ANCE AND BEYOND
France’s framework for addressing diversity and multiculturalism is assimilation-
ist. Nonwhites are expected to assimilate into the mainstream; differences should 
be relegated to the private sphere. But the nation’s colonial history and its unac-
knowledged racial and ethnic foundations deny a segment of its citizens the real 
and symbolic benefits that come with being part of the French nation. It is instruc-
tive to compare the French example with how other pluralistic societies deal with 
cultural, religious, and ethnic diversity. As Stephen Castles (1997) has noted, like 
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France, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands have adopted an assimilation-
ist model, the United States and Canada have opted for a pluralist model, and 
Germany practices differential exclusion. It comes as no surprise, then, that recent 
research has shown how newly immigrated women in London and Amsterdam 
feel like second-class citizens (Ghorashi and Vieten 2012). Citizenship is a marker 
of difference for these immigrants, as it for my respondents. For marginalized 
populations, it remains a continual negotiation, not something conferred on them 
by law.
Maghrébin-origin individuals are depicted as uniquely responsible for their 
own plight: They are said to not try hard enough to fit in, even if their socioeco-
nomic status and professional attainments are the equal of whites. Rather than 
reject their societies, however, Maghrebin-origin individuals in France and other 
marginalized populations around the world are, instead, claiming their rightful 
places within their societies. As citizens, they see themselves as deserving of rights 
and privileges meant for all. We must imagine a citizenship and societal belonging 
in which racial, ethnic, cultural, and religious difference do not stand in the way 
of full societal inclusion. This is how we address the denial of cultural citizenship. 
By failing to accommodate differences in the public sphere, France loses out on 
a true and cohesive national community. France’s emphasis on monoculturalism 
and universalism do not allow for this. And theories of immigrant integration and 
assimilation fail to capture the experiences of immigrant-origin racial and ethnic 
minorities.
The denial of cultural citizenship exists beyond France, as demonstrated by the 
Brexit vote, attributed in part to xenophobic sentiment; by the heightened Islamo-
phobia and rise of the Far Right in European societies such as the Netherlands 
and Germany; and by the debate over how to respond to the Syrian refugee crisis 
in the European Union. In the United States, we can see the denial of cultural 
citizenship to African Americans, who even though they are legal citizens, are 
subject to disparate treatment, as evidenced by “stop and frisk” procedures and 
the phenomenon of “driving while black,” among other examples. Or the case of 
Muslim Americans and immigrants who face heightened suspicion and Islamo-
phobia, including Executive Order 13769 signed by President Donald Trump in 
January 2017 banning immigrants from various Muslim majority countries such 
as Iran, Syria, and Iraq. Our idea of who belongs in a given nation and who is seen 
as a full member of society is undergirded or circumscribed by race and ethnicity. 
This point is clear when we consider Ahmed Merabet, the Muslim and Algerian-
origin police officer who was one of the victims of the massacre at the Charlie 
Hebdo editorial offices. He was just as French as the other victims. He had a stable 
middle-class job. He was a Muslim who fought to defend the French motto of Lib-
erté, égalité, et fraternité yet is rarely mentioned in the news reports of the events. 
And while the cry of “Je suis Ahmed” was virtually ignored, “Je suis Charlie” was 
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quickly adopted as an affirmation of French values. When we consider the lack 
of attention paid to the plight of the North African second generation and other 
racial and ethnic minorities, it is not hard to understand why.
That the struggle for full cultural citizenship is a global struggle is evident most 
recently in the death of Adama Traoré, a twenty-four-year-old black construction 
worker, who died under unusual circumstances after being arrested in the banli-
eue of Beaumont-sur-Oise, north of Paris.10 He was arrested for interfering in the 
arrest of his brother. The police first claimed that he had died of a heart attack and 
then later said he had a severe infection. His family asked for a second autopsy 
because they say he had no health problems prior to his death. Since his death, 
there have been demonstrations demanding justice for Adama Traoré, including 
one protest outside the local police station, which was met with tear gas from the 
police. Part of the mobilization around justice for Traoré has been connected to 
struggles for black liberation in other societies, including the United States. The 
incidents of state-sponsored violence against black Americans are being closely 
followed by racial and ethnic minorities in France, who also seek to affirm their 
rightful place in society and challenge racial and ethnic marginalization. During 
my recent visits to France, I remain fascinated by the transnational connections 
racial and ethnic minorities are making—despite differences in their societies. 
Within Paris and its banlieues, there have even been demonstrations in honor of 
Mike Brown, Freddie Gray, and other black American victims of state-sponsored 
violence.
In titling this chapter “Sacrificed Children of the Republic,”11 I also want to con-
sider what is at stake by denying cultural citizenship to racial and ethnic minori-
ties. I return to Safia, whom I caught up with during a trip to Paris in 2015. She has 
achieved even more success as a journalist—now working as an editor in addition. 
As we met in her office in the fifteenth arrondissement, she recounted a recent 
disturbing incident. One day she traveled to Marseille (in the south of France) by 
train for some work-related meetings. She had no luggage with her since she was 
not spending the night and was carrying a satchel containing the items she needs 
for work. When Safia’s train arrived at the Gare de Lyon at the end of the day, she 
was stopped leaving the train by a plainclothes police officer. He demanded to see 
what was inside her bag. She told me, “Il m’a tutoyée,” that is, he addressed her by 
using the informal, or familiar, pronoun tu (you) rather than the formal vous, not 
merely a breach of etiquette but, in France, a clear sign of disrespect. Safia was 
offended by his use of the tu form, and also because he did not immediately iden-
tify himself as a police officer. He demanded to see her identification and asked 
her why she was carrying only a satchel. “Are you smuggling drugs?” he asked. 
“Are you a prostitute, working for someone?” Humiliated, Safia answered that she 
was a journalist and had gone to Marseille for meetings. She showed him her carte 
d’identité and other identification issued by the publication for which she works. 
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“The craziest thing,” she told me, as her eyes welled up with tears, “was that the 
train was packed with people, white people. There were a ton of white people. And 
I was the one who was stopped. No one said a thing. The other passengers just 
stared at me.” Safia is pursuing legal means to address this incident, which as she 
explained, she has seen happen to too many racial and ethnic minorities in France. 
“You just can’t let these things go by,” she said. “How can people not think this is 
wrong?” Though in many ways Safia, like other immigrants and their descendants, 
has done the things that should allow her to fit in—she has worked hard, attained 
an education, and holds a stable, middle-class job—what’s clear is that these are 
not enough. She does not belong in France—because she is not white.
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Just as my respondents were citizen outsiders, I, too, as a non-French American citizen 
doing research in France, was an outsider. Yet in some ways my identity as a black woman 
created an insider connection with respondents because they also perceived me as a racial 
and ethnic minority. I outline my methodology in what follows and discuss how respon-
dents simultaneously viewed me as an insider and outsider. In line with the direction of 
previous work on the relationship between ethnographer and the “researched,” I consider 
the different boundaries I encountered in my fieldwork and how they relate to aspects of 
my identity, as well as the implications for the boundaries separating insiders and outsid-
ers and for the study of race and difference when one falls within them or outside them. 
Throughout my ethnographic research, my position as an outsider, as well as my personal 
identity, undoubtedly shaped how my respondents perceived me. I further consider the 
implications of this intersubjectivity for my research (Burawoy 1998) and for studying race 
from another national context. My own race and identity were directly implicated in con-
ducting this research. I argue that this further reveal how race operates and manifests itself 
within French society.
THE RESEARCH:  ENTERING THE FIELD,  FINDING PEOPLE,  AND 
NEGOTIATING AC CESS
I became interested in race, ethnicity, and identity in France for both personal and schol-
arly reasons. My own experiences as an African American living in Paris with a French 
family as an undergraduate in a study abroad program piqued my curiosity. My identity 
as an American citizen sometimes affected how I was treated as a black person in public 
spaces like restaurants, shops, or the subway. And other times, my visibility as a black per-
son led to differential treatment not experienced by other American visitors. Sometimes 
people stared at me, particularly in the bourgeois quartiers of the seventh and sixteenth 
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arrondissements. In the immigrant-concentrated quartiers of the eighteenth or nineteenth 
arrondissements or the banlieues of Seine-Saint-Denis or Nanterre, this was less common. 
My sociological imagination was beginning to develop and these questions remained in the 
back of my mind as I pursued my doctoral studies at Northwestern University. As I read the 
work of other sociologists on identity and difference in France (including Lamont 2002 and 
 Wacquant 2007), I became interested in better understanding the experiences of the North 
African second generation: individuals who have been shaped by their parents’ migration 
from former French colonies, though not immigrants themselves and born and raised in 
France. I wanted to understand the nature of minority identity in a society that does not 
recognize minorities based on identity categories and how this might intersect with mar-
ginalization from mainstream society. I moved to Paris in the fall of 2008 to study this topic.
I began recruiting potential participants by contacting over one hundred organizations 
and associations (in person, as well as via mail, telephone, and email) in Paris and its ban-
lieues and placing calls for participants on Internet forums and websites that cater to im-
migrant populations. I stated that I was a doctoral student in sociology interested in the 
experiences and identities of the North African second generation and sought potential 
contacts who might be able to provide information. I had an idea of the questions I would 
ask, but I was purposely broad in my call for potential participants because I wanted to 
appeal to as many as possible. To participate, individuals had to be born in France, be over 
eighteen years of age, live in the Parisian metropolitan region, and have at least one parent 
from the Maghreb.1
Recruiting potential participants proved more challenging than anticipated. Many peo-
ple said no. I believe this was because French Republican ideology makes the discussion 
of race and ethnicity—along with racial and ethnic identity—sensitive or taboo. Although 
I did not explicitly introduce race as a topic unless individuals themselves brought it up, I 
recognize that my visible identity as a black person perhaps made race and ethnicity more 
salient in our interactions than they might otherwise have been. In addition, on a practi-
cal level, it was sometimes difficult to identify potential respondents, because statistics in 
France are not collected based on race or ethnic origin. For example, there was no census 
data I could use to determine which neighborhoods were predominately maghrébin.
Because I am American, potential respondents were sometimes suspicious about why a 
non-French person, particularly an American and non-European, would be interested in 
studying them. What did I already know? What misconceptions did I have? This seemed 
particularly acute following the 2005 uprisings that swept banlieues throughout France. 
Several people told me that they were sick of the media asking immigrant-origin  individuals 
questions about their experiences and the reasons for the uprisings and then distorting 
them to the public. Others also told me that Americans had many misconceptions about 
race and discrimination in French society and about life in France. Their hesitation to talk 
to me was understandable.
The difficulties of obtaining a large respondent sample resulted in my use of snowball 
sampling (Small 2009). As an outsider—neither maghrébin nor French—this method was 
crucial for getting me “inside” the population I wanted to study. Building rapport with re-
spondents in the course of an interview, I would ask at the end for the names of others who 
might take part. Snowball sampling is a kind of nonprobability sampling that is useful for 
theoretical development, especially when knowledge about a particular subject is lacking. 
Methodological Appendix    107
It is often criticized for its empirical generalizability about an entire population yet can be 
useful for theoretical generalizability (Small 2009).
My sample is relatively homogeneous in terms of educational attainment and employ-
ment status. Many respondents were involved in the same professional and social net-
works.2 About half of them are connected to each as friends and acquaintances or because 
they are affiliated with the same organizations. This later became empirically and theo-
retically useful in considering how immigrant-origin individuals are marginalized owing 
to race and ethnicity, regardless of class or socioeconomic status. I was not initially focused 
on the middle-class segment, but from my first interviews, I remember being struck by how 
upward mobility (in socioeconomic status and educational and professional accomplish-
ments) had not altered experiences of exclusion in France. I further refined questions for 
subsequent interviews based on previous interviews and interactions.
I do not generalize the entire second-generation maghrébin population (or the second- 
generation immigrant population as a whole). I also acknowledge that the Parisian metro-
politan region is not representative of all of France, and the focus on the former may shape 
my discussion. Yet I believe the theoretical findings of this research (namely, the denial of 
cultural citizenship to nonwhite minorities on racial and ethnic grounds) have implica-
tions for second-generation minority populations in other contexts. In other words, I have 
sought theoretical generalizability, if not empirical generalizability (Small 2009).
INTERVIEWS AND PARTICIPANT OBSERVATION
I built rapport with my respondents mostly because of my French language skills and an 
awareness of French society I had gained by having lived there previously. Interview ques-
tions addressed a variety of topics related to the North African second-generation: iden-
tity; social networks; employment experiences; family history and parental background; 
relationship to parents’ country of origin; educational experiences; political views; percep-
tions of racism, discrimination, and marginalization; and religious beliefs and identities. I 
conducted interviews in French and digitally recorded them, unless respondents requested 
otherwise. I realized I had interviewed enough people, or reached the point of saturation 
(Small 2009), when discernible patterns and themes emerged from our interviews. A  native 
French-speaking transcriber later transcribed them. Though I am fluent in French, she was 
crucial to making sure I did not miss anything as a nonnative speaker. I analyzed the in-
terviews in French and translated them myself during the writing process. All names and 
identifying information have been changed in accordance with the Institutional Review 
Board’s Human Subjects guidelines.
In addition to these interviews with forty-five individuals, I also conducted about nine 
months of participant observation and field research with my respondents and other indi-
viduals, spending time with respondents’ families and attending various community and 
networking events, such as panel discussions. My ties to the Nanterre Association allowed 
me to supplement interviews with participant observation there. Association directors of-
fered to help me make connections for potential interviewees in exchange for volunteer 
work (eight of my respondents were in some way affiliated with the association). This so-
cial and educational community organization was founded in 1994 by five residents who 
grew up in the Petit Nanterre neighborhood, a public-housing complex. Petit Nanterre is 
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an impoverished neighborhood and considered a zone à urbaniser en priorité by the French 
government.3 The association’s employees, volunteers, and the population it serves are 
mostly North African and sub-Saharan African immigrant-origin individuals. In addition 
to my many interactions with them, I also taught English classes to elementary school, high 
school, and college students, as well as working adults. My experiences at the association 
were invaluable, allowing me to participate in the everyday lives of the population I was 
studying. I became very attached to the many individuals I met there.
NEGOTIATING IDENTIT Y IN THE FIELD
Ethnographers have long reflected on how their own social position and identity affects 
field research. Some have said that interactions with respondents may be thought of as 
“construction sites” (Cordell and Hartmann 2007) in which similarities and differences in 
social location cause the constant negotiation and renegotiation of identities on both sides 
(Horowitz 1986; Lacy 2008; Venkatesh 2002).
The interactions between the two parties inform the analytical process (Horowitz 1986; 
May and Pattillo-McCoy 2000), and reveal “localized systems of meaning” (Venkatesh 
2002, 103). Research participants sometimes view ethnographers as strangers; the curiosity 
of respondents, and the questions it generates, tell ethnographers a great deal about what is 
important to their subjects (Horowitz 1986). Venkatesh discusses the “social production of 
the ethnographer”; that is, the roles assigned to him by his informants in his fieldwork on 
Chicago’s South Side and the importance of their perceptions of his research and his role 
as a field-worker. Horowitz (1986, 410) says this is best considered as “interactional matters 
based on processes of continuing negotiation between the researcher and the researched.” 
The social position or identity of the researcher thus shapes how participants see the re-
searcher and how an ethnographer perceives or interprets the research setting (May and 
Pattillo-McCoy 2000).
Such processes also have implications for the negotiated boundaries between insiders 
and outsiders in field research and the similarities and differences between researcher and 
“researched.” In her ethnographic study of middle-class black Americans in the suburbs 
of Washington, D.C., Karyn Lacy (2008) discusses how ethnographers must bargain with 
participants to ensure their cooperation. As an African American, she found this particu-
larly challenging in the “cross-racial fieldwork” she conducted with white middle-class resi-
dents of the communities in which she was interested. Though she herself was middle-class, 
and also a graduate student at an elite university, her African American identity was most 
 salient in interactions with uncooperative white respondents. In such contexts, participants 
“may rely on either pervasive stereotypes or personal experiences with members of these 
groups as an indicator of how the ethnographer will interact with them” (2). In my case, 
respondents undoubtedly had prior exposure to Americans and black Americans, either 
personally, through the media, or in some other way, and that exposure may have shaped 
their perceptions of me.
Differences in citizenship and nationality add another layer of negotiations between in-
siders and outsiders when researching across national contexts. In her research on symbolic 
boundaries in France and the United States, Michèle Lamont describes how her identity as 
both French Canadian and an American professor shaped the interview process: “People 
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were more prone to explain their taken-for-granted assumptions, not knowing the extent 
to which I might, or might not, be familiar with their culture” (1992, 18–19). This is simi-
lar to what Caitlin Killian (2002) experienced researching maghrébin-immigrant women 
adapting to French society and what Paula Pickering (2007) experienced in her fieldwork 
with minorities in Bosnia. In Pickering’s case, this was particularly challenging in a context 
where ethnicity is considered a sensitive subject.
OUT SIDER STATUS:  AN AMERICAN IN FR ANCE
My own experience mirrored that of researchers who have conducted qualitative research 
in other countries (Killian 2002, Lamont 1992, Pickering 2007). As an American, I was an 
outsider to those I sought to study. Participants often assumed I was not knowledgeable 
about French society and history or maghrébin culture, and I was lectured on the history 
of French colonialism in the Maghreb, for example, as a result. Still, such interactions illus-
trated how maghrébin-origin individuals understand their place in French society.
My outsider status also exposed my naiveté. When first making connections with vari-
ous organizations, I once used the slang term for an Arab, beur, and was immediately made 
aware of its inappropriateness and pejorative connotations. One of my respondents, Mou-
rad, a thirty-year-old of Algerian origin, explained that the issue is not so much that beur 
is offensive, but that it implies that one is neither an immigrant nor French but in between, 
whereas most children of maghrébin immigrants just want to be thought of as French. This 
contrasts with his (and his maghrébin friends’) parents, for whom the term felt more apt. 
This proved to be a huge insight for understanding the plight of racial and ethnic minorities 
in France, and how they simply want to considered as French as anyone else. However, I 
do not know if my blunder would have been so easily excused if potential participants had 
thought me more knowledgeable about France.
The individuals with whom I worked assumed, merely by virtue of my American citi-
zenship, that I could exercise power and influence on their behalf. At the Nanterre Associa-
tion, people often thought I could facilitate their travel to the United States, either for work 
or school, through whatever connections they supposed I had (see Pickering 2007). This 
caused me to reflect on my status as an American citizen—apart from any other identity I 
have. As all research involves power relations (Ali 2006), I realized I needed to be conscious 
of how being American is read or understood by potential participants.
Such assumptions and stereotypes had also arisen during my first extended stay in 
Paris, in 2000, when I lived with a French family as a part of a junior year abroad pro-
gram. I encountered negative perceptions of Americans, which was heightened after the 
contested presidential election of George W. Bush that November. When I returned to Paris 
in fall 2008 to conduct the fieldwork for this book, there was a different energy, as many 
in France—across racial and ethnic backgrounds—were excited about the prospect of a 
Barack Obama presidency. Conducting research during Barack Obama’s presidential cam-
paign often led to conversations with respondents about race and racism, upward mobility, 
and multiculturalism and diversity that might not have otherwise occurred without my 
prompting. That I was an African American who had moved to Paris from Chicago imme-
diately connected me to this other African-American with ties to Chicago. Many potential 
respondents were curious about my perspective on Barack Obama and the prospect of his 
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election as the first black president of the United States. Was I excited about him, too? What 
did it mean to me and other African Americans? My conversations with respondents were 
also illustrative of the ways in which they thought about racial and ethnic representation. 
Many maghrébin-origin individuals identified with Obama and were excited about what 
his presidency would mean for racial and ethnic minorities in France, demonstrating how 
individuals marginalized based on race and ethnic origin could connect to racial and ethnic 
minority populations elsewhere. Many reflected on the similarities and differences between 
racial and ethnic minorities in France and in the United States.
I was repeatedly asked how I became interested in the maghrébin second generation. 
My status as an American complicated my attempt to blend in with others—I did not deny 
I was American, but I did not remind others of it, either. I quickly realized that I was con-
sidered an expert on all things American. Everyone at the Nanterre Association seemed 
to know me as “Jean, the American,” before I had even spoken with them. Mamadou, of 
Algerian origin and one of the directors of the association, told me that news travels fast 
in this community—everyone knows when something new has happened—in this case, 
my arrival as an American volunteer at the center. People could tell that I was not French, 
sometimes even without speaking: “Oh, it’s obvious you’re not from here . . . but I get that 
you want to be discreet,” he said. This resembles the experience of Natasha Warikoo (2011), 
who in her research in London high schools found that students often asked her ques-
tions about the United States and American culture, allowing her to build rapport with 
her participants.
INSIDER STATUS:  BEING A R ACIAL AND ETHNIC MINORIT Y IN FR ANCE
While I was an outsider in some ways, many respondents perceived me as an insider, as 
we shared a status as racial and ethnic minorities (see also Khanna 2011). In interactions 
with them, they often invoked aspects of my personal biography, whether to point out 
likenesses or differences in our two identities. I discuss later the implications of this shared 
racial and ethnic minority status for studying race and ethnicity from a different national 
context.
Conducting research during the campaign and eventual election of Barack Obama led 
to many discussions that might not have otherwise occurred. While I was conscious of not 
imposing an American-style understanding of race and ethnicity on the French context, 
some respondents invoked such a conception. Throughout my interviews, respondents 
made many connections and references to race and African American identity and culture. 
For example, one respondent began our conversation by repeatedly asserting that, although 
race is a big problem in the United States, it was not a big problem in France (and this was 
before I mentioned race or racism). He then went on to enumerate the ways in which he has 
been treated differently from others simply because he is maghrébin.
I also sensed there were moments when being a nonwhite American helped generate 
trust with potential respondents. A director at the Nanterre Association, not long after we’d 
met, said that if I ever needed a place to live, I could stay in one of the apartments in the 
public housing complex affiliated with the organization. I was surprised by his openness, 
despite our only recent acquaintance, and wondered whether his trust stemmed from the 
fact that I am visibly African American and a woman.
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IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERSECTIONS OF IDENTIT Y AND RESEARCH
Before I moved to Paris to conduct fieldwork, I was warned to be careful not to impose 
an American-style understanding of race and ethnicity on the French context, and not in-
terpret my observations based on my own experiences as a black woman. However, what 
I learned in my research and have shown here is that the researcher’s identity is not an 
impediment to ethnographic research. Rather, significant insights can be gained from how 
participants engage and perceive that identity.
This became particularly salient when conducting research related to race and difference 
across national contexts. I was often asked why I did not conduct research on racial and 
ethnic minorities in the United States. And there were questions as to whether, as a member 
of a racial and ethnic minority group myself, I could objectively study race and marginal-
ization. Would I naturally see race and racism through my own filter, rather than under-
standing race and other phenomena through the lens of those individuals under study? 
Yet this misses how minorities in another national context understand race and racism for 
themselves, and ignores the connections they make with racial and ethnic minorities in 
other countries. Other scholars have reflected on the potential complications of studying 
race in France from an American perspective. I agree with Keaton et al. (2012), who posit 
that speaking of race in France does not imply importing American-style constructs of 
race and ethnicity in the analysis.4 My experiences parallel those of minority researchers 
studying race within the United States, whose findings are filtered through their racial and 
ethnic identity but not the research itself (Trusdell 2013; Young 2008). For example, Young 
discusses how he can paint “a more compassionate, rather than intensely critical, portrait” 
of African American men as an African American man himself (2008, 200).
While researchers are never “ideologically free” (Keaton 2006), I remained vigilant, to 
the degree possible, about not imposing my own understandings on my respondents. In 
short, I believe that qualitative researchers should not fear the implications of their iden-
tities and social locations for the research process, including their relationships with the 




PREFACE:  BL ACK GIRL IN PARIS
1. The title to this preface is taken from Shay Youngblood’s novel Black Girl in Paris, 
about a black girl’s pilgrimage to Paris in the 1980s and her reflections on Langston Hughes, 
James Baldwin, Josephine Baker, and other African-American luminaries who had spent 
time in the city.
1 .  NORTH AFRICAN ORIGINS IN AND OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC
1. Manual Valls tweeted this in response in May 2015 to Robert Ménard, mayor of 
Béziers in the south of France, who claimed that he counted the number of Muslim children 
in town based on whether they had Muslim names (AFP 2015).
2. Gare du Nord, in the tenth arrondissement, is one of the main train stations in Paris 
and connects to the subway system. The surrounding neighborhood is known for the pres-
ence of African immigrants and their descendants.
3. Nadine Morano, in an interview on the television program Le Supplément, on the 
 Canal+ cable network, in May 2016. Les Républicains is a center-right political party 
formed in 2015, when former president Nicolas Sarkozy renamed the Union pour un move-
ment populaire (UMP).
4. All names and identifying information have been changed in the interest of confiden-
tiality per Human Subjects guidelines, by the Institutional Review Board.
5. When I began my research, I was initially surprised and confused about why respon-
dents would want to meet at Starbucks (where I conducted about a third of my interviews 
and meetings). Besides the fact that they are ubiquitous in Paris, I later realized that many 
respondents assumed that all Americans like Starbucks and likely they just wanted to make 
sure I was comfortable.
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114    Notes
6. When I indicate that someone is of a certain origin, I mean that he or she is a child 
of an immigrant from that particular country. In addition, I use maghrébin (the French-
language term for those from the Maghreb, the former French colonies countries of Tunisia, 
Morocco, and Algeria) and North African interchangeably. Many respondents also used the 
term arabe interchangeably with maghrébin and North African.
7. By assimilated, I am referring to the process or processes by which racial and ethnic 
minorities “come to share a common culture and to gain equal access to the opportunity 
structure of society” (Zhou 1997, 70). Language assimilation, socioeconomic attainment, 
and increasing rates of intermarriage are all commonly seen as evidence for contemporary 
assimilation (Alba and Nee 2003).
8. French Republicanism frames the French nation as one in which “only individuals 
are citizens, citizens are equal, and therefore all individuals are equal citizens” and “ethnic, 
regional, or religious categorizations are ignored” (Bertossi 2007, 3). Furthermore, there 
can be “no intermediate bodies between the state and the citizens. . . . As soon as the prior 
existence of these groups is acknowledged, there is nothing to prevent them from being 
considered minorities that are impossible to absorb” (Amselle 2003, 114). Part of the fear of 
communautarisme (communitarianism)—see note 9 below for a definition of the term—in 
France is a fear that it may result in the lack of any nation-based cohesion and community. 
Many of the questions concerning the meaning of French Republicanism center on the ten-
sion between universality and particularity (Schnapper et al. 2003).
9. Communautarisme is the often-feared idea in France that groups based on identity 
will only settle and interact among themselves, rather than integrating into society and be-
ing a part of the French national community (Fernando 2014). Multiculturalism is seen to 
lead to the fragmentation of society along identity lines, as in the United States, for example 
(Chabal 2015). This sentiment was often mentioned in my interviews as respondents con-
sidered the implications of different models of identity politics.
10. For an elaborated definition of laïcité see Gunn (2004) and Weill (2006). While 
secularism is not an exact translation of laïcité, I follow the trend of other scholars who use 
the terms interchangeably for simplicity’s sake (Kastoryano 2002, 2004).
11. This 1905 law withdrew state official recognition and financial support from religions 
while also guaranteeing citizens the right to form private religious associations (Bauberot 
2009; Laurence 2001; Scott 2007).
12. Over the years, several exceptions to this rule have been made, allowing the 
French state to, among other things, subsidize private religious schools and the building 
of mosques, recognize religious holidays, and create Muslim state organizations (Bowen 
2006; Laurence 2001).
13. Chabal (2015) rightly critiques Noiriel for his separating out of immigration from 
colonialism in this regard.
14. Wright (2004) further argues that blacks are framed as “other” so that whites can 
maintain superiority in Western culture and that Europe is more generally tied to blackness 
as a permanent “othered” category.
15. “The case of differential status in the French colonies offers an example of a breach in 
the continuity of the universalist principle. It demonstrates that, in the colonial context, the 
Republic made distinctions between individuals on the basis of their belonging to a specific 
group considered as ethnically different. Furthermore, post-colonial immigrants who came 
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to France in the second half of the 20th century carried this complex system of status with 
them” (Kastoryano and Escafré-Dublet 2012, 29).
16. In Black Skin, White Masks (1967), Frantz Fanon describes the relations between 
the white colonizers and the black colonized and its impact on racism in French Algeria. 
Colonized Algerians internalized the cultural values of the French colonizers and therefore 
began to see themselves as inferior to their colonizers. This was originally published in 1952 
in French as Peau noire, masques blancs. I elaborate on Fanon in chapter 5.
17. Unlike later periods of migration, prewar immigrant workers from the Maghreb did 
not permanently settle in France (Kaya 2009).
18. In 1945 the Haut Comité consultatif de la population et de la famille (High Commit-
tee for Population and Families) was created by de Gaulle to formulate immigration policies 
that were more favorable to groups considered more easily assimilated (often Europeans). 
Those policies never officially adopted (Derderian 2004; Lyons 2013). In 1946 the Office na-
tional d’immigration was founded. In 1958 the Fonds d’action sociale (Social Action Fund) 
was created to provide social services to immigrant workers (Amara 2006; Bleich 2004; 
Derderian 2004; Simon 1998).
19. I do not have space here to fully capture the horrific nature of the Algerian War 
of Independence (Chabal 2015; Dubois 2010). The Paris massacre of October 17, 1961, in 
which the police repressed Algerians, including drowning them in the Seine, is one ex-
ample. France did not acknowledge the conflict as a war until 1999. Other scholars have also 
detailed how the memory of this conflict and its suppression has been reinforced through-
out France, particularly as it concerns descendants of Algerian migrants (Silverstein 2008). 
In my own findings, respondents who are not children of Algerian immigrants but instead 
children of Tunisian or Moroccan immigrants similarly identified the brutal conflict be-
tween France and Algeria over its independence as an example of how France has long 
disregarded nonwhite individuals.
20. I use the term white French or white throughout this book to refer to Français de 
souche, or those of white native French-European origin, though I recognize that white is 
not an official term in French society. I am also following the lead of many respondents who 
use the term white. Even though much of the extant literature uses the term native French, I 
use the term white since children of immigrants born in France are also native French people.
21. While I do not discuss migration from former French colonies in sub-Saharan Af-
rica, including Senegal and the Ivory Coast, nor the descendants of this postcolonial mi-
gration in this book, there were similar increases in migrants from these regions in the 
postcolonial period (Bass 2014; Bleich 2001; Hargreaves 2003).
22. Some scholars argue that the spatial relationship between Paris and its banlieues is 
emblematic of the spatial relations between France and the colonial Maghreb (see Silver-
stein 2008; Stovall 2003).
23. The government also considered suspending family reunification, but that was con-
sidered a right in 1976 (Kirszbaum et al. 2009).
24. Barou (2014) notes how many of the immigration-related policies were influenced 
by racist ideologies.
25. Bleich refers to this as “antiracism without races” (2003, 50). As racism is framed as 
more of an individual act, the 1972 law targeted hate speech more than direct discrimina-
tion. This at least partially explains how the satirical publication Charlie Hebdo has been 
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charged multiple times for hate speech against Muslims and other groups. The collection 
of statistics based on race and ethnicity was reminiscent of the Vichy regime and gener-
ated opposition. The 1990 Gayssot law extended the 1972 law, by among other measures, 
establishing an annual report by the National Commission on Human Rights (Bleich 2001; 
Bleich 2004).
26. Mitterand’s politique de la ville (urban policy program) targeted social integration in 
zones urbaines sensibles (poor urban neighborhoods, or ZUSs) without mentioning race and 
ethnicity (Barou 2014). For example, a 1989 law created zones d’éducation prioritaire (edu-
cational priority zones, or ZEPs) to increase educational resources for students from disad-
vantaged regions (Calvès 2004; Dikeç 2007; Simon 1998). A 1991 law was passed to prevent 
residential concentration based on ethnic origin (though Republicanism did not permit use of 
the term ethnic origin) (Dikeç 2007). In 1999, in response to growing evidence of discrimina-
tory behavior, then-interior minister Jean-Pierre Chevenevent established the Commission 
départementale d’accès à la citoyenneté (Departmental Commission for Access to Citizen-
ship, or CODAC) in each département of France to monitor cases of discrimination. How-
ever, it had no significant impact (Hargreaves 2004). The debate over discrimination positive 
( affirmative action) also illustrates the complications in addressing issues related to ethnic 
origin in public policy and government programs (Bleich 2008; Sabbaugh 2002).
27. A 2001 report by the Haut Conseil à l’intégration (High Council on Integration, or 
HCI) distinguished between being “of Muslim culture” and “of Muslim religion” based on 
how often Muslims pray in mosques; it estimates that there are about one million Muslims 
“of Muslim religion” and about three million Muslims “of Muslim culture” (Bowen 2004c; 
HCI 2001). As of 2007, 33 percent of people from Muslim families are believing and practic-
ing Muslims and 38 percent are believing Muslims. About 35 percent of French Muslims 
live in the Parisian metropolitan region (Sebian 2007). In terms of practices, 61 percent of 
French Muslims pray every day; 23 percent attend mosque every Friday; 70 percent fast 
during Ramadan; and 62 percent only consume meat that is halal. Praying daily and going 
to the mosque on Fridays are the most discriminating distinctions between believing and 
practicing Muslims. Praying every day and going to the mosque on Fridays are the most 
discriminating distinctions between believing and practicing Muslims (IFOP 2009). Recent 
research has distinguished between an Islam en France (Islam in France) and an Islam 
de France (Islam of France) meaning “a simple presence of Muslims and their practices 
visible in France” versus “an Islam that is expressed and developed within national institu-
tions, assuming its freedom from ‘foreign’ influences, especially those of the homeland” 
( Kastoryano 2004, 82). This perspective focuses on how Muslim practice is constructed, 
adapted, and influenced by the French context (Bowen 2004b, 2004c, 2009; Fernando 2005; 
Gray 2008; Roy 1994).
28. When considering the ratios of regular mosque participation to regular church 
participation, French Muslims are as secularized as other French people (Hargreaves et al. 
2007; Kuru 2008; Laurence and Vaisse 2006). According to a 1999 study, about 18 percent 
of second-generation Muslim immigrants attend mosque regularly, about 28 percent attend 
mosque sometimes, and about 54 percent never attend mosque (Penn and Lambert 2009).
29. A 2006 Pew report found that French Muslims are equally likely to identify as 
French (about 42 percent) as they are to identify as Muslim (about 46 percent) (Barou 
2014). A 2007 Gallup poll similarly found that, while Muslims in Paris are more likely to 
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define religion as an important part of their lives than the Parisian population as a whole, 
that does not prevent them from identifying with being French (Nyiri 2007).
30. These changing demographics had political implications. For example, in the 1980s, 
and continuing into present society, the Front National (National Front), a Far Right po-
litical party led by Jean-Marie Le Pen, became increasingly popular and portrayed North 
African and sub-Saharan African immigrants as eroding French society (Fysh and Wolfreys 
2003).
31. According to the ministry’s website, promoting French identity included the follow-
ing: “both our historical heritage and the future of our national community. Article 1 of the 
Constitution of the Fifth Republic states that ‘France is a Republic—indivisible, laic [secu-
lar], democratic and social. She ensures equality in front of the law of all citizens, without 
distinction of origin, race or religion.’ The promotion of our identity constitutes a response 
to communitarianism and aims at preserving our nation’s equilibrium. Immigration, inte-
gration, and national identity are complementary and very closely linked. Because of her 
own identity, which she can be proud of, France had the means to integrate immigrants who 
respect our values and can organize immigration in a confident way.”
32. Official communications from the Ministry of Immigration, Integration, National 
Identity and Codevelopment emphasized the following questions: What does it mean to 
you to be French today? What do issues of diversity mean for our national identity? What 
are the elements, symbols, and values of French national identity? What is the role of the 
French nation? Why should we welcome and/or integrate foreigners into our Republic and 
our national community? What is the relationship among national, local, and European 
identities? What is the relationship between national identity and globalization? How can 
national identity be better celebrated?
33. For example, activist and journalist Rokhaya Diallo (Diallo et al. 2012), a child of 
Senegalese immigrants, wrote in Le Monde: “The national identity ‘debate’ questions only 
the identity of certain French who are a little too tan. The endless debates on secularism 
scrutinize those of us who are unfortunate enough to be Muslim. Nicolas Sarkozy’s Greno-
ble speech—whose objective was to strip targeted French of their nationality, as if it were an 
option—the difficulties we are confronted with in simply renewing an ID card if one of our 
ancestors is linked to a foreign country. All the above have created an enormous identity 
insecurity for us.”
34. I use the term postcolonial immigrants here to distinguish between immigrants to 
France who are attached to its colonial history and immigrants from countries without a 
colonial relationship with it.
35. Many Algerians fought for France during World War I, though they had no citizen-
ship rights and military service at that time was tied to French citizenship (Cornell and Hart-
mann 2007; Silverstein 2008). Moreover, according to Tetreault: “During the colonial period, 
French citizenship by colonial African subjects could often only be obtained when individu-
als renounced Islam, indicating a bias against religious and racialized difference” (2013, 533).
36. Moreover, “while Muslim Algerians gained French citizenship with the adoption 
of the Constitution of the Fifth Republic in 1958, a racialized distinction in legal status 
and representation was maintained. After independence, Algerian citizenship superseded 
French legal belonging, with nationality replacing racial-cum-religious status in setting di-
vides between populations” (Silverstein 2008, 28).
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37. In 1985 the Front National and the Rassemblement pour la République (RPR, a 
former right-wing political party associated with former president Jacques Chirac) began 
the process of revising the code de la nationalité to restrict the citizenship of those born 
in France of noncitizen parents (Silverman 1992). The Méhaignerie law, passed in 1993, 
amended the code de la nationalité to end the automatic acquisition of citizenship to chil-
dren of immigrants (Silverstein 2008; Thomas 2007).
38. According to the Haut Conseil à l’intégration (High Council on Integration, or 
HCI), integration refers to a reciprocal process between the immigrant and the host society 
that incorporates immigrants and their children while also maintaining social cohesion in 
“construction of a society that brings [its citizens] together around shared principles (lib-
erty of thought and conscience, equality between men and women) as they are expressed in 
equal rights and common responsibilities” (Chabal 2015, 91; see also Tetreault 2013).
39. There is a debate in France over whether to collect statistics on ethnic origin. As cat-
egorization is seen to promote differentiation among citizens, the absence of such statistics 
is often seen as protection against racism and discrimination. The 2007 Hortefeux law pro-
posed that data related to race and ethnicity should be gathered to monitor discrimination. 
It was later ruled unconstitutional (it also involved stricter requirements for naturalization 
related to family unification (Bass 2014). See Begag (2007), Bleich (2004), Escafré-Dublet 
and Simon (2011), Maxwell (2009), Ringelheim (2009), Sabbaugh (2008) Simon (2008), 
and Simon and Clement (2006) for more on the debate regarding ethnic statistics.
40. Concerning immigrant-origin individuals across generations, as of 2000, 7.3 per-
cent of the French population (including those born overseas and those who have acquired 
French nationality) has origins in the North African nations of Morocco, Algeria, and Tu-
nisia (Lamont et al. 2002; Préteceille 2008; Thomas 2007).
41. While I follow the convention of research on immigration in the United States in 
using the terms second generation and second-generation immigrants, I recognize their 
problematic nature. Constant (2009) notes that applying the term immigrant to the sec-
ond generation implies that their immigrant status is inherited. Throughout my research, 
the various terms I found used for this population include issus de l’immigration (people 
of immigrant background), enfants d’immigrées (children of immigrants), secondes généra-
tions (second generations), descendants d’immigrées (descendants of immigrants), jeunes 
d’origine maghrébine qui sont nés en France (youth of maghrébin origin who were born in 
France), franco-maghrébins, jeunes ethniques (ethnic youth), and descendants des peuples 
colonisés (descendants of colonized peoples). See Begag (2007) for more on terminology as 
it relates to this population.
42. I discuss my own experience with this term in the methodological appendix.
43. A 1999 survey of second-generation immigrants aged sixteen to twenty-five from 
Britain, France, and Germany found that 31 percent of second-generation maghrébin immi-
grants perceived discrimination at school and 35 percent of second-generation maghrébin 
immigrants reported experiencing racism (Penn and Lambert 2009).
44. Those who appeared to be of sub-Saharan African or Caribbean origin were six 
times more likely than whites to be stopped (OSI 2009).
45. As of 2008, about 21 percent of children of immigrants lived below the poverty line, 
in contrast to about 10 percent for children of French citizens and 28 percent for immigrants 
overall. The gap between children of European immigrants and children of French citizens 
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is narrower than the gap between children of African immigrants (including North African 
and sub-Saharan African) and children of French citizens (Lombardo and Pujol 2011).
46. First-generation Moroccan and Tunisian immigrant men had a 24.6 percent un-
employment rate, and women had a 26.1 percent unemployment rate. Among second-
generation Moroccan and Tunisian immigrants (ages 18–40), 19.4 percent of men and 21.7 
percent of women were unemployed. First-generation Algerian immigrant men had a 29.6 
percent unemployment rate and women 30.5 percent. Among second-generation Algerian 
immigrants (ages 18–40), 23.2 percent of men were unemployed and 22.3 percent of women 
were unemployed. Those of Italian, Spanish, and Portuguese origin had lower unemploy-
ment rates. First-generation Spanish and Italian immigrant men had an unemployment rate 
of 10.7 percent, while women had an unemployment rate of 13.8 percent. Among second- 
generation Spanish and Italian immigrants (ages 18–40), 10.3 percent of men were unem-
ployed and 13.5 percent of women were unemployed. Among first-generation Portuguese 
immigrants, men had an unemployment rate of 9.8 percent, while women had a 10.2 per-
cent unemployment rate. Among second-generation Portuguese immigrants (ages 18–40), 
14.3 percent of men and 16 percent of women were unemployed (Meurs et al. 2006).
47. The HCI was created in 1990, and in a report it defined integration as “not midway 
between assimilation and insertion, but a specific process where the active participation 
in the national society of varied and different elements is encouraged” (Barou 2014, 649)
48. In fact, according to a meta-analysis of field experiments of hiring discrimination, 
France has a higher rate of hiring discrimination than the United States, Great Britain, 
Netherlands, Canada, Belgium, Sweden, and Germany. Whites receive about 80 percent 
more callbacks than nonwhites. Compared to other groups, North African–origin indi-
viduals are discriminated against the most (Quillian et al. 2016).
49. Per the Institut national d’études démographiques (National Institute of Demograph-
ic Studies, or INED), the mainstream refers to “persons living in France who are not immi-
grants and who do not have an immigrant parent. This group includes French persons born 
abroad and their children, including colonial repatriates and their children born in metro-
politan France. It also includes the adult grand-children of immigrants” (Shon 2011).
50. Such African American professionals continually face an inability to fit in, exclu-
sion from the “club,” low expectations, shattered hopes, faint praise, coping fatigue, identity 
troubles, self-censorship and silence, and guilt by association (Cose 1994).
51. As Neckerman et al. (1999) show, the experiences of middle-class immigrants in the 
United States are often like those of the black middle-class, particularly in terms of navigat-
ing discrimination and conforming to white middle-class society. Their “minority culture 
of mobility” “draws on available symbols, idioms, and practices to respond to distinctive 
problems of being middle-class and a minority” (949). However, this framework exists in a 
context of multiple options for identity based on race, ethnicity, and national origin. In this 
book, I explore how this interplay among race, ethnicity, and middle-class status plays out 
in a context of limited identity options.
52. In response to their marginalized status, affected groups develop an altered 
worldview, indigenous organizations and leaders, and a comprehensive framing of their 
marginalization.
53. “It is this peculiar sensation, this double-consciousness, this sense of always looking 
at one’s self through the eyes of others, of measuring one’s soul by the tape a world that looks 
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on in amused contempt and pity. One ever feels his twoness—an American, a Negro; two 
souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body, whose 
dogged strength alone keeps it from being torn asunder” (DuBois [1903] 1994, 3).
54. Here I am also informed by Guinier and Torres’ (2002, 16) framing of race, which 
“both reinforces hierarchies of power and simultaneously camouflages those hierarchies,” 
in considering the multiplicative ways that race structures society.
55. As I later discuss, some respondents can cross symbolic boundaries around race and 
ethnicity owing to their lighter skin color or a traditionally French sounding name, which 
make their North African origins less apparent to others.
56. Here I am informed by Vilna Bashi Treitler (2013) regarding how ethnic groups exist 
on a racial hierarchy.
57. I am also informed by Wimmer’s (2013) call for an all-encompassing definition of 
ethnicity, which does not treat race as fundamentally different from ethnicity.
58. Ethnic identities can vary in terms of the degree to which they shape social 
life. For example, thick ethnic identities comprehensively organize social life, and thin 
ethnic identities minimally organize social life (Cornell and Hartmann 2007). Ethnic 
and racial identities are constructed and continually negotiated in various contexts or 
“construction sites” (170). (Lacy [2007] distinguishes between private versus public con-
struction sites.)
59. We can see this in the United Kingdom, as evidenced by Hall’s (2004) ethnography 
on working-class second-generation Sikh immigrants in London, which reveals how be-
coming middle-class British citizens involves reconciling their sense of being Sikh, Indian, 
and Asian. This is also evident in the United States. Sharma’s (2010) ethnography of middle-
class second-generation South Asians reveals how these “desis” adopt a diasporic ethnicity, 
as they invoke conceptions of black identities and blackness in how they self-identify.
60. Research reveals a typology of ethnic self-identifications, including those based on 
ethnic origin, those based on the nation, and a hyphenated identity (Ajrouch 2004; Chong 
1998; Eid 2008; Labelle 2004; Rumbaut 1996; Song 2010; Waters 1999; and Zéphir 2001). 
For example, Waters’ (1999) examination of second-generation West Indian immigrants in 
New York delineates three paths for identity construction—a black American identity, an 
ethnic American identity with some distancing from black Americans, and an immigrant 
identity outside of racial and ethnic categories. Waters’ typology reflects how individuals 
who are read by others as black come to understand and make sense of the black-white ra-
cial divide in America. Zéphir’s (2001) research on second-generation Haitian immigrants 
in New York similarly emphasizes how immigrant families socialize their children and that 
children understand American race relations as the process in which second-generation 
individuals develop their ethnic identity. In other words, the degree of their “Haitianness” 
depends on a multitude of factors, revealing the heterogeneity of ethnic identity among 
second-generation populations.
61. Moreover, Goldberg (2006) argues that when race is mentioned in Europe, it is at 
the level of embarrassment, as a reference to the past, as in the case of the Holocaust.
62. Lamont and Molnar (2002, 168) define symbolic boundaries as “conceptual dis-
tinctions made by social actors to categorize objects, people, practices, and even time and 
space. .  .  . Symbolic boundaries also separate people into groups and generate feelings of 
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similarity and group membership.” Symbolic boundaries become social boundaries when 
there is a consensus about their meaning and “take on a constraining character and pattern 
social interaction in important ways,” including “identifiable patterns of social exclusion or 
class or racial segregation” (169). Boundaries have “both a categorical and social or behav-
ioral dimension. The former refers to acts of social classification and collective representa-
tion, the latter to everyday networks of relationships that result from individual acts of 
connecting and distancing” (Wimmer 2013, 9). Boundaries are marked through  everyday 
interactions that privilege particular groups over others. Moreover, Alba explains how so-
cial and symbolic boundaries affect immigrant-origin individuals: “In all immigration so-
cieties, the social distinction between immigrant and second generations, on the one hand, 
and natives, on the other, is . .  . in a sense, a fault line along which other differences and 
distinctions pile up” (2005, 41).
63. I am also informed here by Bloemraad (2015, 60), who clarifies how citizenship 
boundaries work: “If citizenship is a boundary demarcation between those ‘inside’ and ‘out-
side’ the membership circle, that boundary is not a single wall, but rather a series of fences 
that can be more or less inclusive, and which can overlap our cut across each other.”
64. I build upon Stephen Castles’ (1997) notion of differential exclusion, in which im-
migrants and their descendants are incorporated into certain areas of society (such as the 
labor market) but not others (i.e., political participation). Regarding France, he argues that 
the Republican model “appears to be purely political, yet it brings culture in through the 
back door. There is no room for cultural diversity or for formation of ethnic communities” 
(9). In this sense, cultural citizenship extends the notion of multicultural citizenship, which 
is opposed to universal citizenship and recognizes that formal equality through citizenship 
rights can mask actual disadvantage and that therefore difference needs to be recognized 
and accommodated (Bloemraad 2015; Castles 1997; Joppke 2001). Thus, additional rights 
should be given to particular groups (Kymlicka 1995). My notion of cultural citizenship 
differs from this, in that I am not arguing for a differentiated citizenship, nor for different 
kinds of citizenship rights to be applied, but rather for recognition of the nonlegal dimen-
sions upon which citizenship is based (Beaman 2016b).
65. British sociologist T. H. Marshall (1950) first referred to citizenship as a status ac-
corded to full members of a community.
66. For example, Cohen (2010) discusses the second-class citizenship of African Amer-
icans, and Berry and Junn (2015) discuss the citizenship of racial and ethnic minorities, 
particularly Asian Americans and Latinos, as “silent citizenship.”
67. Or as Étienne Balibar (2004) argues, reinforcing a “virtual European apartheid” in 
which anyone connected to immigration is always seen as an immigrant.
68. While I have an almost even number of men and women in my respondent sample, 
I do not explicitly use gender as a variable of analysis in this study, primarily because the 
experiences of my respondents did not vary substantially by gender.
69. Most of my respondents with dual citizenship are of Algerian origin (including 
three respondents who were born in Algeria and immigrated to France as babies).
70. See the INSEE (2003) report Nomenclature des professions et catégories socioprofes-
sionnelles des emplois salariés d’entreprise.
71. I also made contacts for potential interviews at these events.
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2 .  GROWING UP FRENCH? EDUCATION,  UPWARD MOBILIT Y,  AND 
C ONNECTIONS ACROSS GENER ATIONS
1. This history is somewhat distinct from other maghrébin families because there was 
no arranged marriage (Begag 2007; Gray 2008).
2. It is worth noting the history of assimilation through French education for rural, 
regional populations who were considered culturally distinct in the nineteenth century. I 
thank Deborah Reed-Danahay for this insight (Reed-Danahay 1996).
3. Fernando (2014) refers to schoolteachers as “guardians of the Republican school.”
4. Diana particularly takes issue with the terms les issus de l’immigration (persons of 
immigrant background) and l’intégration (integration).
5. The three phases of the French educational system are école primaire (elementary 
school), for ages 6–11; collège (secondary school), for ages 11–15; and lycée (high school), 
for ages 15–18. Educational attainment levels in France are typically referenced in terms 
of the baccalauréat, or bac, exam (taken by lycée graduates, it is a prerequisite for higher 
education) and the number of years of school post-bac (“bac plus 7,” for example, means a 
student has passed the bac exam and has seven years of postsecondary education). There 
are three types of bac exam—general, technology, and vocational (students choose a track 
in high school that leads to one of these bac exams). The university system is divided be-
tween public universities and the prestigious grandes écoles (including the École nationale 
d’administration [ENA], Institut d’études politiques de Paris [Sciences Po], and the École 
des hautes études en sciences sociales [EHESS]); public universities admit all bac graduates. 
See Brinbaum and Kieffer 2005 and Brinbaum and Kieffer 2009.
6. One notable and recent exception is Sciences Po, which has an affirmative action–
style program for students from zones d’éducation prioritaires (ZEPs), areas considered 
educationally disadvantaged. This has been heavily debated and critiqued (Sabbaugh 2002; 
Sabbaugh 2011).
7. University of Paris 8, University of Paris 1, and University of Paris 2 are all public 
universities connected to the Paris-Sorbonne university system.
8. The full names of these universities are as follows: École polytechnique; École natio-
nale des ponts et chaussées; École supérieure des sciences économiques et commerciales; 
and École des hautes études commerciales.
9. For more on how an education at Sciences Po and other grandes écoles translates to a 
higher social status, see Bourdieu (1984) and Draelants and Darchy-Koechlin (2011).
10. See the Human Rights Watch report The Root of Humiliation: Abusive Identity 
Checks in France (HRW 2012) and the Open Society Institute report Profiling Minorities: A 
Study of Stop-and-Search Practices in Paris (OSI 2009) for more information on this.
3 .  MARGINALIZ ATION AND MIDDLE-CL ASS BLUES:  R ACE,  ISL AM, 
THE WORKPL ACE,  AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE
1. One example was how some middle-class respondents framed and understood the 
2005 banlieue uprisings as the only resort for their working-class and impoverished coun-
terparts many of whom are unemployed and underemployed.
2. On October 27, 2005, two teenagers—one of Tunisian origin and the other of  Malian 
 origin—were electrocuted in an electricity substation as they fled police in the Clichy-sous-Bois 
Notes    123
banlieue. They were apparently trying to avoid the constant police identity checks targeted at 
youths. A few days later, police shot a tear-gas grenade into a local mosque and refused to 
apologize. These events led to uprisings, which spread in banlieues throughout France for 
about three weeks. See Balibar (2007), Echchaibi (2007), Koff and Duprez (2009), and Schnei-
der (2008) for an overview of the vast literature on the causes of these uprisings.
3. See Bremner (2005), Bell (2005), Body-Gendrot (2007), Bowen (2006); Canet et al. 
(2008), Haddad and Balz (2006), Smith (2005a, 2005b), and Snow et al. (2007).
4. This was seen in the media and popular discourse surrounding the treatment of Af-
rican Americans by the police in the death of Sandra Bland in Hempstead, Texas, and Mi-
chael Brown and the ensuing uprisings in Ferguson, Missouri (Beaman 2015b).
5. This is the case in France, as evidenced most recently in the aftermath of the massacre 
at the offices of the satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo in January 2015, when many anti-
Muslim incidents and attacks occurred (Beaman 2015c).
6. Here I follow Brubaker (2013, 6), who cautions that “people who identify as Muslims 
(like those who identify with any other religion) do not identify only or always as Muslims, 
and they may not identify primarily as Muslims, though some of course do [italics in the 
original].”
7. Religious identity, as Eid (2008) describes it, encompasses familiarity with beliefs, 
observation of religious practices, and a sense of belonging to one’s religious culture.
8. A 2009 UNICEF report on children of immigrants found that many second- 
generation Muslims practice Islam in way that could be considered tolerant, inclusive, and 
largely secular (Kirszbaum, Brinbaum, and Simon 2009).
9. Mourad further explained that this apartment was too small to rent out, according 
to French law. The landlord, also an attorney, would have known that his attempt to do so 
was illegal.
10. Furthermore, as Silverstein (2008) has shown, residents from the cités are consid-
ered immigrants even when they are not.
11. One example of this euphemistic coding is in territorial affirmative action. According 
to Calvès (2004, 222), “in communities where problems and tensions tend to be translated 
in the language of race, the very categories of territorial affirmative action (young zone resi-
dents, ZEP pupils) do convey racialized denotations that are unambiguously perceived as 
such by institutional as well as local social actors. An implicit consensus filters the geograph-
ical criteria through the sifter of various religious, ethnic, and phenotypical denominations.”
12. Shon (2011) states that, as of 2008, 42 percent of migrants from North Africa, sub-
Saharan Africa, and Turkey live in the 10 percent of neighborhoods with the highest un-
employment rate. This number drops to 35 percent for children of these immigrant groups, 
pointing to a moderate intergenerational residential mobility.
13. Hicham clarified that the old mayor was reprimanded for abuse of power and is 
currently fighting these charges in court. I should also note that, while some of the HLM 
complexes will be demolished, Hicham and others signed an agreement with the current 
mayor that reduced the number of units to be demolished and would increase the number 
of housing units in the cité.
14. Sherwood (2009) highlights how the prominence of North African culture in Mar-
seille sets it apart from other French cities, and that residents’ identification with Marseille 
supersedes other identities and identifications.
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15. For more on housing discrimination, see Bonnal et al. (2012), Shon and Verdugo 
(2014), and Simon and Heath (2013).
4 .  FRENCH IS ,  FRENCH AIN’ T:  B OUNDARIES OF FRENCH IDENTIT Y
1. See Ernest Renan’s 1882 Qu’est-ce qu’une nation? et autres essais politiques.
2. I thank Marcus Anthony Hunter for this suggestion.
3. According to the Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques 
(National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies, or INSEE), as of 2013, foreign-
ers (individuals of foreign nationality born outside France) make up about 6.4 percent 
of the total French population and immigrants about 8.9 percent of the total French 
population.
4. Sarkozy is the child of a Hungarian immigrant father and a French mother. I discuss 
later in this chapter how his Hungarian origins do not stigmatize him in the same way my 
respondents’s maghrébin origins do.
5. For more on inequalities in the French school system, see Brinbaum and Kieffer 
(2009), Brinbaum and Lutz (forthcoming), d’Appollonia (2009), and Van Zanten (1997).
6. Still, some respondents (about 13.5 percent) do not invoke their North African ori-
gins or French citizenship and instead adopt an abstract identity (such as “citizen of the 
world”) or one based on where they grew up in France. For these individuals, being French 
and being maghrébin are not the most significant aspects of their identity.
7. By consciousness, I am referring to the “meaning people give to their acts through the 
symbols, norms, and ideological forms they create” (P. H. Collins 1989, 746).
8. In fact, more than a few respondents noted how their parents had them celebrate 
Christmas when they were children so they would not stand out.
9. It is important to note that, while banlieues are often a catchall for residential dis-
advantage (Hargreaves 2007), from a demographic standpoint, they are heterogeneous 
(Oberti 2007). Neuilly-sur-Seine and Orsay, for example, where fewer immigrant-origin 
individuals live, are not characterized as socioeconomically disadvantaged.
10. This correlates with large-scale studies of the maghrébin second generation, such as 
Simon (2012).
5 .  B OUNDARIES OF DIFFERENCE:  
CULTUR AL CITIZENSHIP AND TR ANSNATIONAL BL ACKNESS
1. Yade is a conservative French politician who emigrated from Senegal to France when 
she was eight years old.
2. I think my visible identity as a black American was invoked as a way to get at my 
closeness with or proximity to the people I was studying. I discuss this further in the meth-
odological appendix.
3. Individuals reject what is “available to them and [reach] out for those less-known 
samples, including aspects of South Asian and African diasporic formations in England 
and the Caribbean. In not being a biological concept tied to ancestry that is imputed upon 
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individuals, ‘desi’ becomes a racialized construct selected by some South Asians” (Sharma 
2010, 27).
4. James Baldwin, in his 1955 essay “Encounter on the Seine: Black Meets Brown,” ob-
serves the nuances of race and racism in Paris, where African American expatriates were 
appreciated in France but Algerians were not.
5. This is also reminiscent of how some African Americans consider themselves more 
American than white Americans because the labor of their ancestors built the United States.
6. Brown discusses how the French census, in its refusal to collect racial and ethnic 
statistics, is an instrument of racial and ethnic exclusion.
C ONCLUSION:  SACRIFICED CHILDREN OF THE REPUBLIC?
1. See http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-30767929.
2. See http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/08/world/europe/charlie-hebdo-paris-shooting.
html). See also https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/19/world/europe/dieudonne-mbala-
mbala-french-comedian-convicted-of-condoning-terrorism.html?_r=0.
3. Note how the French government has extended this state of emergency six times to 
November 2017 (http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-40105183), which makes it the 
longest state of emergency in France since the Algerian War of Independence. Under a state 






6. The title of this section is borrowed in part from William Julius Wilson’s The De-
clining Significance of Race: Blacks and Changing American Institutions (1980), although I 
argue that race and ethnicity remain significant in understanding France’s past and present 
society.
7. See http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/22/opinion/a-lingering-injustice-in-france.html?_ 
r = 0.
8. See http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/20/world/europe/france-minorities- assimilation. 
html?emc=edit_tnt_20160926&nlid=43222843&tntemail0=y&_r=0.
9. By identity politics, I am referring to how culture and identity are constructed to vari-
ous political ends. As Hill and Wilson articulate, “Identity politics refers mainly to the ‘top 
down’ processes whereby various political, economic, and other social entities attempt to 
mold collective identities, based on ethnicity, race, language, and place, into relatively fixed 
and ‘naturalized’ frames for understanding political action and the body politic” (2003, 2).
10. See http://redux.slate.com/cover-stories/2017/01/the-death-of-adama-traore-has-
become-frances-ferguson.html.
11. The inspiration for the title of my conclusion comes from an article by activist and 
journalist Rokhaya Diallo, “Zyed et Bouna: Enfants sacrifiés de la République” (Zyed and 
Bouna: Sacrificed children of the Republic), about the death of two adolescents that led 
to the 2005 uprisings; see http://www.regards.fr/web/Zyed-et-Bouna-enfants-sacrifies-de.
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METHOD OLO GICAL APPENDIX:  ANOTHER INSIDER:  
D OING R ACE FROM/IN ANOTHER PL ACE
1. I included three respondents in my sample who were not born in France because they 
immigrated when they were two years of age or younger. They self-identified as children of 
immigrants or second-generation immigrants. Other scholars define the second generation 
by their place of socialization and primary schooling (see Noiriel 1996), and I felt confident 
including them in my sample. All of them were naturalized French citizens.
2. Small (2009) has noted that another critique of snowball sampling is that respon-
dents are more likely to know each other or even “constitute a social network” which might 
be “more biased” than random sampling. He challenges this by showing how random sam-
pling involves the bias of nonresponse, meaning that only those individuals who are willing 
to participate are interviewed. Furthermore, he argues that samples may be considered “a set 
of cases with particular characteristics that, rather than being ‘controlled away’, should be 
understood, developed, and incorporated” (14) into researchers’ analytical understanding.
3. According to INSEE, as of 1999, about 86 percent of neighborhood housing is public 
housing.
4. I also want to challenge the idea that an American understanding of race and eth-
nicity is completely divorced from the European one, particularly when considering the 
history of slavery and colonialism in both Europe and the United States (Goldberg 2006).
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